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ABSTRACT
This dissertation Is concerned primarily with the ideas of 
Francis Hutcheson about the nature of man, economic life, and eco­
nomic institutions. Hutcheson Is considered by many to be the 
founder of the Scottish Enlightenment, and he Instructed Adam Smith 
at the University of Glasgow.
Hutcheson's positive contribution to moral philosophy centers 
around his doctrine of the moral sense which was an internal faculty 
capable of apprehending good and evil. The moral sense also dic­
tates certain duties of the virtuous life including the development 
of wise forms of polity and Improvement in technological processes. 
The analysis of economic phenomena constitutes a part of wise state­
craft and as such la included as a part of the life of virtue.
Hutcheson's philosophical work provides a strong underpinning 
for liberal economics, because freedom will allow many men to 
follow the dictates of the moral sense. Therefore, decent behavior 
as well as economic growth are to be expected from the extension of 
liberty. This la very different from the spirit of Handevllle’s 
prlvate-vlces-public-beneflts paradox.
Hutcheson's positive economic work added to the growing corpus 
of economic theory. His Importance for modern economists Is that 
policy recommendations are thoroughly grounded on objective princi­
ples of good. Economics and moral relativism do not go hand in hand
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for Hutcheson. He Is similar to modern liberals In the flexible 
approach he takes toward government, but Hutcheson's flexibility 
concerns the means to be used in attaining objective moral ends.
Hutcheson's treatment of wise statecraft as part of the life 
of virtue leads to the legitimation of economics as an autonomous 
science. The outstanding early example of an autonomous economic 
study came thirty years after Hutcheson's death with the publica­
tion of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith.
v
INTRODUCTION
Francis Hutcheson was born August 8, 1694. He was the son of 
a dissenting minister in Northern Ireland. Hutcheson studied the 
classics and scholastic philosophy In Ireland until 1711 when he 
matriculated at the University of Glasgow to study for the ministry. 
One of Hutcheson's professors at Glasgow was Gershom Carmichael, a 
well-known commentator on the works of Samuel Pufendorf, a famous 
German jurist. In 1717 Hutcheson returned to Ireland with Inten­
tions of entering the Presbyterian ministry. In 1719 he was li­
censed to preach by the Synod of Ulster.
By 1719 Hutcheson had some reputation in Northern Ireland as a 
classical scholar; and before he accepted a full-time pastorate, 
he was requested by clergymen in Dublin to open a private academy 
there. While in Dublin Hutcheson developed a friendship with Lord 
Viscount Molesworth, a wealthy merchant, diplomat, and student of 
philosophy. Molesworth was particularly a student of the philosophy 
of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury who first 
expounded the moral sense doctrine which was more fully developed 
by Hutcheson. Under the impetus of Shaftesbury's philosophy, Hutche­
son published his first book in 1725, An Inquiry Into the Original 
of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. In 1728 the Essay on the Passions 
further established Hutcheson's reputation as an author, and In
1
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1729 he was called to Scotland as Professor of Moral Philosophy at 
Glasgow where he Instructed Adam Smith,
Hutcheson served at Glasgow for sixteen years. While there he 
was a leader In the "new light" movement which sought to introduce 
learning and culture Into the Presbyterian Church. He was a thinker, 
lecturer, and writer upon ethical, political, and economic Issues.
He had a gift for teaching, and his writings were well known among 
intelligent readers of his day. He was beloved by students for the 
sincere interest he took in them. Hutcheson died while on a trip 
to Dublin on August 8, 1746 at the age of fifty-two.^
What contribution to knowledge can a study of Hutcheson's works 
make? To answer this question we must answer the more general ques­
tion; "What contribution to the knowledge of economics does the 
discipline of history of economic thought make?" The study of his­
tory of economic thought should be divided into two parts for pur­
poses of clarity - history of economic analysis and history of 
economic thought. History of economic analysis is the study and 
exposition of the historical development of the tools of technical 
economics. The value of this lies in gaining a deeper understanding 
of economics and the problems which early economists were attemp­
ting to solve. History of economic thought is concerned with 
changes in ideas about man and the world that has caused changes
^William Robert Scott, Francis Hutcheson (New York, 1966), pp. 
4-145. Also see the preface by William Leechman to Francis Hutche- 
son, A System of Moral Philosophy (Glasgow, 1755), pp. i-xlviii.
See the bibliography for a note on Hutcheson's works.
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la the understanding of economic activity and has Influenced the 
development of economic institutions. This type of study gradually 
leads to an understanding of ideas concerning man and the world that 
shapes contemporary economic institutions. An attack or defense of 
existing institutions can then take place based on the truth or 
falsity of underlying ideas.
The present study of Hutcheson will include history of economic 
analysis and history of economic thought with emphasis placed on the 
latter. My thesis is that with the development of modern science 
(Galileo, Descartes, Newton) the modern view of nature and reason 
arose which gradually replaced the ancient view of nature (Plato, 
Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas). The ancient view Is that nature is 
ar. internal principle of growth toward an end. For instance, nature 
directs that the end of an acorn when planted is an oak. The reason 
of man was thought to be sufficient for knowing or seeing the ends 
of things including the end for man himself. The modern view of 
nature is one of atoms in motion which are moved by external forces. 
Reason can aid us in understanding the movement of bodies but can 
tell us nothing of teleology.
Hutcheson occupies a mediate position between ancients and 
moderns. At timeB he views nature as an internal principle of growth 
toward an end, but he says explicitly that reason cannot apprehend 
the end. This seems to be inconsistent; for how can we know that an 
end exists if reason cannot know the end. Hutcheson solves this 
dllenma with his doctrine of the moral sense, an internal faculty
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(not reason) capable of knowing the ends for nan. Through the moral 
sense doctrine, Hutcheson develops his position as a proponent of 
political and economic liberalism, and a founder of a type of in­
visible hand doctrine. By means of the moral sense, Hutcheson de­
velops the idea of the life of virtue as part of the good for man, 
and through his treatment of the virtue of justice provides a power­
ful basis for the emergence of economics as an autonomous science.
The relationship between Hutcheson*s moral philosophy and his 
economics has never been explored adequately by other writers.
Most of the literature on Hutcheson deals only with his philosophy 
or only with his economics. The exception here Is W. R. Scott who 
deals extensively with Hutcheson's philosophy and includes one chap­
ter on Hutcheson's economics. However, rather than tie philosophy
and economics together, the chapter traces influences of Hutcheson's
2economics upon Smith's economics.
Some further points will be brought out In the course of the 
study concerning Hutcheson's relationship with the philosophical 
radicals and his contributions to positive economics. There is a 
misconception In many economic works that Hutcheson was unambigu­
ously moving toward utilitarianism. For Instance, Schumpeter
states; " . . .  his (Hutcheson's) basic social conceptions clearly
3reveal a utilitarian tendency." Schumpeter's statement la true
2Scott, Francis Hutcheson. pp. 230-243.
■1JJoseph A. Schumpeter, Economic Doctrine and Method, trans­
lated by R. Arls (New York, 1967), p. 22,
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to a certain extent, but 1 shall show that Hutcheson was not a 
utilitarian, although he unwittingly prepared the ground for Ben- 
tham's philosophical radicalism.
Concerning Hutcheson's economic work, 1 shall show that Hutche­
son played a role in making explicit the costs of production. This 
is to be contrasted with the alledged scholastic view that persons 
were to be allowed to charge for their products on the basis of 
each man's status. Actually this does not seem to be the scholas­
tic view, but the view Introduced by Pufendorf, Hutcheson, and 
Adam Smith.
The fourth chapter of this study will show Hutcheson's rela­
tion to Adam Smith both as a moral philosopher and as a liberal.
The last chapter will give an exposition of the positions of Hutche­
son and Smith as prototypes of modem liberals. The orientation of 
the thought of these two men toward economic growth may present 
problems for the liberal programme in light of current discussion 
of the limits to growth. The wisdom which can be gained from the 
works of Hutcheson and Smith in relation to these current discus­
sions will be presented.
ANCIENTS AND MODERNS 
In order to adequately understand Hutcheson's work as an econo­
mist and political philosopher. It Is necessary to grasp the salient 
points of difference between ancient and modern political philosophy. 
In both cases ideas about nature and reason have a definite Impact on 
discussions of the state and economic activity. Hutcheson acts as 
a mediator between ancient and modern outlooks on the world; and in 
the development of his own philosophy he plays an important role in 
founding liberal economics and In setting up economics as an auto­
nomous sphere of Inquiry. Let us turn now to an exposition of the 
philosophical traditions from which Hutcheson drew his particular 
outlook.
Ancients
In attempting to understand the political philosophy of the 
ancients we must become familiar with the term "natural law". The 
ancient Greeks are generally credited with the founding of the 
natural law tradition. Plato and Aristotle are certainly the great 
exponents of this tradition, The first task then Is to seek some 
understanding of the natural law as taught by these two philosophers. 
Natural law obviously has something to do with nature, but how 




For those things are natural which, by a continuous 
movement originated from an Internal principle, 
arrive at some completion: the same completion is 
not reached from every principle; nor any chance com­
pletion, but always the tendency in each is towards 
the same end, If there Is no Impediment. ̂
Nature Is a cause that directs toward an end or purpose. "It
Is plain then that nature Is a cause, a cause that operates for a
2purpose." Nature propels any phenomenon toward Its end. Nature 
Is an internal principle of growth. This Is an Important point In 
the ancient philosophy and an important principle of the natural 
law. Since natural things have this Internal principle that in­
clines them toward some end, man, as part of nature, is also In­
clined toward an end. If we speak of "human nature" we are speaking 
of the tendency of man's activity which leads to some end. It Is 
possible to speak of a man acting against nature if he acts in such 
a manner as to thwart the attainment of the natural end of man. We 
can also speak of the good life as being In harmony with nature or
acting according to nature, and the rules or maxims which direct us
1toward the good life may be called the natural law.
^■Aristotle Physlca 199b 15-18.
2Ibid., 199b 32.
^"The good life simply, Is the life in which the requirements 
of man's natural Inclinations are fulfilled in the proper order to 
the highest possible degree, . . . The good life is the perfection 
of man's nature. It is the life according to nature. One may there­
fore call the rules circumscribing the general character of the good 
life 'the natural law.'11 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History 
(Chicago, 1953), p. 127.
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The difficult problem Is to discover the end of man. How can
we proceed? Aristotle states that: "Presumably, then, we must begin
4with things known to us." The quest for the good and the natural 
law Is not a purely rationalistic one In which we make logical Infer­
ences from definitions, but Is one In which the good for man must 
be arrived at through observation of human actions and their conse­
quences, conversation with mature men, and the use of judgment as
well as careful reasoning.
Man's reason can know the end for man. This is a crucial point 
in the ancient outlook on the world. Man has an internal principle
of development which inclines him toward an end, and reason is cap­
able of knowing the end. This reasoning toward the truth Is allied 
with the concept of the dialectic in Plato. The dialectic is the 
intellectual progress toward the ultimate truth.
Dialectic, in fact, is the only activity whose method 
is to challenge its own assumptions so that it may 
rest firmly on first principles. When the eye of the 
mind gets really bogged down in a morass of Ignorance,
dialectic gently pulls it out and leads it up, using
the studies we have described to convert and help It.
These studies we have often, through force of habit, 
referred to as branches of knowledge. but we really 
need another term, to Indicate a greater degree of 
clarity than opinion but a lesser degree than knowledge-- 
we called it Reasoning earlier on.^
These two principles are Important in understanding the ancients 
and natural law In its classic form. 1. Nature is an Internal
^Aristotle Ethlca Nlcoroachea 1095b 3-4.
-*Plato The Republic 533. We know from Plato's analogy of the 
divided line that the knowledge spoken of here consists in part of 
knowledge of the ultimate truth of nature. Ibid., 510-511.
9
principle of growth Inclining the object toward an end. 2. Rea­
son can know ends including the end for man. With these principles 
in mind, the ancients proceed to build up a body of natural law; 
that is, a body of specific maxims for man and state which will aid 
men in their pursuit of their natural, highest good. Let us look 
at specific examples of natural law theorizing by Plato, Aristotle, 
and St. Thomas Aquinas.
Aristotle states that the end toward which man tends is happi­
ness. Happiness is that for the sake of which all things are done. 
Happiness consists of virtuous activities; and a man who engages in 
virtuous activities can never be truly miserable, although he may 
not reach the highest happiness which Aristotle calls blessedness.7 
If a series of highly unfortunate events befall an Individual, he 
may not reach the state of blessedness, although he will remain 
happy through the exercise of virtue. Concerning virtue Aristotle 
states: "Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in
which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the
gintermediate is praised and is a form of success; . . . "
**". . . happiness is among the things that are prized and per­
fect. It seems to be so also from the fact that it is a first
principle; for it is for the sake of this that we do all that we
do, and the first principle and cause of goods is we claim, some­
thing prized and divine." Aristotle Ethlca Nlcomachea 1102a 1-4.
7Xbid., 1100b, 33-1101a 8.
8Ibid., 1106b 24-26.
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Virtue Is a mean or middle way between excesses. Courage Is a 
virtue and is Intermediate between recklessness and cowardice. In 
order to be virtuous and move toward the natural end of man which is 
happiness, we must control and direct our passions toward an inter­
mediate course between excess and defect of the passion. We are 
quite prudently warned, however, that the principle of the golden 
mean cannot be applied in all cases: "But not every action nor every
passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply
badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the cases of actions
gadultery, theft, murder; . . . "
We might legitimately Inquire of Aristotle as to how he knows 
that the virtuous life and the golden mean are conducive to happiness 
and that adultery, murder, envy, and spite are absolutely bad. 
Aristotle's reply would be that these matters cannot be absolutely 
proved or demonstrated mathematically, and that we should never de­
mand more certainty than the subject matter permits.*'® It would seem 
that the temperate life is the right way to achieve happiness be­
cause after much observation of human behavior, it seems that intem­
perance leads to unhappiness and temperance to happiness. Likewise, 
murder and other groSB actions and passions are condemned on the 
basis of the observation that murder leads to the unhappiness of 




The living of a virtuous life, then, allows us to achieve our 
natural, proper end as men. In fact, in order to act according to 
nature, it is our duty to engage in activities conducive to the
attainment of the end prescribed for us by n a t u r e . P l a t o  concurs
in this view and equates the tempering of the passions with the 
proper function of man.
Then we must remember that each of us will be
just, and do his duty, only if each part of him is
performing its proper function , . .
So the reason ought to rule, having the ability 
and foresight to act for the whole, and the spirit 
ought to obey and support it , . .
When these two elements have been brought up 
and trained to their proper function, they must be 
put in charge of appetite, which forms the greater 
part of each man's make-up and is naturally insati­
able. They must prevent it taking its fill of the 
so-called physical pleasures, for otherwise it will 
get too large and strong to mind its own business 
and will try to subject and control the other ele­
ments, which it has no right to do, and so wreck
life entirely.12
The man who lives the virtuous life is happy. The virtuous 
life consists of contemplative activity and performance of practical 
virtue. The life of practical virtue does not produce the highest
^"All thingB are parts of one single system, which is called 
Nature; the individual life is good when it is in harmony with 
Nature, In one sense, every life is good when it is in harmony with 
Nature, since It Is such as Nature's laws have caused it to be; but 
In another sense a human life is only in harmony with Nature when 
the individual will is directed to ends which are among those of 
Nature. Virtue consists in a will which is in agreement with Na­
ture." Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York, 
1945), p. 254.
l^Plato, The Republic, 441-442.
12
happiness, but it does produce happiness of a second type. This 
happiness comes from typically human acts performed In their proper 
manner and relationship.
But In a secondary degree the life In accordance 
with the other kind of virtue (practical virtue) Is 
happy; for the activities in accordance with this 
befit our human estate. Just and brave acts, and 
other virtuous acts, we do in relation to each other, 
observing our respective duties with regard to con­
tracts and services and all manner of actions and with 
regard to passions; and all of these seem to be typi­
cally human.13
The virtuous life is a type of action, ", , , the life of the 
man who is active in accordance with virtue will be happy."*4 How­
ever, the highest happiness that man can achieve is through the con­
templative life. ". . . the activity of God, which surpasses all 
others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activi­
ties, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the 
nature of happiness."15
Perhaps we can understand more fully the activity of contempla­
tion which leads to happiness from the following statement by Eric 
Voegelin who is interpreting Aristotle on this point:
The happiness of theoretic activity is highest because 
contemplation Is the highest function in man; and It 
is the highest function because it Is the function of 
the highest part In the soul of man, that is, of the 
intellect (nous). The activity (energeia) of the




Intellect Is Identified as the theoretic activity 
(theoretike energeia) (1177a 17 ff), The meaning 
of 'highest* or 'perfect' is further elucidated by 
the designation of nous as the divinest part (to 
thelotaton) in man; the activity of the dlvlnest 
part, thus, becomes the dlvlnest activity; and the 
pleasure accompanying it becomes the dlvlnest plea­
sure, the true eudalmonia.
The contemplative life necessarily requires leisure In which to 
contemplate, and the leisured life becomes for Aristotle the highest 
type of life to which citizen or state could aspire. "Since the 
end of Individuals and of states is the same, the end of the best 
man and of the best constitution must also be the same; it is there­
fore evident that there ought to exist in both of them the virtues 
of leisure; . . .
These natural lav thinkers also had an idea as to the proper 
role of the state. If the end of man Is happiness, then the purpose 
of the state is to aid man In attaining this end through the encour­
agement of a virtuous life in the citizenry. Socrates states in The 
Republic that if the citizens are educated toward goodness first, 
then all other problems of legislation and administration become 
much s i m p l e r . I f  a state does not educate toward the good then 
perhaps any form of polity that allows the sustaining of life is 
acceptable. Aristotle states; "But a state exists for the sake of
■^Eric Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (Baton Rouge, 1972), p.
305.
l^Aristotle, Politics, 1334a, 12-15.
^®Plato, The Republic, 425-426.
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a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were
the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they
cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free
U , ,,19choice."
However, the sustaining of life does have importance for the 
state. Economic activity and material goods are necessary for life 
and even play a role in the virtuous life. "Let us assume then that 
the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of vir­
tue, when virtue has external goods enough for the performance of 
20good actions."
The endowment of a state with goods Is not primarily a matter 
of rational calculation and scientific endeavor but a matter of 
luck. Rational and deliberate actions belong primarily to the sphere 
of virtue. ". . , May our state be constituted in such a manner as 
to be blessed with the goods of which fortune disposes (for we ac­
knowledge her power); whereas virtue and goodness In the state are
21not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge and purpose."
Goods are Important, and they play a part in the virtuous life, but
certainly they are not the cause of happiness or of virtue. They are
22included in a hierarchy of ends but are not the end itself.
^Aristotle, Politics, 1280a, 31-34.
20Ibld., 1323b, 40-1324a, 4.
21Ibid., 1332a, 29-31.
22StrausB, Natural Right, pp. 126-127.
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The Greeks are not saying that statecraft and economic policy 
are Impossible; they do warn against the consequences of excluding 
the deliberate pursuit of the virtuous life. This warning seems to 
be bound up with the ancient cycle of hubris and nemesis, which is 
that the over-stepping of natural limits ultimately brings bad luck 
and destruction. This point is illustrated by the ancient Greek 
historian Herodotus in the story of Polycrates, the ruthless master 
of Samos and conqueror of many islands and cities. Polycrates was 
a man whose calculations in matters of war and fortune continually 
met with success. However, his friend Amasls, the king of Egypt, 
warned him to part with something of the highest consequence to his 
happiness. It was Amasls' opinion that no man had a continual streak 
of good luck without also having a calamitous end. Polycratea heeded 
Amasls* advice and cast his favorite ring Into the sea, only to have 
it returned to him In the belly of a fish which had been caught by 
a local fisherman. Polycrates wrote of the incident to Amasls, and 
Amasls then broke relations with Polycrates, for he was certain that 
calamity awaited such a person of uninterrupted good fortune. The 
ending of the story is predictable, Polycrates was Infamously tricked 
and killed by Oroetes, the Persian governor of Sardis. Polycrates'
23pride In his statecraft and fortune had brought about his downfall.
^Herodotus, Ancient History, Book III XXXIX-CXXV.
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We must be careful to keep these different aspects of life In
perspective. Those parts of our natures that tend to get out cf
control such as avarice must be kept In check. If not checked this
passion may grow to such an extent that all other legitimate ends
are obliterated. Aristotle claims that the origin of this avaricious
disposition is in the intent of men to live only, not to live well,
that is to pursue the good life of virtue.^ If men simply live,
the senses present a virtually unlimited demand for gratification
which leads to an unlimited demand for the means of gratification.
The remedy for this passion of avarice is, again, education
toward the virtuous life. Aristotle goes further than this, and in
a quite illiberal manner advocates repression of those who cannot
control this appetite.^ Virtue is also a political necessity; for
2 ftit binds the citizens together in unity. The law for Aristotle is
24Aristotle, Politics. 1257b, 37-1258a, 2.
25"And the avarice of mankind is insatiable; . . . men always 
want more without end; for it is the tiiture of desire not to be 
satisfied, and most men live only for the gratification of it. The 
beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as to train 
the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the 
lower from getting more; . . ." Ibid., 1267a, 41-1267b, 9,
^"It la clear then that a state is not a mere society, having 
a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and 
for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state 
cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, 
which is a community of families and aggregations of families in 
well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such 
a community can only be established among those who live in the same 
place and Intermarry. Hence arise in cities family connexions, 
brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. 
But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together 
is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are
17
more Chan groundrules for legitimate activity or an economic insti­
tutional framework. The law seeks to promote unity and virtue among
the citizens in accordance with the legitimate end of the state.
. . . virtue must be the care of a state which is truly
so called, and not merely enjoys the name: for without
this end the community becomes a mere alliance which
differs only in place from alliances of which the mem­
bers live apart; and law is only a convention, 'a surety 
to one another of justice,' as the sophist Lycophron says, 
and has no real power to make the citizens good and just.2?
Finally, in regard to these early natural law ideas about the 
state and society, the state's existence was viewed as a natural 
outgrowth of man's existence, not an artificial one. This viewpoint 
differs from later contract theorists such as Hobbes and Rousseau. 
The state arises out of the union of small villages for the purpose 
of sustaining life. The state continues in existence for the pur­
pose of the good life for its citizens, that is the life of virtue. 
If the original establishment of villages is a natural process, then 
the establishment of the state is also a natural process for the 
state is the end of villages. °
the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and 
villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a 
happy and honourable life," Ibid. 1280b 30-1281a 2.
27Ibid., 1280b 6-11.
2®"When several villages are united in a single complete com­
munity, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the 
state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, 
and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And there­
fore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, 
for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end." 
Ibid., 1252b 27-30.
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The early natural law thinkers viewed the state as natural, not 
conventional. Likewise justice and virtue had a natural, objective 
basis, not merely a conventional one. The matter of elucidating the 
natural law in many specific cases was undertaken by the church 
fathers, However, the outlook of the whole range of natural law and 
later natural right thinkers can be basically identified with a quo­
tation from The Republic: "Justice is much more valuable than gold,
u29■ * •
With the advent of the Christian era the natural law took on 
the added dimension of divine revelation. Revelation provided the 
framework for the medieval thinkers in which philosophizing could 
take place; and ", . , they sought to explain the natural and the 
human by reference to such tenets of faith as God, creation, the 
Incarnation, using philosophical argument to do so,"JW An attempt 
was made by the scholastics to use reason as a complement to the 
tenets of faith. This leads to the concept of right reason which 
is the notion that the moral correctness or justice of a situation 
can be found through the use of reason. Reason is not used in this 
sense as the means of obtaining some arbitrarily specified end,
but is used as having the ability of apprehending the end itself,
^Plato, The Republic, 336,
^°Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought (Aylesbury, England: 1970),
p. 11.
31"The effort to harmonize reason and faith was the motive force
of medieval Christian thought; . . Ibid., p. 19,
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The concept of right reason Is very important in the scholastic
treatment of the natural law. The church fathers employed this con­
cept for obtaining a knowledge of the natural law, and for clarify­
ing and explaining the moral law.
The close assocatlon of morals and law is the distin­
guishing mark of natural law theory throughout Its 
long history. The very enunciation of natural law la 
a moral proposition. The first precept of natural 
law, says Thomas Aquinas, is 'to do good and to 
avoid evil.' And Grotius declares that 'the law of
nature is a dictate of right reason which points out
(lndleans) that an act . . . has In it a quality of
moral baseness or moral necessity.
However, right reason was not the exclusive vehicle for finding 
truth. The church fathers had an additional lss^e with which to 
deal, which the Greeks and Romans did not. That issue was the matter 
of divine revelation as indicated through the Scriptures. If the 
knowledge of the end for man and of moral precepts Is divinely re­
vealed, what purpose can be served by the employment of reason to 
illuminate the morality of a particular action? Different positions 
can be taken in regard to this question, One position is that rea­
son occupies a subservient position under the command of faith. 
Another position is that reason is autonomous and is needed to pro­
nounce judgments on complicated moral issues that are not specifi­
cally stated as revealed truth. Also we might have to appeal to
32A. P. D ’Entreves, Natural Law (New York, 1965), pp. 80-81,
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right reason in obtaining the acquiescence of non-believers to cer­
tain moral precepts.
St. Thomas Aquinas is the great scholastic expounder of the 
natural law. Thomas took natural phenomena as being the surest 
evidence available of reality. The sensible world was used to appre- 
hend the transcendent world and the natural law. Reason Is an aid
in understanding proper moral and ethical conduct. However, man 
cannot legitimate moral conduct by his own authority. The good has 
an objective existence apart from man, although it may be known from 
the evidence of nature.
Natural law Is the token of the fundamental harmony 
between human and Christian values, the expression 
of the perfectabillty of man and of the power and 
dignity of his reason. But the system of ethics 
which Is based on these assumptions cannot properly 
be called a 'rationalist' system. The proud spirit 
of modern rationalism Is lacking. There Is no asser­
tion of man's self-sufficiency and Inherent perfec­
tion. There is no vindication of abstract ’rights', 
nor of the autonomy of the individual as the ultimate 
source of all laws and of all standards.
33"Perhaps we can best describe St. Thomas' outlook by saying 
that, whereas all Christian thinkers before him had sought to explain 
the effect by the cause, he started with the effect: that is, in­
stead of trying to explain God in his own transcendent terms, he 
began with what could be known from His creatures. He did not dis­
miss the sensible world as a shadow and its existence as unreal; but 
as the surest evidence open to us of reality." Leff, Medieval 
Thought, p. 214.
'Entreves, Natural Law, p. 45.
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Reason, of course, has the connotation of right reason for St.
Thomas; It Is a vehicle to be conscientiously used to attain the
truth of moral Issues.
Now, since the good has the rational character of an 
end, and evil has the contrary meaning, as a consequence 
reason naturally apprehends all things to which man 
has a natural Inclination as goods and, therefore, as things 
things to be sought after In working, and their con­
traries are apprehended as evils and as things to be 
avoided.35
Notice here the themes of classic natural law. Man has a natu­
ral Inclination toward goods, or an internal principle is operating 
which Inclines us toward ends. Reason Is quite capable of apprehend­
ing the ends. In this general outlook Thomas Is explicitly following 
the Greeks. However, while recognizing the efficacy of natural rea­
son to the attainment of moral truth, St. Thomas never denigrates 
faith or revelation, but on the contrary, he holds that revelation 
can give a super clarity to reason.
. . .  We have a more perfect knowledge of God by 
grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus.
The knowledge which we have by natural reason re­
quires two things: images derived from sensible 
things, and a natural Intelligible light enabling 
u b  to abstract Intelligible conceptions from them.
Now In both of these, human knowledge Is assis­
ted by the revelation of grace.36
St. Thomas in a manner similar to the Greeks held that the good 
for man was the end for which man was naturally appointed. The end
35st. Thomas Aquinas, The Su™>* Tehologlca XI Q. 94 Art. 2. 
36Ibld., II Q. 12 Art. 13.
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for man on earth was the beatific vision or an experience of com­
plete communion with God; this is the summum bon uni. If there were 
no highest good, the daily chores of life would be sufficient for 
man's existence; but the summum bonum draws everything toward it, 
and all activities aim (or should aim if man is to achieve his 
natural end) at Its attainment.
The state is natural to man's existence, for man is by nature a 
social animal. Group habitation makes the procuring of life's neces­
sities an easier task. Reason and nature dictate this type of 
life.^ The state, like man, has an end which is to enable men to 
live the good life. The good life according to St, Thomas sounds 
very much like that of Aristotle. The good life consists in acting
-^"Now, the end of our desires is God; hence, the act whereby 
we are primarily joined to Him is basically and substantially our 
happiness. But we are primarily united with God by an act of under­
standing; and therefore, the very seeing of God, which is an act of 
the Intellect, is substantially and basically our happiness." St. 
Thomas Aquinas Quodllbetal Questions VIII 9, 19, c.
38"it ig the carpenter's business to repair anything which might 
be broken, while the pilot bears responsibility of bringing the ship 
to port. It is the same with man. The doctor sees to it that a 
man's life is preserved; the tradesman supplies the necessities of 
life; the teacher takes care that man may learn the truth; and the 
tutor sees that he lives according to reason.
Now if man were not ordained to another end outside himself, 
the above-mentioned cares would be sufficient for him. But as long 
as man's mortal life endures there is an extrinsic good for him, 
namely final beatitude which is looked for after death In the enjoy­
ment of God, . . St. Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship II, 104-105.
39Ibld., I, 5.
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virtuously and, as a secondary matter, in having a sufficient supply 
of bodily necessities.4® The procuring of bodily needs may from time 
to time give occasion for sin, and since sin Is to be avoided in the 
life of virtue, the doctors were forced to make pronouncements on the 
legitimate spheres of economic activity. The main body of opinion 
dealt with the just price and usury.
There has come into existence a large and somewhat erroneous 
literature on the just price doctrine of the scholastics. The fal­
lacious view is associated with the names of such notable scholars 
as John M. Clark and R. H. Tawney. This view is that the Just price 
was intrinsically bound up with medieval ideas of a social hierarchy, 
and was a charge which enabled the producer to support himself and 
his family in a style commensurate with his status in society. This 
position is certainly taken in the works of Samuel Pufendorf, Francis 
Hutcheson, and to some extent Adam Smith. However, it will be shown 
that the recognition of a legitimate charge due to status is a part 
of the development of economic analysis.
Societies were built on status long before the middle ages, but 
it is fairly evident that the scholastics did not consider a man's 
status in their pronouncements on the Just price. The authority 
usually cited in support of this view is Henry of Langensteln, the 
Elder (1325-1397). Raymond de Roover claims that Langensteln was
40Ibld.. II, 118.
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at best a lightweight scholastic who was little quoted by later
^  - 41doctors.
Impressive evidence is marshalled by de Roover and another
contemporary scholar, John T. Noonan, in support of the thesis that
the Just price, though occasionally an administred price, was usually
the prevailing market price.
According to the majority of the doctors, the Just price 
did not correspond to cost of production as determined 
by the producer's social status, but was simply the cur­
rent market price, with this Important reservation: in 
cases of collusion or emergency, the public authorities 
retained the right to Interfere and to impose a fair 
price.42
Albert the Great (St. Thomas' teacher) identifies the Just price
as: "What goods are worth according to the estimation of the market
/ 1at the time of sale." John Noonan calls the following witnesses
in support of the just-price-as-market-price thesis:
. . . Giles of Lessines teaches that value increases or 
decreases with changes in the use of the good; that is, 
with variations In the demand for it. He writes, 'Accor­
ding to justice, each thing ought to be uZ greater worth 
and price at the tlrna and for the time of its use, than 
at another time when its use is not so necessary and con­
venient.' John Buridan says explicitly, 'A good is worth 
as much as human need needs it.' Henry of Hesse, citing 
Aristotle by name, declares that the Just price consists 
'in a near equality of goods in proportion to the measure 
of their market or usual or customary value. This mea­
sure, however, which is to be roughly considered, is a
4^-Raymond de Roover, "The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and
Economic Policy," The Journal of Economic History, XVIII (December, 
1958), 418.
42Ibld, , pp. 420-421.
43ibld.. p. 422.
25
value as great as the quantity of human need.' In 
a slightly different formula, but again empha­
sizing the role of human desire, St. Be maid in e 
teaches that value is determined by a good's 
utility, scarcity, and complacibllltas. that 
Is, Its quality of pleasing the will of a buyer,
* rates St. Bernardlne's
St. Thomas also seems to agree, within bounds, that the just 
price is determined by the utility of a thing on the demand side and 
the general higgling of the market, "As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei 
xi. 16) the price of things saleable does not depend on their degree 
of nature, since at times a horse fetches a higher price than a 
slave; but it depends on their usefulness to man."4-*
A man may even deceive or be deceived up to half the amount of 
the just price before state sanctions should apply. However, divine 
law is always operative, and the virtuous man should always rectify 
an injustice In the price as far as he is able to discern it: . .
because the just price of things Is not fixed with mathematical 
precision, but depends on a kind of estimate, so that a slight addi­
tion or subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of 
Justice.
What scholastics do Inveigh against is monopolistic practices 
which artificially fix price. They did approve of price fixing by
44john T. Noonan, Jr., The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cam­
bridge, Massachusetts; 1957), pp. 83-84.
45st. Thomas Su m m  II Q. 77 Art. 2,
46Ibld., II Q. 77 Art. 1.
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the state to prevent profiteering In extreme cases such as famine 
or natural disaster. Contrary to accepted opinion, however, price 
fixing by the guilds was not regarded as licit. De Roover citing 
the authority of San Antonino(1389-1459) states: "The scholastic
writers, in their weighty treatises, rarely mention the guilds, but 
when they do, it is not to praise them for their humanitarian live­
lihood policy but to blame them for their monopolistic practices.
The condemnation of price fixing seems to be an almost continuous 
thread In natural law thinking beginning with Plato who in The 
Republic condemns an elaborate system of market regulation as being 
redundant for good men.^® Of course, price fixing may be necessary 
in an imperfect regime. Ue recall that the education toward goodness 
was a primary task of the state. This matter of good men and market 
regulation will be of importance in the following exposition of the 
ideas of Hutcheson and Smith.
If the natural law thinkers and particularly the scholastics 
held that the just price was the market price, what is the differ­
ence between the scholastic teaching and that of the classical
4?de Roover, p. 431. Noonan also comments on this point; "The 
scholastics also condemn attempts to manipulate the market price 
artificially by monopolistic restruction of the supply or by purely 
speculative purchases, The just price Is the price established by 
genuine consumer or comnerclal demand and available supply. But this 
repugnance to monopoly and sheer speculation does not alter the fact 




liberals? One difference certainly must be over the matter of usury 
which Is vigorously attacked by St. Thomas and others, although later 
scholastics modified the prohibition against taking Interest on 
loans. The reasons given for the prohibition of usury vary and In 
some cases are not clear. Modern scholars are in disagreement as to 
the animus behind the usury doctrine. Bernard W. Dempsey states: 
"Positive ecclesiastical legislation especially enjoining clerics 
from the practice of usury, and declaring it to be sinful to anyone, 
cleric or lay, to practice It rested fundamentally on the natural 
law rather than on divine positive legislation."^ John Noonan makes 
this statement: "Taken together, the Bible, the patristic writings,
and the Councils witnessed that the Christian tradition Itself con­
demned usury, and It was the combined weight of these authorities, 
and no single authority by Itself, that was responsible for the 
medieval position."^®
St. Thomas expounds the natural law case against usury In The 
Suimm Theologlca.^  It Is stated that it is unlawful to exact a 
price greater than unity for the loan of anything that Is consumable 
such as wine. We may loan a bottle of wine to a friend, and we ex­
pect to be repaid one bottle of wine; but If we require an additional 
payment we are exacting usury, It is against natural law to require 
any repayment In excess of the amount of the loan.
^Bernard W. Dempsey, Interest and Usury (London, 1948), p. 165,
^®Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, p. 11.
51st. Thomas, Summa II Q. 78 Art. 1,
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The prohibition against usury has a long history In natural 
law writings; Aristotle claims that usury is justly censured because 
the end of money is exchange, not to increase at interest.^2 Never­
theless, late scholastics such as John de Lugo (1593-1660) legiti­
mated usury In some cases on natural law grounds. If opportunity 
cost (lucrum cessans) was incurred by the lender, then compensation 
was due him as a matter of justice,-^ The natural law case against 
usury doesn't seem to be completely clear.
It seems possible that the scholastic view of the good for man 
provides a coherent basis for the prohibition against usury. On 
many occasions usury is seen by the doctors as a device for exploit­
ing the poor and oppressed. However, utury is more commonly de­
nounced as being simply unjust.^
The doctors at times display a disinclination to allow the 
monetization or selling of time, and this idea becomes bound up 
with usury doctrine. A little known fifth century scholastic is 
quoted by Gratian in 1180; "Of all merchants, the most cursed is 
the usurer, for he sells a good given by God, not acquired as a 
merchant acquires his goods from men; . . . Noonan commenting
^ A r i s t o t l e ,  Politics, 1258a 38-1258b 8.
^Dempsey, Usury, p. 171.
54{|oonan, Scholastic Analysis, pp. 16-20,
55lbld., p. 38.
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on this passage says: ". . , the usurer sells what is God's, by
which is presumably meant time; . . ."56
William of Auxerre (1160-1229) speaks of the great evil Involved
In credit sales because time is sold. It is held that time is a
natural gift to all creatures and to monetize It is grossly against 
S 7natural law. St. Thomas also seems to support this position.
. . if those who accept money with usury wish to recover that 
usury by selling cloth at more than its worth on account of the 
aforesaid delay, there is no doubt that this Is usury since time is 
clearly sold."^®
Although the above quotation by St. Thomas is not from The 
Summa Theologica, It agrees with William of Auxerre's prohibition 
against usury. It seems that a coherent basis can be found for the 
usury doctrine. It might be hypothesized that the church fathers 
were averse to the monetization of time and the rational economic
56Ibid., p. 39.
5?"He (the usurer) also acts against the universal natural law, 
because he sells time, which Is common to all creatures. Augustine 
says . . . each creature is compelled to give himself; the sun Is 
compelled to give itself to Illuminate; similarly the earth is com­
pelled to give whatever it can, and similarly the water. Nothing, 
however, so naturally gives itself as time: willy-nilly things have
time. Because, therefore, the usurer sells what necessarily belongs 
to all creatures generally he Injures all creatures, even the stones; 
whence if men were silent against the usurers, the stones would cry 
out, if they could; and this Is one reason why the Church so pur­
sues the usurers. Whence especially against them God says, 'When 1 
shall take up the time, that Is, when time will be so in My hand 
that a usurer cannot sell It, then I will Judge justly," Ibid.. 
pp. 43-44.
5®St. Thomas Aquinas, On Buying and Selling.
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calculation of all life's activities. This prohibition steins from 
a world view that holds the beatific vision as the highest good; It 
does not stem from an ignorance of economic affairs but from an 
understanding of them. It would seem that the achievement of the 
beatific vision would constitute an extremely time Intensive activity
C Qinvolving prayer, fasting, and good works. 7 This project is, of 
course, not impossible for a man in an economically rational society 
to undertake. However, the project becomes much more difficult If 
men perceive dollar values as being attached to time. Thomas and 
other scholastics realized this relationship between Interest, par­
ticularly on credit sales, and time value. They discouraged this 
monetization of time because they realized quite well the avaricious­
ness latent In most men, and they knew that the Infinite desire for 
money might replace the infinite desire for the good if allowed by 
the Church. Thomas discusses the infinite desire for money (arti­
ficial wealth) and the infinite desire for the good:
The desire for natural wealth Is not infinite because 
at a certain point the needs of nature are satisfied.
But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite be­
cause it is subject to disordered concupiscence which 
observes no measure, as the Philosopher shows. There 
is a difference, however, between the infinite desire 
for wealth and the infinite desire for the ultimate 
good, since the more perfectly the ultimate good Is
^®"If someone should busy himself investigating the truth for 
a period, he will be aided In the discovery of the truth by the pas­
sage of time." St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nlcomachean 
Ethics, I. L. XI;c 131-138. Also on this point Thomas says; " . . .  
we must come to knowledge of eternity by way of time," SiiMna I Q.
10 Art. 1., and further, . . nothing but God 1b eternal." Ibid.,
I Q. 31 Art. 3.
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possessed the more it is loved and other things
despised, for the more it is possessed the more
it is known.6°
It seems that Thomas and others were trying to lead men into
the pursuit of the good, the proper sphere of infinite desire. The
usury prohibition was one of the tools employed in this project.
It is my opinion that it is this scholastic view of the good for 
man that is the important point of disagreement between the medieval 
fathers and later political economists, not any disagreement over 
what it Is that constitutes the just price. This discussion of 
scholastic just price will be used as a background for presenting 
the more explicit development of the costs of production by Pufen- 
dorf, Hutcheson, and Smith. It was these later political economists 
that talked of a charge being levied because of status.
Some of the outstanding propositions of the natural law have 
been presented: the objective nature of truth, the use of right
reason to apprehend ultimate moral principles, the idea of nature 
as an internal principle of growth toward ev.de, and the need for 
men's lives and society to conform to those ends. In the seventeenth 
century a new trend of thought appeared: the actions and passions
of men assumed a greater importance as a means of finding moral 
truth rather than right reason or revelation. The good for man be­
came identified with fulfillment of the sensual passions rather than 
a search for a higher ideal such as the beatific vision. This change
^®St. Thomas Smuaa I Q . II Art. 1.
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In viewpoint has Important Implications for political and economic 
Institutions. Hutcheson, while retaining older Ideas of the highest 
good, follows the newer natural right position In founding political 
and economic Institutions on the senses of man rather than on faith 
or reason. The works of two major, seventeenth century authors will 
be considered in order to Illustrate the new viewpoint.
Moderns
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke participated in a movement away 
from tradition?! natural law Ideas of man and society. This break 
has come to be Identified as the modern natural right tradition.
The task now is to make clear the elements of thought that constitu­
ted this new view of society. Hobbes and Locke lived in an age when
Intelligent men were becoming more and more inmersed In the inodes 
of thought engendered by the new science of Galileo, Descartes, and 
Newton. The crucial conceptions of the new science, beginning with 
Galileo (1564-1642), are these: 1. Nature is composed of atoms In
motion. 2. Reason can help us understand nature through the process 
of mathematlzlng the motions of the atoms. Causation is described 
in terms of forces propelling the atoms.^ Of course, the height of
®*E . A. Burtt describes Galileo's view of nature: "The real
world is simply a succession of atomic motions in mathematical con­
tinuity. Under these circumstances causality could only be Intel­
ligibly lodged in the motions of the atoms themselves everything 
that happens being regarded as the effect solely of mathematical 
changes in these material elements." E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Science (Garden City, New York: 1932), p. 99.
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achievement In analyzing the forces is Sir Isaac Newton's universal 
law of gravitation. But what about the cause of the forces them­
selves? How did the new science answer that question? The question 
of ultimate causatlcn was simply not answered on grounds that It was 
outside the realm of science. The teleological orientation of nature 
is lost. Nature does not incline toward an end. Nature Is simply
atoms In motion without a particular end. E. A. Burtt states con­
cerning Galileo:
Teleology as an ultimate principle of explanation he 
set aside, depriving of their foundation those con­
victions about man's determinative relation to nature
which rested upon It. The natural world was portrayed 
as a vast, self-contained mathematical machine, consis­
ting of motions of matter In space and time, and man 
with his purposes, feelings, and secondary qualities 
was shoved apart as an unimportant spectator and semi- 
real effect of the great mathematical drama outside.
In view of these manifold and radical performances 
Galileo must be regarded as one of the massive intellects 
of all time. In every single respect of importance he broke 
the ground or otherwise prepared the way for the only two 
minds in this advancing current of thought comparable to 
his own--Descartes and Sir Isaac Newton.
The fundamental principles of the new science are opposed to 
the principles used by the ancients in developing classic natural 
law. Nature is no longer an Internal principle of growth inclining 
toward an end, but a number of atoms in motion with no particular 
end, or no end knowable by science. Since ends are outside the 
realm of science, they are also outside the realm of reason.
This new scientific viewpoint presents problems for political 
theorists such as Hobbes and Locke. The ancients could discuss
62Ibid.. p. 104.
34
political and economic Institutions with the knowledge that these 
Institutions served to aid man in attaining his natural end. Ends 
could be apprehended by reason, so a basis existed for reasonable 
discussion of institutions. For the moderns, since ends for man are 
unknowable, reasonable discussion of polities Is impossible, because 
there is no way of knowing what ends they are to be made to serve. 
How then, can economic and political institutions be legitimated?
We shall observe the attempts of Hobbes and Locke to solve this 
dllenma and then proceed to the solution offered by Hutcheson. It 
will be instructive to discuss the views of these authors on the 
nature of man In order to see their orientation as modern thinkers; 
then, the types of polity and economy envisaged by them will be 
presented.
Hobbes, like many present-day social scientists, adopted a 
mathematical mode in analyzing the problems of civil society. It 
Is said that in 1629 at the age of forty-one, Hobbes had his first 
encounter with Euclid's Elements, and was afterward enamored with 
the power of reasoned demonstration; that is, beginning with simple, 
self-evident propositions and from them demonstrating the truth of 
more obscure propositions. The rigor of mathematics is what Hobbes 
was seeking in his discussions on the nature of man and the proper 
form of civil government. In fact, Hobbes in 1651, in Leviathan 
(thirty-six years before Newton's Principle) seems to be searching 
for a universal social law of gravitation. If all the senses can 
be understood as motion, at least analogously, then the mathematical
35
statement that makes the whole system hang together may not be far
behind. Hobbes posits that life Itself is machine-like motion;
"For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof Is
in some principal part within; . . . For what Is the Heart, but a
Spring . . . and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to
64the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer?" Our sen­
ses and passions are also the result of various pressures and 
motions upon us; "All which qualities called Sensible, are in the 
object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, 
by which it presseth our organs diversely."
The first problem that Hobbes must face in his construction of 
the perfect commonwealth is to understand the forces that cause men 
to be in motion. Perhaps Hobbes' most fundamental postulate of man's 
nature is that he will attempt to preserve his life at all times, 
and no law or power can alter this fact. This is simply a natural 
right of mankind that cannot be abridged. "If a man by the terrour
^ Leo Strauss correctly points out that Hobbes' method was not 
the crucial point in Hobbes' philosophy. "The universal importance 
of Hobbes' political philosophy cannot but remain unrecognized so 
long as, in accordance with Hobbes' own statements, the method is 
considered to be the decisive feature of his politics. Now it is 
obvious that the method is not its only and even not its most impor­
tant characteristic." Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes (Chicago, 1963), p. 2. The important point is Hobbes' ana­
lysis of the nature of man which seems to be an analysis of bodies 
in motion powered by some force.
^Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.
65Ibid., 3.
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of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the Law, he Is 
totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his own 
preservation." Although It cannot be claimed that fear of death 
or tendency toward life is an absolutely universal trait, it was 
universal enough for Hobbes to use as the fundamental premise upon 
which to construct the commonwealth.
Another fundamental tendency of mankind is the desire for power: 
"So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all 
mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, 
that ceaseth onely in D e a t h . T h e  pursuit of power may be mani­
fested in different forms:
The passions that most of all cause the differences of 
Wit, are principally, the more or lease Desire of Pow­
er , of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which
may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power.
For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts 
of Power. ®
Accompanying man's desire for power is the desire for security
in that power once attained. Men seek to assure themselves of their




.  the object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely,
and for one Instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his
future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclina­
tions of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the 
assuring of a contented life; . . Ibid., 47.
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appetite for power, If properly channeled can become the basis for a
stable, prosperous comnonwealth.
In discussing the nature of man, Hobbes uses a metaphor that has
remained popular with political economists (e.g. Mandevllle) . The
question to which Hobbes addresses himself Is, "Why can't men live
together sociably as bees?" It may be Instructive to quote Hobbes'
reply at length:
It Is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and 
Ants, live sociably one with another, . . . and there­
fore same man may perhaps desire to know, why Kan-klnd 
cannot do the same. To which I answer,
First, that men are continually In competition for 
Honour and Dignity, which these creatures are not; and 
consequently amongst men there arlseth on that ground,
Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst these 
not so.
Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common 
good dlffereth not from the Private; and being by nature 
encllned to their private, they procure thereby the 
conmon benefit. But man, whose Joy conslsteth In com­
paring himself with other men, can relish nothing but 
what Is eminent.
Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as men) 
the uBe of reason, do not see, nor think they see any 
fault, In the administration of their common businesses 
whereas amongst men, there are very many, that think them­
selves wiser, and abler to govern the Publlque, better 
than the rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, 
one this way, another that way; and thereby bring It 
into Distraction and clvill warre.
Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have 
some use of voice, in making knowne to one another 
their desires, and other affections; yet they want 
that art of words, by which some men can represent 
to others, that which 1b Good; and augment, or diminish 
the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill; discontenting 
men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.
Flftly, Irratlonall creatures cannot distinguish 
betweene Injury, and Pannage; and therefore as long as 
they be at ease, they are not offended with their 
fellowes; whereas Man is then most troublesome, when 
he is most at ease: for then It Is that he loves to
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shew his Wlsdome, and controule the Actions of them that 
governe the Consnon-wealth.
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures Is Naturall; 
that of men, Is by Covenant only, which is Artlflciall: 
and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else 
required (beside Covenant) to make their Agreement con­
stant and lasting; which is a Conmon Power, to keep them 
in awe, and to direct their actions to the Conmon Benefit.
In this dismal portrait of mankind, Hobbes tells us that even 
the maintaining of civil peace, which is certainly the sine qua non 
of civilized life, will be a difficult task, due to man's pride and 
vanity and his attempts to secure prominence over his fellow citi­
zens. Man's pride and search for preeminence will also prevent any 
sort of invisible hand from operating. We cannot live socialby as 
bees precisely because the conmon good differs from our private 
good, which Is our desire to be preeminent over our fellow citizens. 
Finally, we are told that there is no spontaneous unity of men into 
nation-states, no spirit of the people; there Is only an artificial 
social contract which men deem wise to enter into for the purpose 
of their mutual protection. Men may be tempted to break this con­
tract if another one appears more conducive to their happiness, or 
if their pride or reason leads them to experiment with a new form 
of polity; only an absolutely powerful sovereign can maintain peace 
and prevent the continual breaking of the social contract.
Hobbes' treatment of the nature of man would not be complete 
without some statement about the nature of transcendent values and 
man's search for them. In the language of the schoolmen, what is
70Ibid., 86-87.
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the sunmum bonum toward which we should direct ourselves? Hobbes 
quite bluntly says that there Is no highest good in this life, at 
least as the scholastics conceived It. Hobbes' conception of human 
nature Is that man Is simply in motion, so happiness or felicity for 
man Is continual satisfying of desires which allows him to be con­
tinually In motion.
By manners, I mean . . . those qualities of man-kind 
that concern their living together in Peace, and Unity.
To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of 
this life, consisteth not In the repose of a mind satis­
fied. For there is no such Finis Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) 
nor Sumnum Bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in 
the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man 
any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, 
whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity 
Is a continual1 progresse of the desire, from one object 
to another; the attaining of the former, being still but 
the way to the later.7^
Again we find the theme of civil peace bound up with the feli­
city of this life. In order to maintain the peace, Hobbes would 
Instruct the sovereign power to be concerned with the things that 
make the citizenry happy, e.g. the continuous (attainment and pur­
suit cf desires. There is no ultimate goal which when attained will 
keep man content. Good and evil lose their absolute character for 
Hobbes in a similar manner to a later calculator of felicity (Ben- 
tham): "Good, and Evlll, are names that signifle our appetites,
and aversions; which In different tempers, customes, and doctrines




In disavowing the existence of a transcendent highest good, 
Hobbes seems to be Instituting a more mundane highest good which 
Is the attainment of happiness primarily through a prosperous life. 
Hobbes admits that a transcendent highest good may exist, but it is 
simply Impossible to know It. Therefore, let us act reasonably and 
pursue the goods with a little more fervor and the good with a 
little less.*^
The whole matter of transcendent values can be troublesome for 
the coomonwealth: . . 1  observe the Diseases of a Comnonwealth,
that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; wherefore one
74is, That every private man Is Judge of Good and Evlll actions." 
Varying individual interpretations of good and evil may lead to 
strife among individuals and factions and ultimately to civil war.
73 "Continual1 successe In obtaining these things which a man 
from time to time desireth, that is to say, contlnuall prospering,
Is that men call Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing 
as perpetuall Tranquility of mind, while we live here because Life 
it selfe is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without 
Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath 
ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner 
know, than enjoy; being joyes, that now are as incomprehensible, as 
the word of Scholl-men Beatlflcall Vision Is unlntelligble," Ibid.. 
29-30. Hobbes seems to be saying here that if God has ordained 
happiness for some, it will not be known until after death. The 
only felicity in this life is prosperity. Leo Strauss also conaoents 
on this point. "According to Hobbes, the preservation of life is 
c^e primary good, an unhindered progress to ever further goals, a 
'contlnuall prospering'--in a word, happiness is the greatest good, 
but there is no supreme good, in the sense of a good in the enjoy­
ment of which the spirit might find repose." Leo Strauss, Hobbes, 
pp. 15-16,
^Hobbes , Leviathan , 168 .
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Hobbes' solution Is to make good and evil, as far as possible, a 
matter of positive lav. The older natural lav concept of right 
reason is said to be Inoperable as a basis for the lavs because of 
the continual controversies engendered by private reflections upon 
the nature of transcendent good.^ Hobbes Is strictly in the modern 
camp here. Right reason doesn't exist. Knowledge of ends is out­
side the realm of science.
We have seen Hobbes' view of man's nature; what role then should 
the state play in providing for man's well being? The first essen­
tial service that the state must provide is the ensuring of the civil 
peace; this theme runs continually through Leviathan and becomes the 
raison d'etat. The fear of violent death must be eliminated by the 
state before man's desire for power can be fulfilled. In the 
absence of peace there can be no flourishing of the market society 
which Hobbes is seeking to promote.76
75", . . when there is a controversy In an account, the parties 
must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of 
some arbitor, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand or 
their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for 
want of a right Reason constituted by Nature . , Ibid.» 18-19.
In a later passage Hobbes seemingly contradicts himself; "For all 
men by nature reason alike and well, when they have good princi­
ples." Ibid., 21, However, the "good principles" would seem to be 
the conscious avoidance of seeking to use reason to attain transcen­
dent truth; for it is nonexistent or unknowable.
76"in such condition, (civil war) there is no place for Indus­
try; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no 
Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities 
that may be Imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instru­
ments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; 
no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no ArtB; 
no Letters; no Society; , , ." Ibid,, 62.
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C. B. Kacpherson makes the observation that Hobbes Is claiming 
no transformation of man due to the entrance of the rule of law.
The existence of the law and a sovereign power will simply allow 
natural man to channel his drives for power Into market activities, 
because he no longer Is required to enter the variables of plundering 
his neighbor or of self-protection into his calculations of attain­
ing power. "The passion for commodious living is a pssslon of 
Hobbes' natural man. Natural man is civilized man with only the 
restraint of law r e m o v e d , T h e  rule of law then becomes the 
cornerstone of bourgeois society because it allows and requires man's 
passions for power and glory to be fulfilled in the market place and 
through accumulation.
Hobbes supported the monarchy in England (this support was 
risky, for Charles I had been beheaded two years before the publica­
tion of Leviathan), but perhaps we should not construe Hobbes as 
being a monarchist to the exclusion of all other political positions, 
Hobbes' fundamental concern was maintaining the civil peace; the 
means adopted wuuld require a prudential judgment. Once men con­
tract with each other to institute a conxaonwealth, the form of the 
cotmonwealth whether monarchical or democratic should be maintained 
for the purpose of prevention of civil war which is the end of the
” C . B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individ­
ualism, Hobbes to Locke (Oxford, 1962), p, 29.
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78commonwealth. Evidently, Hobbes felt that continuation of the 
hereditary monarchy would best serve England In this task. A ten­
dency toward support of monarchy might stem from the Hobbeslan view 
of human nature. If an assembly of men becomes the legislative 
organ of state rather than one man, the human tendency toward pride 
and vanity will lead to endless harangues over the law. Nevertheless 
Hobbes does not seem to discard representative assembly as a viable 
form of polity.
There seems to be a conflict in Hobbes' mind between support of 
the monarch as the guardian of peace and acquiescence to the desires 
of the newly emerging merchant class to have some voice in the eco­
nomic affairs of state. At one point in Leviathan the statement is 
made:
In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forralgne 
Trafflque, the moat corauodious Representative Is an 
Assembly of all the members; that Is to say, such a 
one, as every one that adventureth his mony, may be 
present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of 
the Body, if they will themselves.?9
"A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of 
men do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to what­
soever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, 
t*ie Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be 
their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for It, as 
he that Voted against It, shall Authorise all the actions and Judg­
ments, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if 
they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, 
and be protected against other men," Hobbes, Leviathan. 88,
79Ibid., 119.
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It Is not clear from this statement whether Hobbes has an 
affinity for a bourgeois legislature or whether he Is simply out­
lining a plan for a joint stock company for purposes of engaging 
In International trade. From a later statement in Leviathan It 
seems that Hobbes Is giving advice on the proper handling of a busi­
ness venture. Those that have most to gain from a business venture 
should not be giving counsel to the king.
Another Buslnesae of the Soveralgn, is to choose good 
Counsellours; 1 mean such, whose advice he is to take 
In the Government of the Commonwealth . . . The choyce 
of Counsellours therefore Is proper to Monarchy; In which, 
the Sovereign that endeavoureth not to make choyce of 
those, that In every kind are the most able, dlschargeth 
not hia office as he ought to do. The most able, Counsellours, 
are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill 
Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that con­
duce to the Peace, and Defence of the Coimnon-wealth
This statement seems to be pointing toward the Board of Trade 
instituted under the tutelage of John Locke. A group of disin­
terested experts, not interested bourgeois. Is called for by Hobbes 
to advise on matters of peace and defense. Ft_eign policy seems to 
be emphasized In the quotation. Leo Strauss points out that the 
Hobbeslan emphasis on foreign policy arises because the principle 
of pride and vanity has been applied to the state as well as to
81individual men. The state jealously compares Itself with others.
80Ibid.. 183-184.
®^Strauss, Hobbes, pp. 162-163,
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However, domestic economic policy is not neglected because the 
sovereign must also prevent civil disorder In maintaining the 
peace:
The best Counsell, In those things that concern not 
other Nations, but onely the ease, and benefit the 
Subjects may enjoy, by Laves that look onely Inward,
Is to be taken from the general1 Information and 
complaints of the people of each Province, who are best 
acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore, 
when they demand nothing in derogation of the essen- 
tlall Rights of Sovereignty, to be diligently taken 
notice of.^2
Economic thinking has now entered into discussions of polity in
an Important way. The wishes of the bourgeoisie must be considered
because they provide the nutrition for Leviathan, Hobbes' artificial
man (and mortal god). "The nutrition of a Common-wealth conslsteth,
In the Plenty, and Distribution of Materials conducing to Life; 
m 83
Hobbes' system now is complete; man's basic drive is to preserve 
his life. For this reason men contract among themselves to form 
commonwealths. The end, of course, for the commonwealth is to ful­
fill the contract and preserve men's lives, that is to prevent civil
®^Hobbes, Leviathan, 184-185.
®^Jbid., 127, Hobbes also discusses the circular flow of money 
and goods as being the very life-blood of Leviathant "By the means 
of which measures, (gold and silver) all commodities. Moveable, and 
Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to all places of his resort, 
within and without the place of his ordinary residence; and the same 
passeth from Man to Man, within the Common-wealth; and goes round 
about, Nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof; In so much as 
this Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification of the Common­
wealth: . . . "  Ibid., 130.
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war. In addition to man's most reliable passion, there is a desire 
for power which Is manifested in our pursuit of honor, knowlege, or 
riches. The monarch must be shrewd enough to let men vent these 
natural drives within a framework of law which will at all times 
maintain the peace. Men may not find this rule of the monarch 
odious if they will content themselves with the pursuit of riches 
and not become overwrought in the search for the highest good. This 
pursuit will not only lead to contentment but will also provide 
those useful and necessary goods that are the life-blood of the 
c omnonwe a 11 h.
John Locke takes his position as a man of modern science in
An Easay Concerning Human Understanding. The two modern principles
concerning nature and reason are adopted by Locke. Since nature is
atoms in motion, there is no internal principle of development; and
men, as part of nature, possess no innate principles.
Virtue generally approved, not because innate, but 
because profitable. Hence naturally flows the great 
variety of opinions concerning moral rules which are 
to be found amongst men, according to the different 
sorts of happlnesB they have a prospect of, or pro­
pose to themselves; which could not be if practical 
principles were Innate, and imprinted in our minds 
immediately by the hand of God.®^
®^John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 79-80.
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Reason, for Locke, Is a means toward knowledge; but the conno-
85tatlon of right reason Is absent. Knowledge Is not knowledge of 
ultimate causes but a perception of agreement or disagreement be­
tween two ideas.
Knowledge Is the Perception of the Agreement or Dis­
agreement of two ideas. Knowledge then seems to me 
to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and 
agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of 
our Ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this 
perception Is, there is knowledge, and where it Is 
not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, 
yet we always come short of knowledge. For when we 
know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive 
than these two ideas do not a g r e e ? 8 6
In Locke's political works divine revelation is used in part to 
legitimate economic and political institutions, and at times Locke 
introduces the concepts of natural law and right reason. This is a 
clear inconsistency with his position on internal principles and 
reason as given in the Essay. Locke was fully aware of this and 
simply said that a detailed study of natural law was "besides my 
present purpose." His "present purpose" in the Two Treatises of 
Government was obviously to convince people of the correctness of 
his doctrines of property and civil government.
®-*"The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions 
and intermediate ideas; and in those cases where we are fain to 
substitute assent instead of knowledge, and take propositions for 
true, without being certain they are so, we have need to find out, 
examine, and compare the grounds of their probability. In both 
these cases, the faculty which finds out the means, and rightly 
applies them, to discover certainty in the one, and probability 
in the other, is that which we call reason." Ibid., 416.
86Ibid., 320.
48
Peter Laslett comments on the differences betveen these two
Important worlts by Locke:
So sharp Is the contrast between two almost contem­
poraneous works by the same man that in one passage In 
Two Treatises. . . . Locke uses language on the subject 
of natural law which seems Inconsistent with his own 
statements about innate Ideas In the Essay. Questioning 
on this point cannot be pressed too far. for we are told 
that 'it would be besides my present purpose, to enter 
here Into the particulars of the Law of Nature, or its 
measure of punishment; yet. it is certain there is 
such a Law. and that too. as Intelligible and plain 
to a rational Creature, and a Studler of that Law, as 
the positive Laws of Commonwealths nay possibly plainer'
(IX, 12).87
So Locke solves the modern dilemma of political legitimation by 
speaking two contrary doctrines. However, the fundamental law of 
nature spoken of In the Treatises Is self-preservation which seems 
more like an instinct or passion than any natural law apprehended 
by right reason. " . . .  the fundamental law of nature being the 
preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good or valid 
against it."88 This passion does not necessarily mean that life 
must be nasty, brutish, and short In the state of nature. For 
Locke, the desire for power and riches can be bridled internally by 
reasonable men.
And thus, X think it is very easy to conceive 
without any difficulty how labour could at first 
begin a title of property in the common things of 
nature, and how the spending It upon our uses bounded
87This quotation Is taken from the introduction by Peter Laslett 
to John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. by Peter Laslett,
(New York, 1963), pp. 94-95.
88Ibld., II, 135.
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it; so that there could then be no reason of quarrel­
ling about title, nor any doubt about the largeness of 
possession It gave. Right and convenlency went together: 
for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour 
upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than 
he could make use of. This left no room for contro­
versy about the title, nor for encroachment on the right 
of others; what portion a man carved to hlmselfe was 
easily seen, and It was useless, as well as dishonest, 
to carve himself too much, or take more than he needed,
Reason dictates that we not plunder our neighbor's possessions
in the state of nature because of the ease of accumulating posses­
sions without plunder. Any war of all against all must be regarded 
as an aberration: "Men living together according to reason, with­
out a comDon superior on earth with authority to judge between them,
90is properly the state of nature," Natural man for Locke is not
driven by uncontrollable, inflamed passions, but Is a calmer, more
reasonable man.
If this is the state of nature, why should men have the pro­
pensity to contract among themselves and form civil societies? It
seems that there are two possible answers. One is that Locke is 
really not serious in his description of natural man, and in fact 
is very Hobbeslan in his view of the state of nature. This can be
hypothesized on the basis of the following quotation from the
Second Treatise:
89Ibld., II., 51. 
90Ibld., II, 19.
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. . . whereby It Is easy to discern who are and who 
are not In political society together. Those who are 
united into one body, and have a common established 
law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to 
decide controversies between them and punish offen­
ders, are in civil society one with another; but 
those who have no such common appeal— 1 mean on 
earth— are still in the state of nature, each being, 
where there is no other, judge for hlmaelfe and 
executioner, which is, as I have before shown it, 
the perfect state of nature.91
If each man Is judge and executioner in the state of nature, 
then the nasty, brutish, and short life may not be far behind. Per­
haps the clearest explanation of the need for a social contract is 
found in Locke's explanation of the development of the money economy. 
In the days of barter men tended to acquire land and goods only in 
quantities sufficient for their preservation, only those quantities 
that could be used without spoilage or wastage. Money provided a 
medium of accumulation which would not spoil or perish and which had 
a continual command over the really valuable things of life. A man 
could justify the planting of excess crops if the excess could be 
converted into something of permanent value— that is money. Man 
now begins to look more Hobbeslan. The desires for power and glory 
become prominent. More land la enclosed than can be made use of 
and accumulation becomes the order of the day.
91Ibid., II, 87. 
92Ibid.. II, 50.
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In the state of nature (before the money economy) no one had 
the inclination toward undue accumulation of property. This is not 
true after the appearance of money, and the social contract is made 
for the purpose of establishing an umpire over conflicting property 
claims. This will prevent each man being his own judge and execu­
tioner and a probable war of all against all,
Macpherson presents another interpretation of Locke's nature 
of man before and after the money economy: especially with regard
to the apparent contradiction in Locke's showing a limited right to 
appropriation of land before the money economy and an unlimited 
right to appropriation after the introduction of money. The contra­
diction can be solved by considering Locke's assumption that all 
men have the right to preservation. Before money, an unlimited accu­
mulation of land would deny some their natural right to subsistence. 
After the introduction of the money economy, appropriation of land 
denies no one the right to subsistence because wage employment is 
now available. Appropriation of land actually makes the whole eco­
nomy more productive, through Increased agricultural output and 
increased wage labor (or alienable labor to use the technical Marxist 
term). So, far from denying any natural rights, appropriation of 
land has made It possible to satisfy these rights more fully.
Peaceful preservation Is the end of government for Locke as 
well as Hobbes. Why then does Locke advocate civil government by
^•HiacpherBon, Possessive Individualism, pp. 212-215,
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assembly and Hobbes advocate monarchy? Locke raises the possibility
that Hobbes' monarch may be deranged and do those things to his sub­
jects which they contracted together In order to prevent:
. . . absolute monarchs are but men, and If government 
Is to be the remedy of those evils which necessarily 
follow from men's being judges In their own cases, and 
the state of nature Is therefore not to be endured, 1
desire to know what kind of government that is, and
how much better it is than the state of nature, where 
one man commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be 
judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects 
whatever he pleases; and in whatsoever he doth, whether 
led by reason, mistake, or passion, must be submitted 
to, which men in the state of nature are not bound to 
do one to another?9*
Locke also claims that man's reason can obtain a knowledge of 
decent conduct: "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern
it, which obliges every one; and reason, which Is that law, teaches 
all mankind who will but consult It, that, being all equal and inde­
pendent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or
Q Cpossessions." Hobbes would disagree precisely over this point, and 
claim that man's reason will lead to conflicting claims of proper 
conduct. It Is for this reason that an authority must be set up to 
compel men to maintain the peace.
Regardless of Locke's natural law vocabulary In the Treatises 
both he and Hobbes are taking the modern natural right position.
9*Locke Treatises II, 13. Hobbes answers this point by claiming 
that no act of the sovereign can be disputed by a subject, even the 
putting to death of a subject, because every subject Is author of 
every act of the sovereign due to the social contract. Hobbes 
Leviathan, 109. The problem here would seem to be that the raison 
d'etat is ended If a deranged king begins to kill his subjects.
9 Locke, Treatises, II, 6.
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The fundamental right of man is self-preservation. It Is a right of 
necessity— a principle of atomic motion. This Is quite different 
from the Internal principles of growth emphasized by the earlier 
natural law theorists which led to a highest good such as the bea­
tific vision.
The tenor of the arguments of both Hobbes and Locke is that 
maintaining the peace la the primary task of government, and that 
men seem to have a passion for accumulation and acquisition. Locke 
is of the opinion that most men are reasonable (even after the devel­
opment of the money economy), or can act reasonably if given a 
chance. Hobbes would disagree. Individual liberty seems to be more 
consonant with the writings of Locke, However, as mentioned above, 
individual actions may become harmful to society as a whole after the 
introduction of the money economy unless the social contract Is made 
and a rule of law Is established. Locke is a liberal in that he 
believes that primordial man (or pre-money man) Is capable of hand­
ling his freedom.
With all Locke's concern with property rights and the freedom 
of citizens to depose unjust rulers, he was not an extreme laissez- 
faire economist. Peter Laslett has written an informative article 
on John Locke's intellectual Influence and practical service upon 
the Board of Trade, a council with the responsibility of making com­
mercial and plantation policy. Like Hobbes, Locke considered a board 
of experts to be the appropriate policy-making vehiclej
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'The country gentleman who la most concerned In a 
right ordering of trade, both In duty and Interests, 
is of all the most remote from any true notions of 
It, or sense of his stake In It.' But to Locke 
the country gentlemen meant the House of Commons, 
the 'Squires’ as they are called in the College 
letters, and from this we may deduce that Locke did 
not trust the Commons with a board of trade. He 
may even have advised Somers in this sense. He 
wanted neither parliamentarians nor merchants on 
the board; he most certainly would not have agreed 
that the Bank of England was a proper model . . .
Locke preferred the committee of expertB which he 
had discussed with Somers.96
In the eighteenth century Hutcheson and Smith must consider how 
far man's freedom can extend and what legitimate restraints must 
limit freedom. In what spheres will the "invisible hand" prove 
successful, and In what spheres will it fall and need augmentation by 
the state? These matters will crop up again as Hutcheson's moral 
foundations of political economy are discussed.
He have seen some of the issues with which the natural law is 
concerned. The Greeks held that the end for man was a life accord­
ing to nature, or a life in harmony with the natural order of things. 
The reason of man is capable of discerning the natural law or the 
duties which when observed will allow man to achieve his place In 
the natural order and thus achieve happiness. The medieval church 
fathers held that reason was appropriate for discerning the natural 
law, but revelation was also available to them as a source of
9*>Peter Laslett, "John Locke, The Great Recoinage, and the 
Origins of the Board of Trade: 1695-1698," The William and Mary
Quarterly. July, 1957 XIV No. 3, 394-395.
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knowledge. For the scholastics the ultimate end for man was the 
beatific vision or a state of pure communion with God. It was to 
this end that society should be organized and man's actions tend.
Thomas Hobbes helps to change the orientation of the natural 
law by adopting the new scientific viewpoint. There are no longer 
any Internal, natural principles of growth. There are some natural 
rights which belong to man by the necessity of his atom-like motion. 
John Locke shares in the natural right viewpoint of Hobbes, but he 
exhibits a less authoritarian bent, primarily because Locke believed 
that government by assembly would be more effective than monarchy in 
guaranteeing natural rights.
tfe turn now to an exposition of the doctrines of Francis Hutche­
son who occupies a position of mediation between the ancients and 
moderns. We shall see that Hutcheson's unique blend of Ideas played 
an Important part In the establishment of liberal economics and the 
foundation of the study of political economy as an autonomous science.
HUTCHESON'S PHILOSOPHY
In order to adequately understand Hutcheson's role as a founder 
of modern economics, we must delve Into his philosophy. We know 
that political theorists, since the development of modern science, 
have faced the following dilemma. "How can political and economic 
institutions be legitimated when modern science tells us that ends 
or goals for mankind are unknowable by reason?" Hutcheson solves 
this dilemma, and In understanding his solution we can understand the 
basis of his support for liberal polity and liberal economics.
Hutcheson as Intermediate Figure 
Hutcheson leads us to believe in some passages from his writings 
that he is not concerned with this typically modern dilemma, but 
that he embraces the ancient view of nature and reason.
If by natural we understand 'the highest Perfection 
of the Kind, to which any Nature may be Improved by 
cultivating Its natural Dispositions or Powers;' as few 
arrive at this in the Growth of their Bodies, so few 
obtain it in their Minds. But we may see what this Per­
fection is, to which our natural Dispositions tend, when 
we improve them to the utmost, as far as they are consis­
tent with each other, making the weaker or meaner yield 
to the more excellent and stronger. Our several Senses 
and Affections, publick and private, with our Powers of 
Reason and Reflection, shew this to be the Perfection of 
our Kind, viz. 'to know, love, and reverence the great 
Author of all things; to form the most extenslve Ideas 
of our own true Interests, and those of all other Natures, 
rational or sensitive; to abstain from all Injury; to pur­
sue regularly and impartially the most universal absolute 
Good, as far as we can; to enjoy constant Self-Approbation, 
and Honour from wise Men; with Trust in divine Providence.
Hope of everlasting Happiness, and a full Satisfaction
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and Assurance of Mind, that the whole Series of Events 
Is directed by an unerring Wisdom, for the greatest 
universal Happiness of the whole.*
Notice Hutcheson's statement that men have natural dispositions 
toward an excellence. This, of course, la the ancient position that 
men have an internal principle of growth toward an end; men are not 
simply atoms or bodies In motion. Hutcheson also states that reason 
and reflection can point out the perfection of man. This, too, Is 
the ancient view of reason. However, we cannot leave Hutcheson's 
philosophy with the assumption that he held the ancient view of 
nature and reason. A large part of his work argues otherwise, par­
ticularly on the matter of reason.
In Hutcheson's student days he attacked the position of Dr.
Samuel Clarke and other moralists who held that moral laws could be
2deduced from the very process of reasoning Itself. Clarke held an 
extreme position, but Hutcheson, In reacting against rationalism In
^Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the 
Fassions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (Lon­
don, 1728), pp. 199-200.
"Samuel Clarke's Boyle Lectures On the Being and Attributes of 
God (1704-1705) had established him as the undisputed head of the 
rationalist school of English philosophy which sought to deduce moral 
laws from logical necessity. A disciple of Newton, Clarke empha­
sized the mathematical aspects of his master's teaching at the ex­
pense of the experimental. In 1713 the student Joseph Butler, later 
the distinguished Anglican bishop, upheld the empirical or Locklan 
position against Clarke's a priori In a series of calm and ably rea­
soned letters. In 1717 another student, Frances (sic) Hutcheson, 
of great distinction later as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glas­
gow University, did likewise." E. C. Mosaner, The Life of David 
Hume (Oxford, 1970), p. 58.
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ethics, seems to eliminate reason completely as a means of knowing 
moral ends.
In 1725 Hutcheson had a vigorous debate in the London Journal 
with Gilbert Burnet over the place of reason in moral life. Burnet 
took the position that reason could know moral ends; Hutcheson held
that this was not possible. In the debate Hutcheson gives a detailed
account of reason and actions that are reasonable.
There are certain Words frequently used In our 
Discourses of Morality, which, I fancy, when welt ex­
amined, will lead us into the same Sentiments with 
those of the Author of the late Inquiry into Beauty 
and Virtue. The Words I mean are these, when we say 
that Actions are Reasonable. Fit. Right. Just. Confor­
mable to Truth. Reason denotes either our Power of 
finding out Truth. or a collection of Propositions 
already known to be True. Truths are either Specula­
tive. as 'When we discover, by comparing our Ideas. the
Relations of Quantities, or of any other Objects among
themselvesT7 or Practical, as ’When we discover what 
Ob jects are naturally apt to give any Person the highest 
Gratifications, or what Means are most effectual to ob­
tain such objects .' Speculative Truth or Reason is not 
properly a Rule of Conduct, however Rules may be founded 
upon It. Let us enquire then Into Practical Reason. 
both with relation to the End which we propose, and the 
Means■
To a Being which acts only for Its own Happiness.
That End is Reasonable, which contains a greater Happi­
ness than any other which It could pursue; and when 
such a Being satisfies Itself with a smaller Good for 
Itself, while a greater is In its Power; it pursues 
an Unreasonable End. A Being of this Temper, as to 
the Means. would call those Reasonable, which were 
effectual to obtain their End with the smallest Pain 
or Toil to the Agent; with such a Being, the Cruelty 
of the Means, or their bad Influence on a Community. 
would never make them pass for Unreasonable. provided 
they had no bad Influence on his own Happiness."3
^Gilbert Burnet and Francis Hutcheson, Letters between the late 
Mr. Gilbert Burnet, and M r . Hutchinson (sic)(London, 1735), pp. 
18-19.
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Notice that speculative truth is a comparison of ideas or ob­
jects . Hutcheson seems to be moving toward a position that holds 
practical reason as a means of instrumentality toward some end, al­
though his statement on practical truth as discovering objects 
"naturally apt to given any Person the highest Gratification" seems 
to indicate the ancient view of reason discovering ends or at least 
objects conducive to man's natural end. However, Hutcheson does not 
conceive of practical reason in this way. Later he speaks of prac­
tical reason "with relation to the End which we propose, and the 
Means." We propose ends; we do not discover them through reason. 
Hutcheson makes this point more explicitly and bluntly later in the
debate. "Our Moral Sense and Affections determine our End, but Rea-
Ason must find out the Means■
It seems clear to me that Hutcheson is adopting the modern posi­
tion that reason cannot know ultimate ends. However, Hutcheson does 
not say that ends do not exist or that they are arbitrary. The dif­
ficulty in understanding him comes from Hutcheson's more ancient view 
of nature. He holds that there are some Internal principles or ten­
dencies in man. It is reason's place to inquire Into the direction 
of natural tendencies but the judgment of rightness or wrongness of 
tendencies comes from a moral sense, not reason. Hutcheson states:
Fhilaretus [Burnet] wants to know if this Moral 
Sense of something amiable In Benevolence be Right 
and Reasonable, or fit and justifiable. If by these
4Ibid., p. 28.
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Words he means, whether the Actions which this Sense 
at any time makes him approve, shall be always approved 
as Morally Good by him? The Author [Hutcheson] tells 
him, that this Moral Sense and our Benevolent Affections 
do make us pursue Publlck Good as the End, find our 
greatest Pleasure In such Pursuits, and approve of all 
Benevolent Actions in others; but then the Author 
[Hutcheson] also In many Places recomnends the most 
serious application of our Reason, to enquire into the 
natural tendencies of our Actions, as the Means to attain 
this End, that we may not be led by every slight Appear­
ance of particular Good, to do Actions which may have 
prepollent evil Consequences. And this Inadvertence he 
makes one great Source of Imnoral Actions, which both we 
ourselves and all others will condemn, when we observe 
the prepollent evil Consequences which the Agent might 
have foreseen.
Hutcheson's younger correspondent, David Hume, understood Hutche­
son's treatment of reason and morality in the manner that I have out­
lined. Reason or "the operations of the understanding" were incapable 
of moral perceptions. Moral Judgments came from the sentiments.
Hume, however, argues for a morality relative to each being which 
Hutcheson does not do.
"That Faculty, by which we discern Truth and Fals- 
hood (sic) , and that by which we perceive Vice and Virtue 
had long been confounded with each other, and all Morality 
was suppos'd to be built on eternal and imnutable Rela­
tions, which, to every Intelligent Mind, were equally 
invariable as any Proposition concerning Quantity or 
Number. But a late Philosopher [noted as Hutcheson] has 
taught us, by the most convincing Arguments, that Morality 
is nothing in the abstract Nature of Things, but is en­
tirely relative to the Sentiment or mental Taste of each 
particular Being; in the same Manner as the Distinctions 
of sweet and bitter, hot and cold, arise from the parti­
cular feeling of each Sense or Organ. Moral Perceptions
5Ibid.. pp. 27-28.
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therefore, ought not to be class'd with the Operations
of the Understanding, but with the Tastes or Sentiments.**
It seems Impossible to say unambiguously whether Hutcheson is 
ancient or modern in his treatment of nature and reason. He holds 
that men have inclinations or tendencies toward ends but that reason 
cannot apprehend these ends. This Impasse is solved by Hutcheson 
through a study of the Internal senses of men resulting in the moral 
sense doctrine. Through the moral sense doctrine Hutcheson exerts a 
mediating influence between ancient and modern philosophy. The 
moral sense doctrine also provides a means of reconciling self- 
interest with the public good and a powerful underpinning for liberal 
political economy.
In order to understand the moral sense more fully let us inquire 
Into Hutcheson's development of this concept. For Hutcheson the 
truth about morals could be found by Investigating the truth about 
men's senses.
This is a difficult task. Hutcheson approaches It by intro­
spection which becomes the empirical method used to study events in 
the human mind. "In this Inquiry we need little Reasoning, or argu­
ment , since certainty is only attainable by distinct Attention to 
what we are conscious happens in our Minds."7 After observing one's 
own senses, the only possible way of making a generalized statement 
about the senses of men is to assume a roughly uniform constitution
^David Hume, The Philosophical Works, ed. by Thomas Hill Green 
and Thomas Hodge Grose, IV (London, 1882), 10.
7Francis Hutcheson, Passions and Affections, p. 2.
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of human nature. Hutcheson assets that this Is the case. " . . .  
we must first know that the same Constitution of our Sense shall al­
ways remain: . . .  Of the Continuance of the same Constitution of 
our Sense, we are as sure as of the Continuance of Gravitation. or
aany other Law of Nature: . . . "
Hutcheson sounded the tocsin of the eighteenth century Scottish
enlightenment by his vigorous explanation of the nature and scope of
reason and his encouragement of the empirical method. Dugald Stewart
gives this assessment of Hutcheson's influence on Scottish thought:
Hutcheson appears to have been the first Scottish thinker 
who, by substituting observation for a purely formal 
method of philosophical inquiry, fairly raised the cur­
rent thought above the region of merely technical defi­
nition, and placed men with awakened sympathies in contact 
with life and reality. Without openly disclaiming the 
received metaphysical principles of the time, his analy­
sis yet revealed elements that, if fairly weighed, were 
subversive of a sensuous theory of knowledge. Hutcheson 
struck with firm hand the key-note of Scottish speculation.
8Ibld ., p. 279.
^Dugald Stewart, The Collected Works (Edinburgh, 1858), X, xix. 
Concerning Scottish philosophy, James McCosh makes the following 
statement: "It (Scottish philosophy) proceeds on the method of obser­
vation, professedly and really. In this respect it is different 
from nearly all the philosophies which went before, from many of 
those which were contemporary, and from some of those which still 
linger among us. The method pursued in Eastern countries, in ancient 
Greece and Rome, in the scholastic times, and in the earlier ages of 
modern European speculation, had not been that of induction, either 
avowedly or truly. No doubt, speculators have been obliged In all 
ages and countries to make some use of facts, In the investigation 
both of mind and matter. But In the earlier theosophies, physiolo­
gies, and philosophies, they looked at the phenomena of nature 
merely as furnishing a starting-point to their system, or a corro­
boration of them; and their Inquiries were conducted in the dogmatic, 
or deductive, or analytic manner, explaining phenomena by assumed 
principles, or bringing facts to support theories, or resolving the
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In developing his system of ethics, the foundation upon which 
Hutcheson builds Is a sense coniDon to mankind which he calls the 
moral sense. The moral sense Is internal but Is as natural to man's 
make-up as the senses of taste and smell. An example of what Is 
meant here by an Internal sense Is the sense of beauty. Arguments 
that are used to explain the essence of this internal sense can also 
be used to explain the moral sense. Hutcheson is In substantial 
agreement with John Locke's tabula rasa concept of the human mind, 
and he holds that the existence of internal senses does not mean 
that Innate Ideas are present. "The Internal Sense is, a passive 
Power of receivIng Ideas of Beauty from all Objects In which there 
Is Uniformity amidst Variety. The Internal sense of beauty does 
not 3lve to the mind Ideas of beauty as such, but is able to appre­
hend a beautiful object when brought Into the purview of this sense 
by one of the other faculties such as sight or hearing. Many objects, 
of course, are apprehended by the external senses, but not all of 
them will be recognized as beautiful. The sense of beauty will enable
complexities of the universe by refined mental distinctions. This 
spirit had been banished from physical science, first, by the great 
realistic awakening of the sixteenth century; then by the profound 
wisdom and far-sighted sagacity of Bacon; and, finally by the dis­
coveries of Newton and the establishment of the Royal Society of 
London. But it lingered for some ages longer in mental science, 
from which it has not even yet been finally expelled." James McCosh, 
The ScottIsh Philosophy (London, 1875), p. 2.
^^Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 75.
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the mind to perceive as beautiful only those objects which truly are 
beautiful.
Custom, no doubt, Influences our perceptions of things, but It
does not change the constitution of our Internal senses: ". . .
Custom makes us more capable of retaining and comparing complex
Ideas, so as to discern more complicated Uniformity, which escapes
the Observation of Novices in any Art; but all this presupposes a
12natural 5ense of Beauty in Uniformity: . . ,' Even though custom
can refine our internal senses, the idea of beauty itself remains
absolute. Hutcheson believes that absolute standards exist, not
merely relative ones. . .in approving a beautiful form, we refer
the beauty to the object; we do not say that it is beautiful because
we reap some little pleasure in viewing it, but we are pleased in
13viewing it because it is antecedently beautiful."
If an absolute standard of beauty exists, why do men profess 
diverse tastes and regard different objects as beautiful? Hutcheson 
answers this objection by stating that men may be swayed by other 
matters than the inherent beauty of a thing in itself, such as re­
wards and punishments. "Our Sense of Beauty from Objects, by which 
they are constituted good to us, is very distinct from our Desire of 
them when they are thus constituted: Our Desire of Beauty may be
 ̂̂ Ibid . , p . 7 .
12Ibid., p. 82.
l^Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy (Glasgow, 1755), I, 54.
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counter-ballanc*d by Rewards or Threatnings, but never our sense of
A fruitful insight may be gained into Hutcheson's thought from
some of his statements about beauty. Beauty consists in unity among
diversity. We can pursue beauty by discovering general principles
for explaining diverse phenomena.
That we may the better discern this Agreement, or Unity 
of an Infinity of Objects in the general Theorem, to be 
the Foundation of the Beauty or Pleasure attending their 
Discovery, let us compare our Satisfaction in such Dis- 
coverys, with the uneasy state of Mind which we are in, 
when we can only measure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, 
or are making Experiments which we can reduce to no 
general Canon, but only heaping up a Multitude of par­
ticular incoherent Observations.15
It seems that for Hutcheson there was an aesthetic feeling con­
nected with systematic models. There is no need to divorce oneself 
from experiencing beauty simply because of systematic scientific en­
deavor. In a related passage on the beauty of the unifying principle. 
Hutcheson gives evidence that he, like others, was seeking to become 
the Isaac Newton of moral philosophy and the social sciences.
In the search of Nature there is the like Beauty in the 
Knowledge of some great Principles, or universal Forces, 
from which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is Gravi­
tation, in Sir Isaac Newton's Scheme; such also is the 
Knowledge of the Original of Rights, perfect and imper­
fect , and external; alienable and unalienable, with their 
manner of Translations; from whence the greatest Part of 
moral Dutys may be deduc'd in the various Relations of 
human life. 16
l^Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. II. 
15Ibld . , p. 21.
16Ibld., p. 30.
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So the search is begun for the original principle or touchstone 
of rights and duties. If this principle can be found, a better under­
standing can be gained and explanation given of the ethical system 
proper to mankind and the proper system of social relationships. 
Hutcheson introduces the moral sense as the ultimate basis of ethical 
behavior, and he seeks to construct a system in which the moral sense 
can serve as the universal social law of gravitation.
The Moral Sense
In order to establish the existence of a moral faculty in man­
kind, Hutcheson states that all societies condemn certain types of 
actions, such as murder and treachery. This universal abhorrence 
must argue for a uniform moral apprehension in man.
To prove that men have no moral faculty, or very dis­
similar ones; we must show either that nations or great 
numbers of men hold all actions to be indifferent which 
don't appear to them to affect their own private interest; 
or that they are pleased with cruelty, treachery, ingrati­
tude, unprovoked murders, and tortures . . . such nations 
have not yet been discovered to us. not even by the in­
vention of the boldest traveller.
Hutcheson places the burden of proof squarely on the shoulders 
of those who would argue against the existence of the moral sense.
The above quotation has some degree of merit; certainly it would be 
very difficult to find a society or culture which condoned indiscri­
minate killing of human beings. Of course, we must not demand more 
certainty from Hutcheson than the subject matter permits, but these
l?Hutcheson, System I, 91-92.
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moral apprehensions were universal enough for Hutcheson to demonstrate 
to his own satisfaction that man has a moral faculty.
The moral sense Is an Internal sense like the sense of beauty 
and operates In a similar fashion. Good and evil events can be dis­
cerned when brought Into the purview of the moral sense by the exter-
1 Anal senses. The good which Is apprehended by each man's moral
faculty is not relative to himself, but Is absolute. Men may not
act on this knowledge of the good due to some other powerful motives
of interest or perhaps deliberate self-delusion.
This moral sense, either of our own Actions, or of those 
of others. haB this in common with our other Senses,
That however our Desire of Virtue may be counterbalanc'd 
by Interest, our Sentiment or Perception of its Beauty 
cannot: as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of 
our approbation were views of Advantage
The moral faculty plays another important part in the constitu­
tion of man. Hutcheson has pointed out that reason is not capable of 
apprehending ends. Neither is reason capable of guiding man when 
immediate decisions must be made. Reason is too slow and deliberate,
*®"We must then certainly have other Perceptions of moral Actions 
than those of Advantage: And that Power of receiving these Perceptions 
may be call'd a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to it, viz. 
a Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of 
an Object, which occurs to us, independently on our Will." Hutcheson, 
Inquiry, p. 109.
l^Ibid., p. 116. We also know that moral good is a higher type 
of good than any other. "But as we lamediately perceive the differ­
ence in kind, and that the dignity of enjoyment from fine poetry, 
painting, or from knowledge is superior to the pleasures of the pa­
late, were they never so delicate; so we immediately discern moral 
good to be superior in kind and dignity to all others which are per­
ceived by the other perceptive powers." Hutcheson, System I, 61.
68
so the senses must be relied upon In such a circumstance. The moral 
sense can apprehend the good quickly.
Notwithstanding the mighty Reason we boast of 
above other Animals, Its Processes are too slow, too 
full of doubt and hesitation, to serve us in every 
Exigency, either for our own Preservation, without 
the external Senses, or to direct our Actions for the 
Good of the Whole, without this moral S e n s e . 20
In A System of Moral Philosophy three reasons are given as to 
why men approve different actions even though the moral sense is uni­
form. The first Is "Different notions of happiness and the means of 
promoting it." Although men may approve as good the same objects, 
differences may arise as to the proper means of achieving the object. 
However, how can men have different notions of happiness if they have 
uniform moral faculties? If happiness consists in knowing what is the 
good for man and doing It, then notions of happiness at least will be 
fairly similar among men. Of course, powerful pressures or confusion 
could act to make ideas of happiness differ, but Hutcheson's second 
reason clears up this objection. "A second cause of different appro­
bations are the larger or more confined systems which men regard In 
considering the tendencies of actions; . , If one's happiness
depends only upon himself and some small sect with which he Is con­
cerned, then there will be a particular set of objects that will tend 
toward his happiness. If another individual's happiness is dependent 
on himself and larger systems of mankind, such as a country or the 
world, then perhaps a different group of objects or events will lead
20Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 245.
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to that Individual's happiness. Whether an event makes us happy or 
not may depend upon how far we are willing to trace the effectB of 
an event on other people in the world and how far our concern extends.
The third reason given to explain differences In approbation Is 
. . the different opinions about what God has commanded." Hutche­
son holds that the moral sense of man is sufficient to attain know­
ledge of the good without divine revelation. In fact divine revela­
tion may prove to be an absolute confusion at times; . (Men)
may have some confused notions of matters of duty and obligation, 
distinct from what their hearts would approve were the notions of 
divine commands removed." Hutcheson realizes that obedience to di­
vine dictates is a commendable trait and frequently advantageous to 
the public good. However, to take an extreme example, if an indivi­
dual is engaging in human sacrifice In obedience to divine dictates, 
he Is clearly acting perversely to the strong inclination of the
moral sense. If he doea not seriously question the truth of this
21religious system, he evidences a defect of character.
21Hutcheson, System I, 92-96, Hutcheson may be following 
Grotius who said that natural law would retain its validity even if 
God did not exist. "But Grotius' aim was to construct a system of 
laws which would carry conviction in an age in which theological 
controversy was gradually losing the power to do so. He therefore 
proceeded on the hypothesis further than anyone had done before him 
. . , He proved that it was possible to build up a theory of laws 
independent of theological presuppositions. His successors completed 
the task. The natural law which they elaborated was entirely 'secu­
lar'. They sharply divided what the Schoolmen had taken great pains 
to reconcile." D'Entreves, Natural Law, p. 52,
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In presenting an explanation of the moral sense and some of the 
problems present in the world which prevent its complete operation, 
Hutcheson presents some ideas which could lead to policy recommenda­
tions with a view toward allowing more perfect functioning of the 
moral sense in society and to prevent Improper functioning.
The first notion Is that education can play a powerful role in 
refining moral tastes and eliminating confusion which might hinder 
us from following the dictates of the moral sense. It seems that a 
complete and thoroughgoing discussion of morals is needed by the 
citizenry. . . presenting more fully all the evidence on both
sides, by serious attention, or the best exercise of the reasoning
power, corrects the hasty judgment. Just so in the moral percep-
22tions. Hutcheson shares the view of Plato here, that if men have 
a firm idea of the good, then they will pursue it. It is precisely 
the task of education to remove the veils of misunderstanding which 
will allow the moral sense to present an unadulterated concept of the 
good to the mind.
Hutcheson, System I, 61. Hutcheson also states; .
among the several affections approved there are many degrees; some 
much more lovely than others, 1 Tis thus alone we correct any appa­
rent disorders in this moral faculty, even as we correct our reason 
Itself. As we Improve and correct a low taste for harmony by enuring 
the ear to finer compositions; a low taste for beauty, by presenting 
the finer works, which yield an higher pleasure; so we improve our 
moral taste by presenting larger systems to our mind, and more exten­
sive affections toward them; and thus finer objects are exhibited to 
the moral faculty, which it will approve, even when these affections 
oppose the effect of some narrower affections, which considered by 
themselves would be truly lovely. No need here of reference to an 
higher power of perception, or to reason." Ibid., p. 60.
71
The next recommendation that Hutcheson makes Is for a method 
of rectifying failures of the moral sense. It Is to be expected that 
occasionally events will give rise to violent and confused passions 
among the populace which will prevent the proper exercise of virtue. 
In such a case ''A Law with Sanctions, given by a superior Being, of 
sufficient Power to make us happy or miserable, must be necessary to 
counter-ballance those apparent Motives of Interest, to calm our
23Passions, and give room for the recovery of our moral Sense, . . . "  
Whether the law is to be given by divine revelation or a philosopher 
king Is not clear from this passage. What Is clear is that the law 
must be established at a time when the moral sense Is in good working 
otder. When this is done, a rule of law can be Instituted which 
should not prove odious to the people. For the only Instance in 
which sanctions would apply is when an individual acts perversely in 
contradiction to his own internal sense. Of course, education will 
make the burden of the law lighter still, as men are made more aware 
of their own self-generated moral imperatives.
The Good
Much has been said about the existence of an Internal moral 
sense, but what does this sense reveal about the nature of good and 
evil, virtue, and happiness for man? We must have answers to these
^Hutcheson, Inquiry, pp. 251-252,
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questions before we can understand the basis for natural rights and 
duties, the role of the state, and the legitimate sphere of economic 
activities.
The good Is not merely absence of pain; although Hutcheson rea­
lized that the threat of pain might be a stronger stimulus to men than
0 ixthe pursuit of good. Death itself is not the greatest evil to be
feared, at least to a generous mind. The basis of Hobbes' Leviathan
may be undermined by the spread of liberal ideas.
. . . an honourable Death is far from appearing to a
generous Mind, as the greatest of Evils. The Ruin of
a Free State, the Slavery of a generous Spirit, a Life 
upon shameful Terms, still appear vastly greater Evils; 
beside many other exquisite Distresses of a more pri­
vate nature, in comparison of which, an honourable Death 
befalling a favourite character, is looked upon as a
D e l i v e r a n c e . 25
However, on the basis of a few quotations, a case could be made 
that Hutcheson, not Bentham, founded the philosophical radical move­
ment. The following statement is made in An Inquiry into the Original
of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue: . . that Action is best, which
accomplishes the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and
26that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery.11 Of course,
2**'\ . . our own selfish passions which repel evil, such as fear, 
anger, resentment, are generally stronger commotions of soul than the 
passions pursuing private good . . . since immunity from pain seems 
previously necessary to the enjoyment of good." Hutcheson, System I, 
20.
25Hutcheson, Passions and Affections, p. 73.
2&Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 164.
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the greatest happiness principle leads to the question: "What Is
happiness." Hutcheson's response In one passage Is:
In the following Discourse, HappIness denotes plea­
sant Sensation of any kind, or a continued State of such
Sensations; and Misery denotes the contrary Sensations.
Such Actions as tend to procure Happiness to the 
Agent, are called privately useful: and such Actions as
procure Misery to the Agent, privately hurtful.27
To this statement can be added another: "Natural Good is Plea­
sure: Natural Evil is Paln."^® It seems that the principle of
utility has been established as the criterion of all human action,
An action is useful or has utility If it leads to the happiness of
the agent; happiness is equivalent to the good for the agent, and the
good is pleasure or pleasant sensation. If Hutcheson held the above 
positions without qualification, autonomous utility functions would be 
enthroned as final arbiters of right. Anything which yielded plea­
sure to an Individual would constitute the good for that individual. 
The question of the good for man would be answered on the basis of 
subjective apprehensions, as it was for Jeremy Bentham. It is also 
true that In An Inquiry Hutcheson seeks to develop a mathematical 
system, similar in concept to the felicific calculus, for computing 
the moment of evil that results from any particular action. The 
connection between Hutcheson and the philosophical radicals would 
seem to be very strong.
^Hutcheson, Passions and Affections, p. 205,
28Ibid., p. 34.
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There may be such a connection, but Hutcheson was not a utili­
t a r i a n . ^  Ends for man were not the result of random desires, but 
were apprehended by the moral sense. Men do achieve happiness through 
pleasure, but there are several kinds of pleasure, and Hutcheson was 
Interested In showing men the path toward achieving the highest plea­
sure or happiness,
Is there therefore no disputing about Tastes? are all 
Persons alike happy, who obtain the several Enjoyments 
for which they have a Relish? If they are, the Dispute 
Is at an end: . . .  Or may not some Characters be found 
among Men, who alone are capable of Judging In this matter?
II. It Is obvious that 'those alone are capable 
of judging, who have experienced all the several kinds 
of Pleasure, and have their Senses acute and fully exer­
cised in them all.' Now a high Relish for Virtue, or a 
strong moral Sense, with its concomitant publick Sense 
and Affections, and a Sense of Honour, was never alledged 
to impair our external Senses or to make us Incapable of 
any pleasures of the Imagination; Temperance never spoiled 
a good Palate, whatever Luxury may have done; a generous 
affectionate publick Spirit, reflecting on itself with 
delight, never vitiated any Organ of external Pleasure, 
nor weakened their Perceptions. Now all virtuous Men 
have given Virtue this Testimony, that Its Pleasures are 
superior to any other, nay to all others jointly; that
^Bentham explicitly belittles Hutcheson's moral sense system of 
morals. MIt is curious enough to observe the variety of inventions
men have hit upon, and the variety of phrases they have brought for­
ward, in order to conceal from the world, and, if possible, from 
themselves, this very general and therefore very pardonable self- 
sufficiency .
I. One man says, he has a thing made on purpose to tell him
what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called a moral sense:
and then he goes to work at his ease, and says, such a thing is right, 
and such a thing is wrong— why? 'because my moral sense tells me it 
i s . J e r e m y  Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, Vol. II of British Moralists,ed. by L. A. Selby- 
Bigge (Oxford, 1897), p. 347.
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a friendly generous Action gives a Delight superior to 
any other; that other Enjoyments, when compared with the 
Delights of Integrity, Faith, Kindness. Generosity, and 
publlck Spirit, are but trifles scarce worth any regard.-*®
Those are capable of Instructing who have been through the whole
range of pleasures open to man, pleasures of the external senses as
well as pleasures of the moral sense. Hutcheson states that the
world's great sages have spoken In a similar vein when speaking of
the highest pleasure (or the good).
Now all Men of Reflection, from the Age of Socrates to 
that of Addison, have sufficiently proved that the truest, 
most constant, and lively Pleasure, the happiest enjoyment 
of Life consists In kind Affections to our Fellow-crea- 
tures, Gratitude and Love to the Deity, Submission to his 
Will, and Trust In his Providence, with a Course of suitable 
Actions. This Is the true Good in our power, which we can 
never too strongly desire. The Pleasures of this kind are 
so great and durable, and so much above the power of For- 
tune, . . . that other Pleasures seem almost to vanish 
when separated from them; . .
The highest pleasures are found in a proper frame of mind toward 
our fellows, love and submission to the Diety, and a suitable course 
of actions in the world. The pleasures built on this view of the 
good are less subject to the vagaries of fortune than pleasures built 
solely upon gratification of the senses. Hutcheson, like Aristotle, 
acknowledges fortune's power neither the moral world nor the world 
of external goods is without risk. It seems that Hutcheson is saying 
here that a life built around external pleasures is a greater risk
3®Hutcheson, Passions and Affections, pp. 128-129.
3lFrancis Hutcheson, A Collection of Letters and Essays on Sev­
eral Subjects (London, 1729), p. 374. See Bibliography.
3^See above, p. 14.
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than a life In the moral world due to the possibility of bad luck In 
procuring external goods and the strong possibility that the life of 
gratification of the external senses will not ultimately produce plea­
sure. However, this is not to say that purposeful action cannot be 
undertaken in the physical world or the world of goods. The moral as 
well as the physical universe Is ruled by general laws from God. This 
makes possible understanding of the moral duty of man as well as con­
sistent cauBe-and-effeet science. The physical world is In fact under 
the sway of the DeiLy's moral law. The man pursuing the highest plea­
sure must apprehend the course of action appropriate to each part of 
the moral order.
As to the Operations of the Deity by general Laws, 
there is a further Reason from a Sense still superior 
to these already consider'd, even that of Virtue, or 
the Beauty of Action, which is the Foundation of our 
greatest happiness: For were there no general Laws
fix'd in the Course of Nature, there could be no Pru­
dence or Design in Men, no rational Expectation of Effects 
from Causes, no Schemes of Action projected, nor any 
regular Execution, If then according to the Frame of 
our Nature, our greatest Happiness must depend upon our 
Actions, as it may perhaps be made appear it does, 'The 
Universe must be governed, not by particular Wills, but 
by general Laws, upon which we can found our Expectations, 
and project our Schemes of Actions.'33
This superior sense that Hutcheson refers to here must be the 
moral sense of the Deity by which he is moved to make the universe
33Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 97. The Internal quotation marks are a 
stylistic device used by Hutcheso.i. They do not Indicate another 
author's work.
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comprehensible to us, and our actions can be made effective when 
they are In accord with the moral nature of the universe. This 
characteristic must move us to love and submit to the great Creator 
of the cosmos.
The third ingredient necessary for the good life is “kind affec­
tions to our fellow-creatures,M or benevolence. Benevolence is 
recommended to man by the moral sense and is also intrinsic to the 
character of God,^ Benevolence is regarded by Hutcheson as the 
great principle by which society is organized. In a striking pas­
sage Hutcheson compares this principle of benevolence to the principal 
of gravitation. The moral philosopher is trying to bring the cer­
tainty attainable in the physical sciences into the social sciences.
This universal Benevolence toward all Men, we may com­
pare to that Principle of Gravitation, which perhaps 
extends to all Bodys in the Universe; but, like the Love 
of Benevolence, increases as the Distance is diminish'd, 
and is strongest when Bodys come to touch each other.
Now this Increase of Attraction upon nearer Approach, 
is as necessary to the Frame of the Universe, as that 
there should be any Attraction at all: For a general
Attraction, equal in all Distances, would by the Con­
trariety of such multitudes of equal Forces, put an 
end to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it 
altogether.35
A strong benevolence among small circles of relatives and 
friends can be depended upon to hold society together. In other 
passages, Hutcheson seems to contradict this notion of benevolence
■^Hutcheson, System I, 69, 
3 5 n u t c h e s o n ,  Inquiry, pp. 198-199.
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by stating that the moral sense gives the highest approval to the 
most extensive benevolence rather than narrower spheres of benevo- 
lence, This seeming tension could be dismissed due to Hutcheson's 
vigorous attempt to arrive at a universal system of social behavior. 
But perhaps there Is no contradiction at all. The principle of 
benevolence which is compared to gravitation is a principle which 
is natural to man and independent of any moral sense, After all, 
even bands of thieves cohere for a time, perhaps due to benevolence 
among some of the members. On the other hand, the principle of uni­
versal benevolence which is apprehended by the moral sense can 
strengthen bonds between larger social groups, perhaps as large as 
a country or the world. As social bonds become more universal, re-
37flnement of tastes and the spread of civilization can proceed apace. 
These two concepts of benevolence point out again the importance of 
proper education of youth. Society needs an educational system that
^"Our moral Sense, tho it approves all particular kind Affec­
tion or Passion, as well as calm particular Benevolence abstractly 
considered; yet It also approves the Restraint or Limitation of all 
particular Affections or Passions, by the calm universal Benevolence." 
Hutcheson, Passions and Affections, p. 31.
R. Scott makes the following statement about Hutcheson.
", . . there is no difficulty in gathering the Impression, from its 
broad outlines, of what he conceived his message to his generation 
to be and the effects which resulted from it. He himself says, 'I 
am called "New Light" here,' and this expression embodies the whole 
secret of his attitude to the questions of his time. He was pre­
eminently the messenger of culture and opponent of Philistinism, 
whether in the Church, the University, or social life. In a word 
he was a Philosopher of the Enlightenment In Scotland." Scott, 
Hutcheson, p. 257,
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will remove foolish prejudices, customs, and associations from the 
mind; only then can the moral sense point out clearly the proper 
course of action to the individual. Hutcheson himself was engaged 
In this type of education in Glasgow where he (and later Adam Smith)
•Iflheld all types of "enthusiasm" In suspicion.
Benevolence or "kind affections to our fellow creatures" is part 
of the highest happiness or the good for man. But, what specific form 
should benevolence take, or what actions does the moral sense recom­
mend to us as benevolent? A detailed discussion of benevolence in 
Hutcheson's writings becomes transmogrified Into a discussion of the 
life of virtue. At the outset of this exposition, Hutcheson warns 
that there are risks involved In attempting to live the life of virtue,
but, of course, the whole tenor of Hutcheson's work argues that the
game Is worth the candle.
. . . Virtue consists in Benevolence, or Desire of the 
publick Good: The Happiness of others is very uncer­
tain, so that our publlck Desires may often be disappointed;
and every Disappointment Is uneasy, in proportion to the 
Degree of Desire. And therefore, however the Admiration
3®Hutcheson notes that the state may appoint leaders of religion 
to "prevent the Influence of dangerous enthusiasts or rogues." Hut­
cheson, System II, 312. The state may restrain either atheists or 
religious fanatics when they deny social virtues. " As to direct 
Atheism, or denial of a moral providence, or of the obligations of 
the moral or social virtues, these indeed directly tend to hurt the 
state in Its most important interests: and the persons who directly
publish such tenets cannot well pretend any obligation in conscience 
to do so. The magistrate may therefore justly restrain them by force, 
as he might any deluded fool or enthusiasts who pretended conscience 
In invading the rights or properties of others." Ibid., II, 313,
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and fixed Pursuit of Virtue nay always secure one 
stable and constant Pleasure of Self-Approbation, 
yet this Enjoyment presupposes a Desire of publick 
Good, subject to frequent Disappointment, which 
will be attended with Uneasiness proportioned to 
the Degree of publick Desire, or the Virtue upon
which we r e f l e c t . 39
Benevolence Is desire for the public good or the desire for the 
happiness of others. Since others are frequently not happy our bene­
volent desires nay be frustrated, leading to some uneasiness on our 
part. But, the life of virtue demands that we take this risk.
For the virtuous man, the happiness of others is bound up with 
his own happiness, but a precise, objective definition of happlnesB 
is required If anytlng further Is to be said about the good life and 
the best regime. As stated above happiness Is equated with pleasure, 
but not merely pleasure as posited by individual utility functions.^® 
There exists a gradation of pleasures from the lowest to the highest. 
The higher pleasures are not relative but absolutely verifiable by 
the moral sense. The greatest pleasure, or highest happiness, or the 
good for man consists In the beatific vision and performance of our 
duty.
I Q Hutcheson, Passions and Affections, pp. 115-116.
40»'The chief happiness of any being must consist in the full 
enjoyment of all the gratifications its nature desires and is capable 
of; or if its nature admits of a great variety of pleasures of dif­
ferent and sometimes inconsistent kinds, some of them also higher and 
more durable than others, its supreme happiness must consist In the 
most constant enjoyment of the more Intense and durable pleasures, 
with as much of the lower gratifications as consists with the full 
enjoyment of the higher." Hutcheson, System I, 100.
81
Such contemplations of the venerable, and adorable Excel­
lency and gratuitous Goodness of God, whom every good 
man regards as the witness and approver of his actions, 
will lead us to an ultimate resting in virtue: that
highest purity of it, by which we look upon conformity 
to the divine Will, the discharging the duty assigned 
us by him, and performing our part well, as the chief 
good, the chief fruit of virtue. 1
Hutcheson's view of the highest good sounds very Thomlstic at 
this point. In addition to the beatific vision, men are called to 
engage in a life of action in the world. The action to which we are 
called is virtuous action.^ Specifically, the life of virtue accord­
ing to Hutcheson can be discussed under four heads: justice, tem­
perance, fortitude, and prudence.^
The Virtues
Temperance is the exercise of power over the lower appetites. 
This is necessary because "the meanest and most transitory" desires 
may overwhelm men and cause a divergence from the life of virtue. 
Fortitude consists in the disdain for death incurred in "every hon­
ourable cause." The virtuous man has weighed the good and evil 
arising from corporeal existence and on occasion may choose death.
^Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, 
(Glasgow, 1747), pp. 73-74.
^"The whole frame of our nature shews that we are destined for 
action, and that in virtuous action alone we can find the highest 
happiness, in comparison with which all sensual pleasures appear 
despicable." Ibid. . p. 52.
^  3This sounds similar to Plato's treatment of the virtuous life 
as consisting of wisdom, courage, discipline, and justice. The Re­
public 427. Hutcheson's own training and his associations with Shaf­
tesbury provided him with a knowledge of and respect for classical 
learning.
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If moral evils, and some sympathetlck sufferings are 
worse than any external ones, and can make life shame­
ful and miserable amidst all affluence of other things, 
as we shewed above; If at beBt, life Is but an uncer­
tain possession we must soon lose; we shall see some­
thing that is mo-e to be dreaded than death, and many 
Just reasons why It may on certain occasions be our 
interest to incur the danger of It.
Hutcheson states concerning the virtue of prudence;
Prudence is that habit of attention to the nature 
of the several objects which may sollicit our desires, 
engaging us to a thorough inquiry into their importance, 
in themselves and their consequences, either to the 
greatest private happiness of the individual, or to 
that of the system. This virtue is some way prerequi­
site to the proper exercise of the other three, and is
generally first mentioned in order; tho 'Justice is 
the supreme one to which all the rest are subservient.
We leave it to more practical treatises to dilate upon
these things.^5
Prudence seems to be a discrimination between lower and higher 
goods or objects of desire. This power of discrimination is seated 
in the moral sense.
The prudent man will understand that external goods constitute
a portion of the objects of desire. There Is nothing pernicious in
this; there is nothing evil in Itself about natural desires and pas­
sions; in fact, they may prove quite useful at times The prudent 
man will not shun labor. Labor is not only necessary to procure 
goods and the objects of desire (these desires, of course, are held 
within limits by temperance), but also a necessary part of the
^^Hutcheson, System I, 223.
45Ibid., I, 223-224.
^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 91.
83
happiness of man, especially when contrasted with mere Idleness or 
sloth
The whole former reasonings unite In this conclusion, 
that happiness consists in the virtues of the soul, 
and in the continued exercise of them in good offices: 
to the completion of which however some moderate advan­
tages with respect to the body and fortune are requisite, 
at least that we enjoy health, and such a competence of 
external things as may satisfy the painful cravings of 
nature. From the possession of virtue alone life Is to 
be counted happy: but to make it completely so there
must be a moderate degree of external prosperity
Three of Hutcheson's cardinal virtues have been presented, and,
following the lead of Socrates, Justice must be what is left. Jus-
49tlce is the supreme virtue to which all the rest are subservient. 
Justice Is recosmended to us by the moral sense, and it consists of:
. . . a constant study to promote the most universal 
happiness in our power, by doing all good offices as 
we have opportunity which interfere with no more ex­
tensive interest of the system; preferring always the
^"Does not the universal choice of Mankind, in preferring to 
bear Labour for the Convenlencles and Elegancies of Life, shew that 
their Pleasures are greater than those of Sloth, and that Industry. 
notwithstanding its Tolls, does really increase the Happiness of Man­
kind? Hence it is that in every Nation great Numbers support them­
selves by Meehanick Arts not absolutely necessary; since the Husband­
man is always ready to purchase their Manufactures by the Fruits of 
his Labours. without any Constraint; which they would not do if the 
Pleasures or Happiness of Idleness were greater. This may shew us 
how little Justice there is in imagining an Arcadia» or unactlve 
Golden Age, would ever suit with the present state of the World, or 
produce more Happiness to Men than a vigorous improvement of Arts." 
Hutcheson, A Collection, p. 378.
/ flHutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 56. Aristotle makes a simi­
lar statement about the place of goods in the life of virtue. See 
above, p. 13. Aristotle also says, "mankind do not acquire or pre­
serve virtue by the help of external goods, but external goods by 
the help of virtue, . . ." Aristotle, Politlea. 1323a 41-1323b 1.
^Hutcheson, System I, 224.
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more extensive and Important offices to those of less 
extent and importance; and cautiously abstaining from 
whatever may occasion any unnecessary misery in this 
system. This is the cardinal virtue of justice . . .
The virtuous man in order to actualize justice must perform good 
offices and pronute the most universal happiness. A specific state­
ment about good offices is found in the second volume of A System of 
Moral Philosophy:
'Tis the duty of each individual toward mankind, as well 
as toward his peculiar friends or relations, to follow 
some profession or business subservient to some common 
good. Men of wealth sufficient for themselves and their 
families, are not perhaps obliged to any lucrative pro­
fessions; but they are rather more than others obliged 
to an active life in some service to mankind. The publick 
has this claim upon them: the divine providence calls
them to extend their views of publick good, in contriving 
wise forms of polity, or prudent laws; in encouraging the 
more ingenious and useful arts; in supporting distressed 
innocence; and employing all their weight and influence 
in society for some generous purposes; . . .
Justice requires that each individual perform a Job which fur­
thers the conmon interest in society. For those with wealth which 
places them beyond the necessity of day to day labor, justice makes 
a further demand for good offices. The good offices involved in 
securing justice include aid to the needy, participation in construc­
ting and maintaining wise government, and encouraging technological 
advance which will secure more easily an adequate supply of external 
goods. This in turn will satisfy the "painful cravings of nature"
50Ibid.. I, 222.
^ Ibld. , II, 113. Wealth leads to sufficient leisure for perfor­
mance of good offices. Certain duties are incumbent on the leisure 
class. "More is demanded from such as have had instruction, leisure 
for meditation, and access to better stations." Ibid., I, 241.
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for larger portions of mankind which will allow many a respite from 
long hours of toil, and more time for achievement of man's highest 
happiness, the beatific vision.
There is a further aspect of Justice, and this is the justice 
that is enforced by the state. The virtuous man will be concerned 
that the state be Imbued with the proper administration of justice 
because this has a strong bearing on the life of virtue of individual 
citizens.
High principles of justice universally prevailing in a 
nation are of great importance to the general happiness; 
not to mention the inward satisfactions attending the 
disposition, it creates universal ease and security, as 
it ensures to each one all his valuable rights and en­
joyments, and gives the greatest encouragement to Indus­
try, by ensuring to each one the fruits of his labours.
Whereas a prevalent injustice in the dispositions of a 
people has all the contrary miserable effects of ani­
mosities, wrath, fear, suspicion, and ruin, or grievous 
distresses to families; and as traders must charge on 
their goods higher prices on account of all the ordinary 
losses of trade, by bad debts, by delays of payment, 
and the expensive suits they are forced to for obtaining 
it, the goods of such a nation must come higher on these 
accounts to all markets, and be sold dearer at home, and 
thus the innocent suffer for the guilty: and foreigners
who have greater regards to Justice, are enabled to 
undersell and engross the trade.52
Justice in the state consists of ensuring each one's valuable 
rights and enjoyments and ensuring to each one the fruit of his la­
bors. If these things are not done the people will be generally 
wrathful. The problem of obtaining the necessary goods to satisfy 
legitimate desires will be made more difficult if thievery and fraud
52lbid., II, 321.
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are not prevented. Real Incomes would be lowered as higher costs of 
doing business are passed along to the citizenry. Some Industries 
may be forced to cease operation by foreign competition. Many citi­
zens now must return to less productive endeavors to obtain life's 
necessary goods, and the good life retreats further and further from 
view. Such are the effects of injustice In the state.
Hutcheson's treatment of justice is somewhat similar to that of 
Plato who says in The Republic that Justice is "keeping to what be-
C  -1longs to one and doing one's own job." Hutcheson's discussion of 
the economic consequences of injustice is more extensive than Plato’s. 
We might enquire as to what is the real difference between Hutcheson 
and the classical writers. Seemingly, there Is not much. Both ac­
knowledge fortune's power in attaining goods, and both acknowledge 
the function of goods In the good life.
One difference between Hutcheson and the writers of classical 
antiquity lies in Hutcheson's treatment of technological development 
as part of the life of virtue. Also Hutcheson's detailed treatment 
of the economic effects of Injustice may indicate a larger concern 
with economic analysis than the classics exhibited. Although many of 
Hutcheson's points about the life of virtue are similar to those of 
older thinkers, his moral sense doctrine places him as a mediator 
between ancients and moderns. We shall see that the moral sense doc­
trine has influenced the direction of economic thought through the 
influence of Hutcheson on Adam Smith.
-*^Plato, The Republic, 433-434.
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Natural Rights
Hutcheson has an idea of the best regime, and it is one that
allows man's natural rights to flourish fully. The rights of man
are ultimately legitimated by the moral sense. Man is capable of
such knowledge from his very nature; "From this Sense too we derive
54our Ideas of Rights."
Man has natural rights because of the type of being that he is-- 
a being with a moral sense and natural appetites.
The private rights of individuals are pointed out 
by their senses and natural appetites, recommending 
and pursuing such things as tend to their happiness: 
and our moral faculty or conscience shews us, that 
each one should be allowed full liberty to procure 
what may be for his own innocent advantage or plea­
sure , nay that we should maintain and defend it to 
him.
To discover therefore these private rights we 
should first attend to the several natural principles
or appetites in men, and then turn our views toward
the general interests of society, and of all around 
them: that where we find no obstruction to the happi­
ness of others, or to the camnon good, thence ensuing 
we should deem it the right of each individual to do, 
possess, or demand and obtain from others, whatever 
may tend to his own innocent advantage or pleasure.
Private rights are either natural or adventitious.
The former sort, nature itself has given to each one, 
without any human grant or institution. The adven­
titious depend upon some human deed or i n s t i t u t i o n . ^
A natural right exists for men to pursue their own innocent ad­
vantages or pleasures where no obstruction to the happiness of others 
ensues. The moral sense can harmonize natural rights and the happi­
ness of others.
■^Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 256. 
^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 141.
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Perfect rights refer to those which cannot be taken away (at 
least under normal circumstances). The perfect, natural rights of 
mankind are:
1. A right to life, and to retain their bodies un- 
maimed. 2. A right to preserve their chastity.
3. A right to an unblamished (sic) character for 
coninon honesty, so as not to be deemed unfit for 
human society. 4. A right of liberty, or of acting 
according to one's own judgment and inclination with­
in the bounds of the law of nature. 5. A right 
over life, so far that each one, as any honourable 
services to society or his friends, may expose him­
self not only to dangers, but to certain death, when 
such public good is an view as overballances the value 
of his life. This our conscience, or moral sense, and 
love of virtue will strongly recommend to us in many 
cases. 7. (sic) There's also a sense deeply infixed 
by nature, of each one's right of private judgment, 
or of judging for himself in all matters of duty,
especially as to religion; . .
These rights though perfect may be taken away under special cir­
cumstances. For instance, society might violate the liberty of a 
felon if that procures a more universal happiness in the state. It 
is a difficult matter to state rules of social behavior that are ab­
solutely limnutable: ", . .we must not imagine that all the special
precepts of the law of nature are thus Inimitable as they are conmonly
enunciated universally . . . some singular cases may happen in which
departing from the ordinary rule may be more for the general interest 
than following it . . .
-^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, pp. 141-142. 
5^Hutcheson, System,!, 272.
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Among the rights of man, Hutcheson burned with a warm heat to 
extend a love of liberty and religious toleration among his stu­
dents.^® There is no reason why these should not be extended.
Since the moral sense exists In men and is generally operable, there 
is no reason to expect that freedom will be generally abused. The 
limit to freedom of action occurs when an act stands in opposition 
to the higher happiness of society. These limits are evident to us.
. . .  It is for the good of the system that every desire 
and sense natural to us, even those of the lowest kinds, 
should be gratified as far as their gratification is 
consistent with the nobler enjoyments, and in a just 
subordination to them; there seems a natural notion of 
right to attend them all. We think we have a right to 
gratify them, as soon as we form moral notions, until 
we discover some opposition between these lower ones, 
and some principle we naturally feel to be superior to 
them. This very sense of right seems the foundation of 
that sense of liberty, that claim we all naturally in­
sist upon to act according to our own inclination in 
gratifying any desire, until we see the Inconsistence 
of its gratification with some superior principles . . .
We condemn the man who should by violence, without the 
just cause, obstruct the enjoyments of a third person 
with whom we are not concerned.^9
Religious toleration demands our approbation because sanctions 
and penalties enforced against persons holding certain beliefs or 
opinions can hardly ever change those beliefs, although they may
58 "As he had occasion every year in the course of his lectures 
to explain the origin of government, and compare the different forms 
of it, he took peculiar care, while on that subject, to inculcate the 
importance of civil and religious liberty to the happiness of man­
kind: as a warm love of liberty, and manly zeal for promoting it,
were ruling principles in his own breast." Ibid., I, xxxv.
59Ibid., I, 254-255.
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change outward professions of belief.^ The danger of religious 
bigotry Is that it leads to pride and vanity in the infallibility of 
the bigot's understanding. Possession of absolute truth frequently 
leads to intolerance of untruth, and Intolerance may lead to such 
excesses as the torture and burning of h e r e t i c s . I f  this occurs, 
then the violation of a man's natural right to his opinion has led 
to the violation of the natural right of life and liberty. Religious 
intolerance may lead to multiplied injustice, and the good regime 
must prevent such a situation from occurring. The conduct approved 
in religious matters is unprejudiced Inquiry and a good dose of humil­
ity to prevent the growth of pride and vanity.
Religious tolerance like other natural rights is not without its 
exceptions. Hutcheson explains several cases in which the state may
**°Hutcheson, Passions and Affections, p. 33.
^ " W e  all know the notions entertained by the vulgar concerning 
all hereticks; we know the pride of schoolmen and many ecclesias- 
ticks; how it galls their insolent vanity that any man should assume 
to himself to be wiser than they in tenets of religion by differing 
from them. When this insolent pride is long indulged by the enjoy­
ment of power and popular veneration, it grows prodigious; and, it 
may explain how such men, and their implicite votaries, can behold 
with joy the most horrid tortures of men truly Innocent, but dres­
sed up in all the forms of impiety, and wickedness." Hutcheson, 
System I , 167.
62Hutcheson may have more keenly felt the need for religious 
toleration than others. He was definitely a theological liberal 
tending toward Deism. Hutcheson was prosecuted unsuccessfully for 
heresy by the Presbytery of Glasgow for "teaching to his students 
in contravention to the Westminister Confession the following two 
false and dangerous doctrines, 1st that the standard of moral good­
ness was the promotion of the happiness of others; and 2nd that we 
could have a knowledge of good and evil, without, and prior to a 
knowledge of God." John Rae, Life of Adam Smith (London, 1895), 
p. 13.
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deny toleration. The state may repress expereaslons of direct 
atheism, or the denial of moral providence, or the denial of the 
obligations of moral or social virtues. This repression is particu­
larly necessary if such tenets lead to violation of rights or inva­
sion of property of others, for these actions would . . tend to 
hurt the state In its most important Interests: . . . "  However,
since persecution by the state often leads to martyrdom and sympathy 
for the persecuted, It may be well to extend freedom of speech and 
toleration to Include expressions of impiety. . . some have looked
upon it as a piece of prudence in magistrates, where there is no mani­
fest danger of the spreading of such opinions, to let them alone to
63the common sense of mankind to be confuted and despised: . . . 
Judgments of this type must be made in view of prevailing circumstan­
ces and the greatest happiness of the greatest number of members of
64the body politic.
In addition to rights of liberty and opinion, perfect rights 
exist to the fruits of one's labor and to demand the performance of 
contracts. Property rights are perfect rights because It has been
63Hutcheson, System, II, 313-314.
64"We form our general rule or precept from what we see tends 
to good in all ordinary cases. But should we see that In some rarer 
cases a different conduct would in the whole of its effects do 
greater good than the following the ordinary rule in these cases 
also, we then have as good a law of nature preceptive or permissive 
to recede from the ordinary rule In those rarer cases, as we have 
to follow it in ordinary cases. These exceptions are parts of the 
law, as well as the general rule." Ibid., II, 120.
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found that a guarantee of property makes labor agreeable to the
citizenry and encourages them In Industrious activity which is good
for society as a whole.
Whatever institution therefore shall be found necessary 
to promote universal diligence and patience, and make 
labour agreeable or eligible to mankind, oust also tend 
to the publick good; and institutions or practices which 
discourage Industry must be pernicious to mankind. Nov 
nothing can so effectually excite men to constant patience 
and diligence in all sorts of useful industry, as the 
hopes of future wealth, ease, and pleasure to themselves, 
their offspring, and all who are dear to them, . . .
All these hopes are presented to men by securing to 
every one the fruits of his own labours . . .65
The perfect right of demanding performance of a contract stems
from the simple necessities of comnercial life. " . . .  from the
necessity of commerce, it must appear, that the rights founded on
contracts are of the perfect sort, to be pursued even by force."^
The place of prudence among the virtues has been acknowledged. If
contracts are not enforced, the procuring of necessary goods by the
prudent man will become much more difficult, and the complete life
of virtue will become more remote. Even if a man makes a foolish
contract, he may be forced to fulfill it because the allowing of
violation of contracts may be more pernicious to society than one
man's misery. "But the allowing men to recede from all imprudent
contracts would be of far greater detriment, as it would obstruct
all commerce, or occasion innumerable inextricable debates.
65Ibid., I, 320-321.
^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 178,
^Hutcheson, System II, A,
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In explicit contradiction of Hobbes, Hutcheson expounds the 
rights of children to life and liberty. Hobbes maintained that 
children were simply goods or chattels due to the mother's property 
right in her own body and the father's possession of all the rights 
of the mother. Hutcheson holds that it is God who ordains procre­
ation and God who directly forms the principal part of every man, 
the soul.00 If any property rights exist over children, the prop­
erty rights belong to God, not man. The children of slaves are born 
free for this very reason.88 God is the legitimation of liberty In 
this case, and the cause of liberty itself may require occasional 
repression of atheism.^
Hutcheson classifies another group of rights as Imperfect 
rights. Imperfect rights cannot call for the use of violence In 
obtaining them. Violation of Imperfect rights men of no
previous good.^ The right of the poor to charity is an Imperfect 
right. Hutcheson realizes quite well that men cannot pursue the
68Ibid., II, 191.
69Ibld., II, 210.
^^Hutcheson Is more liberal than Locke on the repression of 
atheism. Hutcheson was willing to grant toleration to atheists if 
at times it seemed prudent to do so. Locke states that atheism must 
not be allowed at all. "Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated 
who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which 
are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.
The taking away of God, though but even In thought, dissolves all; 
. . . "  John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration. In The Works of 
John Locke, VI (London, 1823), 47.
^Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 258.
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good life until the bare necessities of life are net. But this
should not prove too great a problem because: “The world Is so well
provided for the support of Mankind, that scarce any Person In good
health need be straightened In bare Necessaries."^^ Charity Is a
duty of the virtuous life, but like other actions the act of charity
requires prudent judgement.
Several prudent cautions and general rules are delivered 
about liberality. First, that It be not hurtful to the 
morals of the object, under a false shew of advantage, 
by encouraging them In sloth, meanness of temper, or any 
vicious dispositions; and again, that It be not so Immo­
derate as to exhaust Its own fountain, . . .73
Violation of imperfect rights would not cause universal misery 
as would be the case if perfect rights were violated. The man who 
violates imperfect rights of others simply betrays excessive self- 
love, but his actions are not positively evil as is the case when 
perfect rights are violated.^ In addition to the distinction be­
tween perfect and imperfect rights, Hutcheson classes rights as 
either alienable or unalienable. Some rights can be given away, 
some cannot.
Our rights are either alienable or unalienable. The 
former are known by these two characteristics Jointly; 
that the translation of them to others can be made 
effectually, and that some interest of society, or 
individuals consistently with it, may frequently re­
quire such translations. Thus our right to our goods
^Hutcheson, Collection, p. 372,
73Hutcheson, System I, 306.
^Hutcheson, Inquiry, pp. 258-259.
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and labours is naturally alienable, But where 
either the translation cannot be made with any 
effect or where no good in human life requires 
It, the right is unalienable, and cannot be justly 
claimed by any other but the person originally 
possessing lt.^5
Finally, the apprehension of natural rights by the moral sense 
leads to the knowledge of the equality of mankind. Natural rights 
belong equally to all men.^ If they are denied, anger and unhappi­
ness result. The moral sense Instructs us to pursue the greatest 
happiness of mankind. Therefore, we will be vitally Interested In 
the type of polity which can most effectually act as guarantor of 
these natural rights.
In addition to natural rights, there are certain duties that 
are incumbeqt on the citizenry. The first is to promote the connon 
interest as vigorously as possible while fulfilling our duties toward 
the less extensive groups in society with which more Intimate
?5Ibid.t p. 261. If this discussion of unalienable rights and 
of perfect rights to life and liberty sounds very much like Thomas 
Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, this may be more than 
coincidence. One of Jefferson’s favourite professors at William and 
Mary was William Small, a Scotsman who graduatedM.A. from Aberdeen 
in 1755. David Fordyce who was well steeped In the works of Shaftes­
bury, Molesworth, and Hutcheson taught at Aberdeen but left In 1750 
for a tour on the Continent. Small may not have studied under For­
dyce, but it seems likely that Fordyce*s ideas would still be under 
discussion at Aberdeen by the time of Small's matriculation. Her­
bert L. Gantner, "William Small, Jefferson’s Beloved Teacher " Wil­
liam and Mary Quarterly, IV (October, 1947), 505-506. Dictionary of 
National Biography, 1950. VII, 432.
Even If this connection did not occur, in 1765 Jefferson recom­
mended An Introduction to Moral Philosophy as proper reading material 
in Ethics for a law student. Roy J. Honeywell, The Educational Work 
of Thomas Jefferson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1931), pp. 217-218.
^^Hutcheson, System, p. 299.
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association Is made.77 The second Is to fulfill the duties which our 
job in society requires of us, whether we are artisan, merchant, far­
mer, or philosopher.78 Next, since education is vitally Important to
the complete functioning of the moral sense, parents have a duty to
79provide children with the necessary education. Finally, If the
state Is wisely administered, the citizens will realize that much good
accrues to them from the polity Itself and from the laws. There
exists a duty for each citizen to obey the laws, work toward further
improvement In the state, and if necessary hazard his life for its 
BOpreservation.
Suanary
Hutchespn's views on the good for men can be summarized. Reason 
itself cannot be used to know the good, but an Internal faculty of 
man, the moral sense, can be used for this purpose. The moral sense 
apprehends an objective standard of good which Is gratification of 
the highest pleasures. The highest pleasures are love to God and the 
practice of benevolence toward fellow men. The life of benevolence 
is synonymous with the life of virtue which consists of justice,
77Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 81.
78mAs our reason and moral faculty shew us our station and Its 
duties, the same power must shew us when we are recalled, what the 
duties of life are, when It Is to be exposed even to the greatest 




temperance, fortitude, and prudence. Justice for Hutcheson consists 
of the maintenance of property rights and everyone performing his 
job. For those who are able Justice also requires charity, Involve­
ment in wise statecraft, and technological Improvement.
Hutcheson's treatment of justice includes a somewhat more de­
tailed account of economic activity than that given by the ancients.
Finally, the good life requires the guarantee of certain perfect 
rights of man such as life, liberty, and freedom of opinion. These 
rights are directly apprehended by the moral sense.
What does all this have to do with the development of economic 
thought? The moral sense doctrine makes man a self-sufficient moral 
entity.
Although education plays a role in removing moral confusions, it 
is each man's internal moral sense that gives him the idea of good. 
The moral sense directs men's actions.
"It remains then, 'That as the Author of Nature has determin'd
us to receive, by our external Senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas
of Objects . . .  so he has given us a Moral Sense to direct our 
A1Actions, . . . We ahall see that the idea of man's moral self- 
sufficiency plays an Important part in the development of laissez- 
faire economics.
®^-Hutcheson, Inquiry. pp. 123-124.
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The virtue of Justice demands that those with wealth and leisure 
develop means for more efficient production. This Is very different 
from the conception of leisure held by Plato and Aristotle; leisure
was necessary for contemplation and study of the nature of eternal
82reality or the good. Leisure is a means for achieving happiness
through the life of Intellectual activity which is pursued for no
other reason than its own sake. Concerning leisure and happiness
Aristotle makes the following statement:
But leisure of itself gives pleasure and happiness and 
enjoyment of life, which are experienced, not by the 
busy man, but by those who have leisure. For he who 
Is occupied has In view some end which he has not attained; 
but happiness Is an end, since all men deem It to be 
accompanied with pleasure and not with pain. This 
pleasure, however, is regarded differently by different
persons, and varies according to the habit of Indivi­
duals; the pleasure of the best man is the best, and
springs from the noblest sources. It Is clear then 
that there are branches of learning and education which 
we must study merely with a view to leisure spent In 
intellectual activity, and these are to be valued for 
their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which 
are useful In business are to be deemed necessary, and 
exist for the sake of other things,®-*
Aristotle states that leisure makes Intellectual activity possi­
ble which leads to the happiness of contemplation, Hutcheson states 
that leisure may lead to Intellectual activity, but service to man­
kind (perhaps through techonologlcal invention) should be the end of
®^For an excellent study of this topic see: John C. Eckalbar,
"Work and Leisure in the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle," (unpub 
llshed Master's thesis, Louisiana State University, 1972).
S^Aristotle, Polltica, 1338a 1-13.
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Buch intellectual a c t i v i t y , T h e  life of contemplation of the good 
is not emphasized by Hutcheson. However, the life of business and 
action in service to mankind is given emphasis. Since the moral sense 
can apprehend the good quickly,®^ contemplative activity has less 
importance.
We know that vise statecraft constitutes a legitimate use of 
leisure; certainly the study of political economy would come under 
the rubric of wise statecraft. It would seem that political economy 
could become a legitimate study in its own right as an important part 
of the life of virtue. In 1776, thirty years after Hutcheson's death, 
Adam Smith presented a brilliant example of such a study. We turn 
now to an exposition of Hutcheson's ideas on statecraft and political 
economy.
®*"Men of wealth sufficient for themselves and their families, 
are not perhaps obliged to any lucrative professions; but they are 
rather more than others obliged to an active life in some service to 
mankind," Hutcheson, System II. 113.
®5see above, p. 68.
HUTCHESON'S POLITICS AMD ECONOMICS 
Hutcheson has presented us with a picture of the good life for 
man. There exists a form of polity that Is moat conducive to the 
good life. In addition to dealing with specifics of state organiza­
tion, Hutcheson felt compelled to discuss the origin of the state 
and the social contract. In the manner of other natural right thin­
kers, the state of nature is discussed In order to show man's nature 
as It truly is, before any civilizing forces have Influenced him.
The discussion is continued In order to show how the state develops 
out of the very nature of man.
Politics
Hutcheson Is flatly opposed to Hobbes' war of all against all
as the description of the state of nature. Men are disposed toward
benevolence even In primitive conditions because of the operation
of the moral faculty.*" This Is not to Bay that violence and wars may
not occur. Men's moral sense may be obscured at times by confusion
and superstition. However, violence is not the rule in the state of
nature, but an exception to the rule.
'Tls true that In this state of liberty where there are 
no civill laws with a visible power to execute their
*■". . . the state of nature Is that of peace and goodwill, of 
Innocence and beneficence, and not of violence, war, and rapine: as 
both the immediate sense of duty In our hearts, and the rational con­




sanctions, men will often do Injurious actions con­
trary to the laws of their nature; and the resentments 
of the sufferers will produce wars and violence. But 
this proves nothing as to the true nature of that 
state, since all the laws and obligations of that state 
enjoin peace and justice and beneficence. In civil 
societies many disobey the law, by theft and violence, 
but we do not thence conclude that a political state Is 
a state of war among own thus united.2
Violence can originate among the depraved In a state of nature 
or In civil society. Violence may legitimately be used to stymie the 
perpetrators of violence. If a perfect right of an Individual Is vio­
lated in the state of nature this constitutes a just cause of war. If 
this were not true, then there could be no security of rights against 
a small, depraved minority of men. However, there exist bounds beyond 
which violence should not continue. If the transgressor desists from 
Injury either voluntarily or under compulsion and offers compensation 
for damages and security for the future, then violence should end.^ 
Regardless of his statements about the tranquility of the state 
of nature, Hutcheson discusses the role of violence in the formation 
of civil society. First men may require prodding by an authority to 
encourage them to exercise their right and duty of violence against 
criminals. Men, because of fear, might be inclined to let their 
actions tend to be ineffective.
For altho* men were not generally so depraved, and that 
even humanity and conscience restrained the generality
^Hutcheson, System I, 281.
^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, pp. 234-236.
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from injurlea, and Inclined them to give aid to any 
who happened to be wronged: yet multltudea would
omit this duty through fear and cowardice, If It ex­
posed themselves to danger. Nay further; a sufficient 
number of honest brave men, If they were not directed 
by some head, and that united In their efforts, would 
run Into the most different measures, according to 
their different sentiments; and when thus disjoined 
would become a prey even to a smaller number of less 
bravery, who were united In their counseled
It seems that we have arrived at a potential state of war as the 
basis for the state. This is at least part of Hutcheson's theory of 
the state, but there Is some difference between this theory and 
Hobbes' war of all against all. In Hutcheson's state of nature, 
violence Is originally perpetrated by a relatively small number of 
men, but If these are not quickly subdued, fear and violence may be­
come widespread and ruin an otherwise tranquil situation. For this 
reason men may form combinations and agree on leadership and a plan 
of action to preserve their perfect rights.
Hobbes makes no intimation that the majority of men posit moral 
ends for themselves and are pushed into the use of force by a de­
praved minority. All men simply posit arbitrary ends for themselves 
and seek to pursue them. All men seek to preserve their lives, and 
there Is no particular expectation that violence will be under the 
constraint of a moral sense. Any engine of destruction, and genocide, 




. . . the condition of Men, . . .  is a condition of 
Warre of every one against every one; In which case 
every one Is governed by his own Reason; and there 
la nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help 
unto him, in preserving his life against his eneatyes;
It followeth, that in Buch a condition, every man has 
a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body.^
This Is precisely the view of man which Hutcheson opposes. In 
the state of nature a great majority of men do not feel that they 
have a right to everything because the moral sense apprehends moral 
ends for these men. Threfore, under a regime of freedom, we can 
expect decent conduct from most individuals. It Is only a small 
minority of depraved men, who are present In the state of nature and 
civil society, that must be repressed. There is no need for a thor­
oughgoing leviathan state to ensure peace. Most men can live In har­
mony without authoritarian control. Certainly, Hutcheson's judgment 
about the behavior of men plays an important part In his support of 
liberal forms of polity. Also. Hutcheson's support of a regime of 
freedom rests on an empirical method which consists of introspection, 
appeal to history, and observation of men.
Fear of violence and loss of perfect rights is not the whole 
story of the origin of society. Men desire an association with 
fellow-men for a variety of reasons.
One can scarce deny to mankind a natural impulse to society 
with their fellows, as an ianedlate principle, when we 
see the like In many species of animals; nor should we 
ascribe all associating to their indigence. Their other
^Hobbes, Leviathan. 64.
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principles, their curiosity, communicativeness, desire 
of action; their sense of honour, their compassion, benev­
olence, gaiety, and the moral faculty, could have little 
or no exercise In solitude, and therefore might lead 
them to haunt together, even without an lmedlate or 
ultimate impulse, or a sense of their Indigence,
Although it is possible that the need for protection of perfect
rights spurred the formation of the state. It is equally possible
that the state was formed due to man's need for companionship and
cooDunlcatlon, and his search for that good life beyond mere survival.
In any case when society is formed a social contract is struck with
three specific parts to it.
To constitute a state or civil polity in a regular manner 
these three deeds are necessary: first a contract of each
one with all, that they shall unite Into one society to be 
governed by one counsel. And next a decree or ordinance 
of the people, concerning the plan of government, and the 
nomination of the governors; and lastly another covenant or 
contract between these governors and the people, binding 
the rulers to a faithful administration of their trust, 
and the people to obedience.?
Hutcheson held that there was no divine right given to any man 
or group to rule. Even superior wisdom cannot always be a legitimate 
criterion for rulers, because this trait may on occasion be feigned
aby unscrupulous men in order to gain power. This is not to say that
^Hutcheson, System I, 34-35.
?Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 286.
®"But as no man can give such evidence as shall satisfy his fel­
lows of his superior goodness and wisdom, and remove suspicions of 
his weakness and interested views; as there is no acknowledged cri­
terion of superior wisdom for governing; and multitudes at once would 
pretend to It; as there is no assurance can be given of good inten­
tions, to which the worst might by hypocritical services pretend: 
and as a people cannot be happy while their interests precariously
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men of wisdom should not be entrusted with the civil power; we simply
must exercise caution in selecting our rulers and in drawing up
the plan of government and means of selecting the governors. The
wisdom of Hutcheson's governors seems to contain a large element of
scientific or technological brilliance.
But there's something in our nature which more lsmedlately 
recotmoends civil power to us. Some of our species are 
manifestly superior In wisdom to the vulgar, as the vul­
gar are often sensible. These of superior sagacity, as
all must own, are capable of contriving and inventing many 
things of consequence to the common utility of multitudes, 
and of pointing out more effectual methods for each one to
promote his own Interest, If their directions are complied 
with. 
It has been shown that Hutcheson was very concerned with tech­
nological improvement and thought that this task was particularly 
incumbent on the wealthy; however, it is not clear from this pas­
sage what sort of directions Hutcheson expected from this group of 
wise citizens. Perhaps, these directions are simply technological 
suggestions rather than a thoroughgoing direction of the economy by 
experts, It would seem Ironic if Hutcheson who had posited man's 
self-sufficiency In the moral realm as the basis for liberty hedged 
against more radical extension of liberty in the economic realm due
depend on persons of suspected goodness or wisdom; these qualities 
cannot be among men, the natural foundations of power; nor can it 
serve the general interest that they should be deemed sufficient 
to constitute such a right of governing, or of compelling others 
to obedience. Some extraordinary cases may be excepted." Hutcheson, 
System I, 267.
QHutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 280,
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to man's Insufficiency. Adam Smith attacks this very point of the 
economic Insufficiency of man so powerfully In the Wealth of Nations. 
while holding onto the Idea of man's moral self-sufficiency. It Is 
possible that Hutcheson, like Smith, saw the need for a council of 
experts for imposing the optimum tariff on foreign goods.^
The main point here la that the wisdom necessary for governing 
Is the wisdom of securing prosperity. "But in all governments, even 
the most absolute, the natural end of the trust Is acknowledged on 
all sides to be the prosperity and safety of the whole body."** As 
has been shown above, the wisdom necessary for living the life of 
virtue Is found In all men to a greater or lesser degree; and the 
state does not have to work as hard in guiding men toward the vir­
tuous life as conceived by the earlier natural law thinkers. The 
virtue that should be exercised through the state is the virtue of 
prudence. This change of viewpoint concerning the nature of politi­
cal wisdom Is reflected In the overriding concern of modern govern­
ments with economic affairs.
^^Hutcheson seems to be concerned with the employment aspect 
of tariffs and subsidies. "Foreign materials should be Imported and 
even premiums given, when necessary, that all our own hands may be 
employed; and that, by exporting them again manufactured, we may ob­
tain from abroad the price of our labours Foreign manufactures and 
products ready for consumption, should be made dear to the consumer 
by high duties, If we cannot altogether prohibit the consumption;
. . ." Hutcheson, System II, 319. Smith discusses the relationship 
between tariffs and employment, but the politicians must also Judge 
the propriety of retaliatory tariffs which are proper If they secure 
a reduction In foreign tariffs. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 
ed. by Edwin Cannan, (New York, 1937), p. 435.
^-Hutcheson, System II, 271.
107
Hutcheson has definite Ideas on the proper form of government for 
securing peace and prosperity. One foundation of good government 
derives from the social contract Itself; that Is the principle of 
consent and the right of resistance. If men see the government fallen 
into bad hands, they cannot be made happy by being bludgeoned Into 
submission. The greatest happiness of the greatest number of citizens 
Is what government should be about, and the right of resistance acts 
as an ultimate sanction against violation of this principle. Al- 
though those with superior political wisdom are most fit to rule,
they have only an Imperfect right to rule because It Is possible for
evil men to pretend possession of political wlBdom In order to gain 
power. There exists no right to rule without consent.^ The prin­
ciple of consent and the right of resistance are not to be feared as 
the causes of continual unrest and violence as Hobbes would hold. In 
fact these principles are the only ones upon which a regime of peace 
can be built. Civil war and rebellion are much more likely to occur 
In polities where unlimited power Is In the hands of the governors.
"There Is no hope of making a peaceful world or country, by means of
such tenets as the unlimited powers of governors, and the unlawfulness 
of all resistance.
12Ibid., I, 300-301.
13In fact the principle of consent may become a very conserva­
tive principle. "And where the Just rights of mankind are asserted 
and generally believed, yet there Is such a general love of ease, 
such proneness to esteem any tolerable governors, such a fondness 
for antlent customs and laws, and abhorrence of what is contrary to 
them; such fear of dangers from any convulsions of state, and such
108
A prudent point In constitution making la to devise an Insti­
tutional framework which will minimize damage to the state when 
power falls Into bad hands. Certainly, It Is evident that no system 
of government Is perfect, and the possibility of evil men gaining 
power must be taken Into account by the laws.^ However, no form of 
government Is absolutely the best. There Is no particular ancient 
polity or divine revelation that can answer all questions about govern­
ment . Men must use what wisdom they have to draw up and agree upon 
the best regime.
God has not by any revelation determined the forma of 
government, the quantity of power to be committed, or the 
manner of succession, nor has he named the governors of 
any nations now in the world. His law requires that 
government should be settled; as It requires all other 
means of publlck good. But the form of polity, and the 
degrees of power to be committed, are left to human 
prudence.
After the proper form of government has been agreed upon the 
rights and duties proper to the state derive from the greatest happi­
ness principle. The state has a right to demand military service 
from the citizenry, Just as citizens have a duty to support a good 
polity;1^ that Is one which Is effectual in producing happiness.
advantages enjoyed or hoped for under the present administration, 
that It is seldom practicable to accomplish any changes, or to get 
sufficient numbers to concur In any violent efforts for that purpose, 
against a government established by long custom and law, even where 





The state has the right to punish criminals. "The noblest spring 
of punishment is extensive goodness, or a regard to the safety and 
happiness of the community. Based on the greatest happiness 
principle the state should also perform the following actions; de­
mand divulgence of inventions useful to man, compel the able-bodied 
to labor, prevent suicide and abortion because of the potential use­
fulness of persons to society, and allow emigration from the body 
politic to those who wish to do so.*®
Property rights also come under the sway of the greatest happi­
ness principle. We know that men must be guaranteed the fruits of 
their own labors in order to prevent anger and rebellion. They may
be allowed to store up goods far in excess of their needs strictly for
19purposes of barter and encouragement of cotmnerce. However, some
limitB may be placed on accumulation of land If It seems that one man
Is unduly restricting the means of subsistence of many others.
One head of a family, by his first arriving with his 
domesticks upon a vast island capable of supporting
a thousand families, must not pretend to property In
17Ibid., II, 97.
18Ibid.. II, 105-109. On the justice of allowing emigration 
Hutcheson says; "But when a state Is In no present danger, It seems 
contrary to humanity and justice to make It a trap to Its subjects, 
so as not to allow them, upon any rational prospect of advantage 
to themselves, to leave It, and unite themselves to any other body 
politick, provided that they sell their lands to some remaining 
subject, and make compensation for any advantages they derived from 
the state at its expence." Ibid.. II, 230.
^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 158, John Locke held that 
money was the proper medium of accumulation, not goods. See above, 
pp. 50-51.
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the whole. Ue may acquire ae much as there's any 
probability he can cultivatet but what is beyond this 
remains common, Nor can any state, on account of itB 
fleets first arriving on a vast continent, capable of 
holding several empires, and which its colonies can 
never sufficiently occupy, claim to Itself the dominion 
of the whole continent.
The ownership of property might need to be zealously defended 
and preserved or, on occasion, expropriated. This depends on which 
course of action is most conducive to the happiness of the community. 
Political power derives, to some extent, from the ownership of prop­
erty. If property and political power are exclusively in wicked 
hands then, perhaps, expropriation la needed. If property ownership
21coincides with good polity, preservation of ownership is called for.
We recall that the moral sense directs us toward the most uni­
versal happiness possible. The state should also be guided by this 
principle. When a good form of polity is developed, the state should 
not be averse to imposing such a polity by force on a stupid and pre­
judiced people. This is an exception to the right of consent, but it 
is done with the knowledge that the happiness of the world is being
20Ibid., p. 156.
2^,rA Democracy cannot remain stable unless the property be so 
diffused among the people that no such cabal of a few as could probably 
unite in any design, shall have a fund of wealth sufficient to support 
a force superior to that of the rest , . . when power has its natural 
foundation of property it will be lasting, but may, in some forms, be 
very pernicious and oppressive to the whole body of the people; and it 
must be the more pernicious that it will be very permanent, there 
being no sufficient force to overturn or controul it. And this shews 
the great care requisite in settling a just plan, and a suitable di­
vision of property, and in taking precautions against any such change 
in property as may destroy a good plan: this should be the view of
Agrarian laws." Hutcheson, System II, 247,
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Increased, and that consent will be granted by the Indigenous people 
after a short trial with the new form of government.22 This Is not 
to say that colonists have no right of resistance. They have such a 
right when the mother country acts In such a way that the happiness 
of the colonists Is subordinated to the Interests of the mother coun­
try; or when mild, limited government becomes arbitrary and absolute.23
In A System of Moral Philosophy, Hutcheson gives a good summa­
tion of what all legislation should attempt to accomplish:
As the end of all laws should be the general good and 
happiness of a people, which chiefly depends on their 
virtue; It must be the business of legislation to promote, 
by all just and effectual methods, true principles of 
virtue, such as shall lead men to piety to God, and 
all Just, peaceable, and kind dispositions toward their 
fellows; that they may be Inclined to every good office, 
and faithful In every trust committed to them In their 
several stations.24
It has been shown above that the virtuous life contains Important 
economic elements, particularly the virtues of prudence and justice.
We turn now to a more complete discussion of Hutcheson's views on eco­
nomic life.
Economics
Hutcheson held that the comparative wealth of a nation consisted 
of the quantity of goods which could be exported. This does not seem 
to be the mercantilist view which identifies wealth with gold as such.
22Ibid., II, 231.
23Ibid., II, 307-309. 
2^Ibld., II, 310.
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The quantity of goods which can be exported are the goods which are 
produced In excess of subsistence needs, and foreign trade supports 
employment, populousness, and the good of the whole,^
In addition to concern over the wealth of a nation, Hutcheson was 
concerned with the distribution of wealth In society, because this 
determined to some extent what type of polity could exist. We know 
that on occasion the state might be Justified In expropriating prop­
erty, but Hutcheson saw at least the possibility of a society in which 
republican government could flourish without constant expropriation 
and appeal to the laws. That Boclety Is the liberal economic regime, 
one In which the right to buy and sell Is guaranteed to all, and trad­
ing and manufacture Is prohibited to none.
Different states may admit of different degrees of wealth 
without danger. If the agrarian law limits men to too small 
fortunes; It discourages the Industry of the more able hands 
In trade or manufactures. If It allows too much wealth, 
some cabal of potent families may enslave the rest. With­
out any such laws some mixed states are safe, provided the 
lords can sell their estates, and trade and manufactures 
flourish among the plebeians; and they have access to the 
places of greatest profit and power. By these means, with­
out any law, wealth may be sufficiently diffused.26
25t>The comparative Wealth of any Country Is plainly proportioned 
to the Quantity of the whole Produce of Husbandry, and other Mechanick 
Arts which it can export. Upon the Wealth of any Country, when other 
circumstances are equal, does Its Strength depend, or its Power In 
comparison with others." Hutcheson, Collection, pp. 378-379. "Again, 
If Navigation and foreign Trade will support more Hen than domestick 
Industry and Barter, It may really tend to the good of the whole, tho 
It endangers many Lives. Five Millions subsisting In any Country by 
help of foreign Trade, is a greater Advantage In the whole than four 
Millions without Trade, tho in each Age twenty Thousand should perish 
by Shipwrecks." Ibid., p. 380.
^Hutcheson, System II, 259.
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It must be clear from this passage that Hutcheson had a vision 
of the liberal economic world, not a totalitarian one. This vision 
has on occasion obtained in western economies. Technological advance 
Is pursued by experts, and the freedom to make contracts and to oper­
ate a business is guaranteed. Technological advances are incorporated 
Into society if they prove profitable; they are not imposed by flat. 
Although Hutcheson is concerned with the production and distri­
bution of wealth, he cautions men not to become enamored with wealth 
for Its own sake or the pursuit of wealth. The pursuit of wealth may 
lead to madness and insatiable desire. Great wealth may have an ad­
verse effect on the character, particularly on children of the wealthy.
Such traits as humility, Industry, and courage may be lost, while in-
2 7solence, debauchery, and pride become paramount. However, for men 
with the proper frame of mind, the pursuit of wealth can be moderate 
and a matter of no great disappointment when failure occurs. These 
men of moderate mind understand the usefulness of wealth, but do not 
attach moral dignity and all happiness to wealth. The proper use 
of wealth is as a fund for good offices and secondarily as a giver
of convenience and pleasure.29 Hutcheson states that: ". . . Virtue
30Is the chief Happiness in the universal judgment of Mankind."
Wealth is only a means for more widespread performance of good offices
22Hutcheson, Passions and Affections, pp. 193-194.
2®Hutcheson, System I, 112.
29Ibld., I, 109.
-*®Hutcheeon, Inquiry, p. 228.
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which are a requirement of justice, and justice Is a part of the 
life of virtue.
The pursuit of wealth need not be merely a self-interested
affair or a means toward happiness narrowly defined in economic
terms: "How weak also are the Reasonings of some Recluse Moralists,
who condemn in general all Pursuits of Wealth or Power, as below a
perfectly virtuous Character: since Wealth or Power are as naturally
fit to gratify our Publick Desires, or to serve virtuous Purposes,
31as the selfish ones?" Virtuous purposes are known by the moral 
sense. In Hutcheson's economic world of technological advance, free­
dom of contract, and pursuit of wealth, if virtuous purposes are 
found to be weak, or the moral sense falls, then we must arrive at 
a world of autonomous utility functions grounded completely on self- 
love rather than any more extensive affections.
Were there no other ultimate determination or desire in 
the human soul than that of each one toward his own happi­
ness; then calm self-love would be the sole leading principle, 
plainly destined by Nature to govern and restrain all other 
affections, and keep them subservient to its end; having rea­
son for Its minister of counsellor, to suggest the means.^2
Self-interest Is a principal of human action, but not neces­
sarily a pernicious one or necessarily opposed to the public interest. 
Self-Interested actions can be Included under the heading of prudence
^Hutcheson, Passions and Affections, p. 9.
^Hutcheson, System I, 38-39.
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which is a virtue. Such actions are necessary In order to satisfy 
the appetites of man and, aB such, are innocent. Self-Interest be­
comes pernicious only when It breaks the bounds of moderation and 
becomes all-encompassing and seeks . , to obstruct the proper 
degree of the generous affections in the station and circumstances 
of the agent."33 Some persons may have no other means by which to 
live the life of virtue than by pursuing their own Interests or the 
Interests of a small group. However, since their place In society 
limits their opportunities, the good of the whole is being furthered 
as the good of each individual is promoted.3^
Hutcheson discusses the matter of Individual self-lntereBt and 
the public good in two ways. One Is that selfish actions lead 
toward the public good because each individual Is part of the whole 
society. ". . . these selfish affections are aiming at an end neces­
sary to the general good, to wit the good of each Individual, . , ,"35 
The second means by which these two goals are reconciled is the moral 
sense. Self-love can further the public good when it acts within
33Ibld.. I, 65.
3^"The greater part of mankind, by the necessary advocations of 
life, are incapable of very extensive designs, and want opportunities 
and abilities for such services. But we have this just presumption, 
that by serving innocently any valuable part of a system, we do good 
to the whole. The lives therefore of many of the most virtuous are 
justly employed In serving such particular persons, or smaller so­
cieties, who are more peculiarly recommended to them by the very 
order of nature." Ibid., I, 243-244.
35Ibld., X, 65.
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proper bounds. The moral sense tells us If self-interest and the
general good are In conflict and reconnends that the most extensive
good be pursued.38 The moral sense acts to harmonize human action.
Without a distinct consideration of this moral faculty, 
a species endued with such a variety of senses, and of 
desires frequently Interfering, must appear a complex 
confused fabrlck, without any order or regular consistent 
design. By means of It, all Is capable of harmony, and 
all Its powers may conspire In one direction, and be 
consistent with each other,37
In addition to reconciling self-love and the public Interest, 
Hutcheson also addressed himself to the persistent paradox of the age 
proposed by Mandevllle, which la that private vice leads to public 
benefits. The thesis from The Fable of the Bees that Hutcheson 
repeatedly attacks Is that luxury fosters a high level of consump­
tion and makes possible high levels of employment and vigorous 
Industry.
. . . whilst Luxury 
Employed a Million moret 
Envy It self, and Vanity,
Were Ministers of Industry;
Their darling Folly, Fickleness,
In Diet, Furniture and Dress,
That strange rldlc'lous Vice, was made 
The very Wheel that turn’d the T r a d e . 38
The first argument that Hutcheson presents against Mandevllle Is 
that while luxury may cause high levels of consumption In the short
■^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 37.
3?Hutcheson, System I, 74,
38gernard Mandevllle, The Fable of the Bees, ed. by F. B. Kaye 
(Oxford, 1924), I, 25.
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run, It Is bad long run policy. Debauchery leads to sickness and 
early death, while temperance leads to longer life and larger popu­
lation In the country which will certainly Increase aggregate demand 
over time.
Any given Number In a small time, will certainly consume 
more Ulne by being Drunkards, than by being sober Men; 
will consume more manufactures by being luxurious or proud 
(if their Pride turn upon Expences) than by being frugal 
and moderate. But It may be justly questioned, whether 
that same Number would not have consumed more In their 
whole Lives, by being temperate and frugal: since all
allow that they would probably live longer, and with 
better Health and Digestion: and Temperance makes a 
Country populous, were It only by prolonging Life.39
Hutcheson suggests that the charity of the rich can do more to
increase consumption than can their luxurious expenses. Charity
places money in the hands of groups with the highest propensity to
consume which, of course, will increase the amount of consumption
done by the whole society,
Another point of contention between Hutcheson and Mandevllle
Is over the definition of luxury Itself* Mandevllle*s definition Is
very extreme as he admits:
39Hutcheson, Collection, pp. 388-389,
^0"Men of higher fortunes may without any luxury purchase the 
most Ingenious and nice manufactures, as far as their several obli­
gations In life allow It. And if any such deny themselves such ex­
penses, from views of a finer liberality, in raising the condition 
of indigent friends; they along with thelT families, kinsmen, and 
friends thus supported, may make a much greater consumption of the 
very same products and manufactures, or of others equally deserving 
encouragement In the Btate; and thus they with their dependents are 
more beneficial to artifleers.M Hutcheson, Short Introduction, pp. 
321-322.
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If every thing Is to be Luxury (as In. strictness It 
ought) that Is not Immediately necessary to make Man 
subsist as he Is a living Creature, there Is nothing 
else to be found In the World, . . . This Definition 
every body will say Is too rigorous; I am of the same 
Opinion; but If we are to abate one Inch of this 
Severity, I am afraid we shan't know where to stop.
If Mandevllle agrees that this definition of luxury is too 
rigorous, he, nevertheless, maintains that the greater part of con- 
sumption carried on in the world Is due to man's pride and vanity. 
Expensive habitat, fine food, and curious habilements are simply an 
exercise In vanity. Hutcheson asserts that It is no vice to satisfy 
desires for more curious goods and services as long as desire is 
kept within limits. "It is plain there Is no necessary vice in con­
suming of the finest products, or the wearing of the dearest manu­
factures by persons whose fortunes can allow It consistently with 
all the duties of life."^
We recall that the duties of life for the rich are furthering 
technical knowledge, studying and devising wise forms of polity, and
/ ft
charity; they are not to serve merely as reckless consumers,
^Mandevllle, Fable, p. 107,
i rt
Hutcheson, System II, 320.
^3"Nor ought such as are bora to estates, who therefor need not 
for their own support any lucrative profession, think themselves 
exempted from any such obligation. For It seems more peculiarly 
incumbent on them, as Providence exempts them from other cares, to 
contribute to the publlck interest, by acquiring a compleat knowledge 
of the rights of mankind, of laws, and civil polity; or at least 
such acquaintance with all the coimiion business of mankind, that they 
may be able either by superiour wisdom, or by their Interest and in­
fluence, to serve their country or their neighbours; and not be use­
less loads of the earth, serving only to consume Its products," 
Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 98.
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Finally, Hutcheson la not willing for one segment of the popu­
lation to attain baseness of character even If short run employment 
effects would be favorable.
. . . Luxury, Intemperance, and Pride, tend to consume 
Manufactures; but the Luxurious, Intemperate, or Proud, 
are not a whit the less odious, or free from Inhumanity 
and Barbarity, In the neglect of Families, Friends, the 
indigent, or their Country, since their whole Intention 
Is a poor selfish Pleasure.^
The effects of actions must be viewed not only with respect to 
their economic consequences but also regarding their effects on the 
character of the populace. Long run and short run effects must be 
viewed. Perhaps the vice of one man can benefit others, but to 
approve such action without many qualifying statements must be foolish 
policy.^ If the vice of one segment of the population benefits
^^Hutcheson, Collection, p. 387.
^ I t  seems that this careful approach to policy (the weighing of 
economic and moral consequences of actions) is indicative of Hutche­
son's essential non-radical character. It remained for Bentham and 
his disciples to transform the greatest-happlness-for-the-greatest- 
number rule of thumb Into a universal principle to be rigorously 
applied. This Is what characterizes Bentham as being radical. "The 
Innovation of the Radical (Bentham) was to make the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number dependent upon the greatest power of the 
greatest number. In his Constitutional Code, Bentham explained that 
the legislature had to be omnicompetent because 'any limitation Is 
in contradiction to the greatest happiness principle,' But since the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number meant, In practice, the 
greater happiness of the greater number, the omnicompetence of the 
legislature meant the omnlcompetence of the majority. One of Ben­
tham1 s disciples was asked whether the greatest number always had 
the right to indulge Its greatest happiness, whether the twenty-nine 
out of thirty people who decided to feast upon the thirtieth had the 
right and the power to do so— to which the disciple, with the impec­
cable logic of his master, coolly replied, 'Yes.'" Gertrude Himmel- 
farb, Victorian Minds (New York, 1968), p. 76.
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another segment, we cannot say unequivocally that the public has
benefitted. In the longer view of things vice will very likely
debauch and incapacitate some to the detriment of society.
. . . the greatest part of the Actions which are 
Immediately prejudiced to our selves, and are often 
look'd upon as Innocent toward others, do really tend 
to the publick Detriment. bj making us Incapable of 
performing the good Offices we could otherwise have 
done, and perhaps would have Inclin'd to dot this Is 
the Case of Intemperance and extravagant Luxury.̂
In his Introduction to The Fable of the Bees, F, B. Kaye says 
concerning Hutcheson's opposition to Mandeville: . , and the
concepts concerning which he was most aroused were precisely those 
which underlie laissez-faire— the egoism of man and the advantage to 
society of this e g o i s m . T h i s  statement seems to Imply that Hut­
cheson In some way was opposed to liberal economica. If laissez- 
faire means complete absence of government from economic life then 
Hutcheson did oppose it; it has been shown above that Hutcheson might 
favor land expropriation by the government if the public good required 
it. However, Hutcheson did favor a liberal economic polity with 
government providing a rule of law and enforcement of contracts and 
a framework In which individual liberty can be extended. Also Hut­
cheson's vision of the good society might be more conducive to liberal 
economic polity than Mandeville's. The Fable can be used as an argu­
ment for extending liberty In economic life because the very baseness,
^Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 180.
^Mandeville, Fable, p. cxll.
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pride, and vanity which are so natural to man, are the very engines 
which promote industry and trade. As we have seen earlier, Hutche­
son urged the extension of liberty precisely because vice was not 
(or need not be with proper educational arrangements) the most out­
standing characteristic of man. Freedom would not lead to a vile 
and debauched society, but good action could be expected from most 
men. Freedom Is beneficial In economic life because In some cases 
the legitimate pursuit of self-interest leads to the good of the 
whole society, and where conflict arises between these two the moral 
sense recononends the action that will benefit the greatest number of 
mankind.
Mandevillefs analysis seems a little too simplistic, and as 
F. B. Kaye puts it: "His paradox turned, Instead, on his definition
of virtue . . . Mandeville's definition . . . proclaimed all conduct 
vicious which was not the result of a complete denial of one's emo­
tional nature— true virtue being unselfish and dispassionate,"^®
With this definition Mandeville could simply proclaim any virtuous 
action a vice. Now, this so-called foundation of lalsse2-falre Is 
not designed to convlcnce large numbers of people as to Its benefits. 
On the other hand Hutcheson's vision of the good polity is designed 
to convince, and his discussions of the benefits of liberty did im­
press and convince his students at Glasgow, Certainly It would be 
most flattering to human nature to believe a doctrine which holds
^®Ibid,, pp. xlvii-xlviil.
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that virtue can Increase as freedom Is extended. However, Hutcheson 
was not one bit cynical In expounding this view. He believed In the 
operation of the moral sense and that people could be virtuous if 
given the chance. He possessed "a warm love of liberty, and manly 
zeal for promoting It," not a cynical love of liberty. It remained 
for Smith to consider these two views of man and society and to pre­
sent a comprehensive view of liberal political economy,
In addition to these more extended views of society, Hutcheson 
had ideas about specific problems of economic life. Like Aristotle 
and St. ThomaB, Hutcheson discussed usury and the just price. The 
discussion of just price continues to have relevance for modern so­
ciety with respect to governmental price regulation and ad hoc pro­
hibitions against profiteering In time of natural disaster.
Hutcheson holds that justice In exchange Is not a matter of 
sharp dealing, but the good man will restore all ill-gotten gain
from exchange If he apprehends it. However, this conduct is not 
AQvery common. In a perfectly traditional manner Hutcheson dis­
cusses the justice of equality In exchange,^ while recognizing
Hutcheson, System II, 15.
the honorous contracts, or these for valuable considera­
tion, the parties profess or undertake to transfer mutually goods or 
rights of equal value. And therefor honest men should conceal nothing, 
or give no false representations about the qualities estimable In 
such goods, or their defects: and when they inadvertently have de­
parted from equality, according to the judgment of a wise arbiter, he 
who had less value than he gave, should have something further paid 
him till the contract be brought to equality; and this he has a per­
fect right to demand; tho* no courts of Justice could have time to 
give redress to every little iniquity in such matters." Hutcheson, 
Short Introduction, p. 216.
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that the usefulness of goods will affect each nan's valuation of 
goods. Ultimately the prices of things must be determined by the 
forces of demand and supply, and there are more detailed considera­
tions behind these two phenomena.
The ground of all price must be some fitness In the 
things to yield some use or pleasure In life; without 
this, they can be of no value. But this being pre­
supposed, the prices of things will be In a compound 
proportion of the demand for them, and the difficulty 
in acquiring them. The demand will be in proportion 
to the numbers who are wanting them, or their neces­
sity to life. The difficulty may be occasioned many 
ways; if the quantities of them in the world be small;
if any accidents make the quantity less than ordinary;
If much toll Is required in producing them, or much 
Ingenuity, or a more elegant genius In the artists; If 
the persons employed about them according to the cus­
tom of the country are men In high account, and live 
In a more splendid manner; for the expence of this 
must be defrayed by the higher profits of their la­
bours, and few can be thus maintained.
It seems that Hutcheson has Incorporated the view of just price 
commonly associated with scholastic teaching, In which a charge is 
legitimately levied according to a person's station in society.
If Indeed the scholastics did not hold this view, as I have endeavored 
to show, It Is of Importance to the history of economic analysis to 
Inquire into the source of Hutcheson's statement. The only discussion 
of this matter before Hutcheson's time that I can find (omitting Henry
of Langenstein, the Elder) Is by Samuel Pufendorf who holds that in
the case of services rendered: ". , . difficulty enhances their
51Ibld., p. 209. 
^See above, p . 23,
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price, as do also skill, utllty, necessity, the scarcity or rank or 
freedom of the agents, and finally even the reputation of the art,
C  'Ias being accounted noble or Ignoble.'
Hutcheson was certainly familiar with the works of Fufendorf, 
Gershom Carmichael, Hutcheson's professor of moral philosophy at 
Glasgow, had done a conmentary on Pufendorf's De Officio Hominls et 
Clvis; and indeed Hutcheson taught from Pufendorf In his moral phil­
osophy class at the beginning of his career at G l a s g o w a n d  foot­
notes on Pufendorf appear in some of Hutcheson's works.
However, it seems that Pufendorf, Hutcheson, and Adam Smith in 
discussing this whole matter of a charge being levied according to a
^Samuel von Puffendorf, De Officio Hominls et Clvis Juxta Legem 
Naturalem Llbrl Duo, translated by Frank Gardner Moore (New York,
1927), p. 71. Pufendorf also makes the following comment: " . . .  a
tradesman will receive no attention If he tries to place a higher 
price upon his merchandise because he broke his leg, or became seri­
ously 111 while bringing them into the country, or because he lost 
a part of them by shipwreck or at the hands of thieves; provided, of 
course, such accidents did not contribute to the scarcity of the wares. 
Much less will he be heeded If he tries to shift to the purchasers 
such expenses as he encountered unnecessarily and In opposition to 
the laws of wise business. But merchants can Include In their estima­
tion the time they have spent, the plans they have formed, and the 
troubles they have met In acquiring, preserving, or distributing 
their merchandise, as well as all necessary expences for the labour 
of their servants. And It would surely be Inhuman, and likely to 
destroy the Industry of men, to try to allow a man for his business, 
or any other sort of occupation, no more profit than barely permits 
him to meet his necessities by frugality and hardships." Samuel 
Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Llbrl Octo, translated by C. H. 
Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather (Oxford, 1934), pp. 687-688.
L. Taylor, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume as Predecessors 
of Adam Smith (Durham, 1965), p. 27.
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man's rank In society, are trying to come up with a more accurate
explanation of the costs of doing business. Notice Hutcheson's
treatement of this matter.
From what we said about the grounds of price, 'tie plain 
that in estimating the values of goods in any place, we 
are not only to compute the disbursement made In buying. 
Importing, and keeping them safe, with the Interest of 
money thus employed; but also the pains and care of the 
merchant; the value of which Is to be estimated accord­
ing to the reputable condition in which such men live,
. . . This price of the merchant's labour is the foun­
dation of the ordinary profits of m e r c h a n t s . 55
The above quotation contains the germ of the idea of Implicit 
wages. Smith refines this concept a little further and makes ex­
plicit the concept of normal profit. He suggests that if the price 
of goods does not allow the merchant . . the ordinary rate of 
profit In his neighbourhood, he Is evidently a loser by the trade;
. . .," and may very well take up some other trade more In line with
his expectation of normal profit.^ The valuation of normal profit
will depend generally upon traditionally acceptable standards of 
living associated with the various trades. This discussion of the 
return due a man because of his position in society Is not necessarily 
a medieval argument for the status quo, but a refinement of economic 
analysis in more accurately describing costs of production.
^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 217.
5^Adam Smith. Wealth of Nations, p. 55.
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Concerning the matter of Interest, Hutcheson holds that It Is 
lawful because of the opportunity cost Involved In lending money.^
He also realizes that expansion of credit leads to Increasing employ­
ment and output. "Were Interest prohibited, none would lend, except 
In charity; and many Industrious hands, who are not objects of char­
ity, would be excluded from large gains in a way very advantageous 
to the publlck."^®
It seems that Hutcheson's view of the justice of Interest In 
comparison to scholastics can be explained by reference to their 
respective views on the good for man. Some subtle changes exist be­
tween the views of St. Thomas and Hutcheson that may prove instruc­
tive. Recall that the highest good according to St, Thomas was the 
beatific vision. Hutcheson agrees that this Is part of the good for 
man along with the performance of the duties of the life of virtue, 
Hutcheson and St. Thomas would agree that charity is a duty of those 
that can afford It. But Hutcheson goes farther In his definition 
of the virtuous life by including encouragement of "the more ingenious
57"In loans for consumption, we don't expect the same individual 
goods, but equal quantities by weight or meaeure. If the loan is not 
designed as a favour, there's a right to demand Interest. Nor Is It 
necessary to make interest lawful that the goods lent be naturally 
fruitful: for tho' money for Instance yields no natural Increase;
yet as by It one may purchase such goods as yield Increase; nay by 
employing it In trade or manufactures may make a much higher gain; 'tis 
but natural that for such valuable advantages accruing to us by the 
loan, we should give the owner of the money some price or recompence 
proportioned to them. The prohibition of all loans for interest would 
be destructive to any trading nation, . . ." Hutcheson, Short Intro­
duction, p. 219.
^®Hutcheson, System II, 72.
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and useful arts." Now the rich could subsidize Inventors and business­
men by gifts, but gifts to others than the poor do not fulfill the 
duties of charity as such. It may be more realistic to expect that 
adequately functioning credit markets will prove most beneficial to 
the encouragement of these practical arts. In fact, should a gain be
made by an Inventor or entrepreneur. It Is a matter of justice that
59the gain be shared with the supplier of money,
St. Thomas held that the obtaining of goods necessary for life 
was a secondary part of the good life.**® The place of primary Impor­
tance was occupied by the beatific vision. Hutcheson seems to agree 
with the schoolmen on this point, "The schoolmen therefor justly 
call God the supreme object of happiness, or the supreme objective 
good, from the knowledge and love of whom, with the hopes of being 
favoured by him, our supreme happiness must arise."**^
The subtle difference between Hutcheson and the church fathers 
consists In Hutcheson's according economic activity and technological 
advance a slightly higher place in the life of virtue and In the life 
of happiness than the scholastics had done.
Does not the universal choice of Mankind, in preferring 
to bear Labour for the Convenientlee and Elegancies of 
Life, shew that their Pleasures are greater than those 
of Sloth, and that Industry, notwithstanding Its Tolls, 
does really increase the Happiness of Mankind? Hence
S9Ibld., II, 71.
**®See above, p. 22.
^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 60.
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It Is that in every Nation great Numbers support them­
selves by Mechanlck Arts not absolutely necessary; since 
the Husbandman Is always ready to purchase their Manufac­
tures by the Fruits of his Labours. without any Constraint; 
which they would not do if the Pleasures or Happiness of 
Idleness were greater. This may shew us how little Justice 
there Is in Imagining an Arcadia, or unactlve Golden Age. 
would ever suit with the present state of the World, or 
produce more Happiness to Men than a vigorous improvement
of Arts.
The taking of interest, and expansion of credit markets becomes 
for Hutcheson a means of promoting the society which he envisions. 
Economic activity occupies a place in the life of virtue and happi­
ness, and the taking of Interest allows economic activity to increase 
in most cases.
If the polity of any state allows little commerce with 
foreigners, admits of no great Increase of wealth in 
the hands of a few, nor of any alienation of lands to 
perpetuity; if It is designed for a republic of farmers, 
which some great authors judge most adapted for virtue 
and happiness, there all interest of money might properly 
be prohibited. But where the strength of a state depends 
on trade, such a law would be ruinous. 3
In presenting wise statecraft and economic activity as parts of 
the life of virtue Hutcheson opens the way for a more thoroughgoing 
study of political economy as an autonomous science. Hutcheson In­
corporates technical economic analysis In his writings and helped 
lay the foundation for later economists.
^2Hutcheson, Collection, p. 378. 
^Hutcheson, System II, 74.
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Hutcheson's analysis Includes a quite clear exposition of the
benefits of specialization and exchange:
. . . the common interest of all constantly requires an 
Intercourse of offices, and the Joint labours of many: 
and that when mankind grow numerous, all necessaries and 
conveniences will be much better supplied to all, when 
each one chooses an art to himself, by practice acquires 
dexterity In it, and thus provides himself great plenty 
of such goods as that art produces, to be exchanged In 
commerce for the goods produced in like manner by other 
artisans; . . .^4
In analyzing the exchange mechanism, Hutcheson recognizes the 
importance of demand and supply phenomena, ", . . we shall find that
the prices of goods depend on these two jointly, the demand on account
of some use or other which many desire, and the difficulty of acquir­
ing, or cultivating for human use."^ Demand is presented as being 
determined by utility, and supply Is determined by restrictions placed 
upon the output of goods by the niggardliness of nature or by "all 
other circumstances" which would presumably include artificial re­
strictions.
By the use causing a demand we mean not only a natural 
subserviency to our support, or to some natural pleasure, 
but any tendency to give any satisfaction, by prevailing 
custom or fancy, as a matter of ornament or distinction
in the more eminent stations; for this will cause a de­
mand as well as natural use. In like manner by difficulty 
of acquiring, we do not only mean great labour or toll, 
but all other circumstances which prevent a great plenty 
of the goods or performances demanded. "
^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 163, 
^Hutcheson, System II, 54.
66Ibld.. II, 54.
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In any analysis of the market economy an occasional paradox 
presents Itself and must be explained. The vater-dlamond problem 
Is presented by Adam Smith to Illustrate the paradoxical nature 
of a good whose value in use Is very high, yet whose value In ex­
change Is very low such as water; the use value of a diamond Is low,
yet Its exchange value Is hlgh.®^ The solution to the paradox Is 
found by examining supply and demand phenomena. Hutcheson, no doubt, 
Influenced Smith's thinking here, for he has hinted at the nature 
of the paradox and the solution,®®
Some goods of the highest use, yet have either no price 
or but a small one. If there's such plenty In nature 
that they are acquired almost without any labour, they
have no price; If they may be acquired by easy conmon
labour, they are of small price. Such Is the goodness 
of God to us, that the most useful and necessary things 
are generally very plentiful and easily a c q u i r e d .
Hutcheson held a quantity theory of money. He asserted that
Increasing the supply of coins In a country would make their value
fall (or increase the price level),
If one state had all the mines In the world In Its power,
then by circulating small quantities. It could make the
values of these metals and coins high In respect of other
goods; and by circulating more of them, It could make 
their values fall. We say Indeed commonly, that the rates 
of labour and goods have risen since these metals grow
®^Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 28.
^Smith's treatment, however, Is not as straightforward as 
Hutcheson's. Reasons for Smith's apparent obfuscation of the value 
problem are due to hiB attempt to find a long run standard of value. 
See below pp. 131—132 and 159-163.
®^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 28.
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plenty; and that the rates of labour and goods were 
low when the metals were scarce; conceiving the value 
of the metals as Invariable, because the legal names 
of the pieces, the pounds, shillings, or pence, continue 
to them always the same till a law alters them. But 
a days digging or ploughing was as uneasy to a man a 
thousand years ago as It Is now, tho' he could not 
then get so much silver for it: and a barrel of wheat, 
or beef, was then of the same use to support the human 
body, as it is now when It Is exchanged for four times 
as much silver. Properly, the value of labour, grain, 
and cattle, are always pretty much the same, as they 
afford the same uses in life, where no new inventions 
or tillage, or pasturage, cause a greater quantity in 
proportion to the demand. ' Tis the metal chiefly that 
has undergone the great change of value, since these 
metals have been In greater plenty, the value of the 
coin Is altered tho* It keeps the old names.
In the last part of this passage Hutcheson is evidently discus­
sing what Smith would call real and nominal values of goods and of 
labor.^ Hutcheson's discussion of the fairly constant real value 
of labor and grain may have Influenced Smith In his version of the 
labor theory of value. "Labour alone, therefore, never varying In 
its own value, Is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the 
value of all commodities can at all tlmeB and places be estimated and 
compared.
It seems curious that both Hutcheson and Smith discuss the 
determination of price by supply and demand phenomena and also In­
clude a labor theory of value. It is probable that Smith was trying
^^Hutcheson, System II, 57-58.
71Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 33. 
72ibid.
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to devise a long run measure of value or an Indexing system using
labor as thelong run measure. The above passage by Hutcheson may
point to the same thing where he speaks of the value of labor and
grain being fairly constant, Smith, too, talks of a labor-graln
measure of value over time.
Equal quantities of labour will at distant times be 
purchased more nearly with equal quantities of corn, 
the subsistence of the labourer, than with equal quan­
tities of gold and silver, or perhaps of any other
commodity. Equal quantities of corn, therefore, will,
at distant times, be more nearly of the same real value, 
or enable the possessor to purchase or command more 
nearly the same quantity of the labour of other people,
In a passage from A System of Moral Philosophy Hutcheson showB 
his clear anticipation of Smith on the invariable labor-graln stan­
dard of value. The discussion centers around the possibility of 
fixing a man's salary over time in real terms.
"The most Invariable salary would be so many days labour of 
men, or a fixed quantity of goods produced by the plain Inartificial
labours, such goods as answer the ordinary purposes of life. Quan­
tities of grain come nearest to such a standard.
Hutcheson also suggested principles of taxation, such as ease 
of collection, and emphasis upon taxing luxuries. He also hints at 
a proportional or perhaps progressive tax rate.
As to taxes for defraying the publlck expences, these 
are most convenient which are laid on matters of luxury 
and splendour, rather than the necessaries of life; on
73Ibid.. p. 35.
7^Hutcheson, Systern II, 62-63.
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foreign products and manufactures, rather than domeatlck; 
and such as can be easily raised without many expensive 
offices for collecting them. But above all, a Just 
proportion to the wealth of people should be observed 
In whatever Is raised from them, , , .75
Hutcheson has further Importance for economic science due to his 
Influence on the development of utilitarianism, although it has been 
Indicated above that Hutcheson was not a utilitarian In the sense of 
being a Philosophical Radical. James Bonar comments on the difference 
between Hutcheson and the properly utilitarian school. "The end Is 
so conceived by him (Hutcheson) that It Involves the distinction of 
higher and lower pleasures, separating Hutcheson, not indeed from 
the Greeks, but from the modern utilitarian of the stricter type 'who 
shakes his head and says they are all the same."^
What then was Hutcheson's Influence on utilitarian thought? He 
clearly recognizes that the mind's apprehension of utility influences 
the demand for a good, not something In the nature of the good Itself; 
but this Is not remarkable— St, Augustine would have said the same 
thing. Utilitarianism holds that good is pleasure and evil Is pain, 
nothing more or less. If man Is to pursue the good, he must pursue 
his pleasure, however he conceives it. His apprehension of pleasure 
Is a final judgment of good, or his utility function is autonomous—  
that is, subject to no higher authority. It Is this premise
75Ibid., II, 340-341.
76James Bonar, Moral Sense (London, 1930), p. 100,
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of utilitarianism that underlies so much m odem economic theory. ̂  
Bentham certainly presented a full-blown theory of utility as the 
great mover of human action. However, Hutcheson, perhaps unwittingly, 
laid the groundwork for misapprehensions by utilitarianism with his 
moral sense doctrine.
Recall that Hutcheson viewed benevolence, or doing good to 
others, at two levels, A basic type of benevolence recommends strong­
ly to us our own Interest and that of a small circle of intimates.
This aspect of benevolence is consistent with Hutcheson's greatest- 
happiness-for-the-greatest-number principle, because the Individuals 
constitute the whole society. As the good of each Individual Is pro­
moted, the good of society is furthered. We might call this Hutche­
son's first Invisible hand view. However, the moral sense apprehends 
a more extensive benevolence toward larger groups of mankind as being 
the proper course of action. If conflict arises between pursuit of 
Individual interest and that of society, the moral sense recommends
 ̂ For example, Kenneth Bouldlng makes the following statement 
as a preliminary to discussing consumer behavior and the derivation 
of demand curves. "Amodel which has been of great Importance histor­
ically, and which Is still useful in organizing our thinking even 
though it has some limitations, la the utility model in which the 
household Is assumed to guide Its behavior by maximizing an ultimate 
psychological product called utility. In this model the household 
, . . buys consumer's goods as a firm buys Inputs, and like the firm 
transforms them Into a final product whose worth may In some manner 
be estimated. The final product of the household, however, Is not 
a physical product to be seen, tasted, and handled. It Is a psycho­
logical product, utility . . . Utility, therefore, Is the ultimate 
product of all economic activity— indeed, In Its broadest sense, of 
all human activity whatever." Kenneth E. Bouldlng, Economic Analysis 
(New York, 1966), I, 520-521.
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the more extensive Interest. This Is perhaps the second Invisible
hand view, Bentham agreed after a fashion with Hutcheson's first
view and disagreed with his second. Bentham Is not sure that men
apprehend conflicts In performing benevolent actions. However, he
simply states that benevolence to a small group Is seldom In conflict
with the public Interest. When conflicts do arise men are, or should
be, directed toward the public interest by the laws, not the moral 
78sense.
Once Bentham knocks down the moral sense as an operative force 
in man, Hutcheson's system becomes transformed Into utilitarianism. 
Reason Is still employed as a means; ends are simply posited by men. 
However, ends are no longer moral but arbitrary, and if accomplish­
ing any end whatsoever brings pleasure to a man, then he has experi­
enced the good; for pleasure of whatever kind Is the good for man as 
far as Benham is concerned. Hutcheson preceeded Bentham In equating 
pleasure with the good, but, as Bonar remarks, Hutcheson differen­
tiated the higher or moral pleasures from the lower, or sensual ones. 
Bentham makes no such distinction. Hutcheson could call a man de­
formed in character who was engaging in horrible cruelty to his 
fellow-man. Bentham could make no such statement, Such a fellow Is 
In fact pursuing the good.
76Bentham, Principles of Morals, p. 379. We know that Bentham 
explicitly ridiculed Hutcheson's Moral sense theory. See above, 
p. 74.
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Let a man's motive be ill-will; call It even malice, 
envy, cruelty; It la still a kind of pleasure that Is 
his motive: the pleasure he takes at the thought of
the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his adversary 
undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by 
Itself, Is good: It may be faint; it may be short:
It must at any rate be Impure: yet while It lasts,
and before any bad consequences arrive. It Is as good 
as any other that Is not more Intense.
The wise legislator, to whom Bentham Is writing, must ensure 
through the laws that one Individual's pursuit of pleasure does not 
inflict pain on larger numbers of society. The only problem with 
Bentham*s utilitarianism Is in finding the wise legislator. How can 
a man make laws that will be conducive to the public interest when, 
in some cases, those very laws might oppose his own pursuit of plea­
sure? How can the wise legislator transcend the pursuit of plea­
sure?^ For Hutcheson this poses no problem. The moral sense at 
times overcomes lower sensual desires.
This discussion of the development of utilitarianism is designed 
to show the non-relativistlc nature of Hutcheson's thought as compared
79ibid.» p. 369.
^^Bentham, no doubt, conceived himself to be suitable for the 
job of legislator. It Is known for a fact that for years Bentham 
sought to establish a model prison In England called the Panopticon 
in which he was to become the god-llke jailer observing with an un­
seen eye all the prisoners from a central turret in the circular pri­
son. "Bentham did not believe In God, but he did believe in the 
qualities apotheosized in God. The Panopticon was a realization of 
the divine ideal, spying out the ways of the transgressor by means 
of an Ingenious architectural scheme, turning night Into day with 
artificial light and reflectors, holding men captive by an intricate 
system of inspection. Its purpose was not so much to provide a maxi­
mum amount of human supervision, as to transcend the human and give 
the illusion of a divine omnipresence:" Hlmmelfarb, Victorian Minds, 
p. 35.
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with that of Bentham. Also, some of the assumptions of modern 
economics, such as "Individual preferences count," are not as 
ethically bland as is supposed, Finally, if economists wish to 
posit goals or ends for society, we must rethink these problems 
of the good for man and the nature of man. Make no mistake, eco­
nomists are continually advocating goals such as Individual freedom, 
redistribution of wealth or income, environmental protection, or 
shortening the work-week; and more justification is needed for any 
policy than simply "It Is my value judgment." If we hold that the 
good for man is satisfaction of individual desire, then let us be 
explicit. If this is not our position then let us reflect a little 
further on the good and the good life,
Irving Kristol comments on the problems which a thoroughgoing 
utilitarianism pose for a modern, liberal society.
One of the keystones of modern economic thought Is that 
it is impossible to have an a priori knowledge of what 
constitutes happiness for other people; that such know­
ledge is Incorporated In an individual's 'utility sche­
dules;' and this knowledge, in turn, is revealed by the 
choices the individual makes in a free market. This is 
not merely the keystone of modern economic thought— it 
is also the keystone of modern, liberal, secular society 
itself . . . .
Certainly, one of the key problematic aspects of bour­
geois-liberal society has long been known and announced.
This Is the fact that liberal society is of necessity a 
secular society, one in which religion is mainly a pri­
vate affair, Such a disestablishment of religion, It 
was predicted by Catholic thinkers and others, would 
gradually lead to a diminution of religious faith and 
a growing skepticism about the traditional consolations 
of religion— especially the consolations offered by a 
life after death. One such consequence is that the
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demands placed upon liberal society. In the name o£ 
temporal 'happiness,' have become ever more urgent 
and ever more unreasonable.81
Krlstol also states that the curx of new left thinking is an 
attack on economic science and bourgeois society precisely because 
It has not produced happiness. If liberal political economists are 
to be able to make any utterances other than agreement with the new 
left critiques, then some knowledge of the changes In viewpoint con­
cerning the good for man, as well as some reflection on this impor­
tant question, would be helpful.
Hutcheson's importance and influence in the history of economic 
thought has been indicated— his explanation of reason as a means 
only, his Inclusion of sensual pleasure (albeit of the moral sense) 
In the highest good for man, his love of liberty. Hutcheson's 
treatment of the virtuous life provides a philosophical basis for 
liberal political economy and the founding of economics as an auto­
nomous science. Hie moral sense doctrine leads to an early state­
ment of the means of harmony between self-interest and the public 
good. Although not a utilitarian, Hutcheson has Importance for 
the development of utilitarianism In his treatment of the good as 
the pleasant. Finally, Hutcheson's technical economic analysis 
including his development of the concept of implicit wages and his 
attempt to devise a long run measure of value contributed to the 
growing corpus of economic theory.
81lrvlng Krlstol, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Nihilism,"
The Public Interest, (Spring, 1973), p. 6, 10.
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We now proceed to a more detailed discussion of the Intellectual 
relationship between Hutcheson and Adam Smith, pursuing further the 
themes that have been presented thus far. What Is Smith's view of 
human nature and the good? How does he resolve Mandeville*s paradox? 
Is he completely utilitarian?
HUTCHESON AND SMITH
In addition to his famous book on political economy. The Wealth 
of Nations (1776), Adam Smith also wrote a book on moral philosophy, 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Much effort has been expended 
In an attempt to reconcile sympathy or sentiment, the operative force 
in Smith's moral world, with self-interest, the operative force in 
Smith's economic world. This Is the so-called Das Adam Smith Problem 
of German scholarship. In this chapter the Influence of Hutcheson's 
thought on the works of Adam Smith will be traced, and an attempt 
will be made to show the complementarity of Smith's moral and economic 
works.
Smith seems to accept Hutcheson's eplstemologlcal approach In 
all points. Smith states that reason is incapable of apprehending 
ends. "These first perceptions, as well as all other experiments 
upon which any general rules are founded, cannot be the object of 
reason, but of immediate sense and f e e l i n g . S m i t h  also seems to 
point toward psychological Introspection as the empirical method 
suitable for finding the truth about man's passions and motivations.
Smith states that speculative systems of natural philosophy may 
d e c e i v e  for a l o n g  time such as the vortices of Descartes. However, 
Smith states:




But It Is otherwise with systems of moral philosophy; 
and an author who pretends to account for the origin 
of our moral sentiments, cannot deceive us so grossly, 
nor depart so very far from all resemblance to the 
truth . . . .  An author who treats of natural philo­
sophy, and pretends to assign the causes of the great 
phenomena of the universe, pretends to give an account 
of the affairs of a very distant country, concerning 
which he may tell us what he pleases; and as long as 
his narration keeps within the bounds of seeming possi­
bility, he need not despair of gaining our belief. But 
when he proposes to explain the origin of our desires 
and affections, of our sentiments of approbation and 
disapprobation, he pretends to give an account, not only 
of the affairs of the very parish that we live in, but 
of our own domestic concerns.2
Smith seemB to be saying that men are capable of knowing their 
own motivations of approval or disapproval to some extent. Also, 
men can judge the faculty or power of approbation in others by ob­
serving such a faculty in themselves. “Every faculty In one man is 
the measure by which he Judges of the like faculty In another."3
Smith also seems to follow Hutcheson in holding with the ancients 
that man has an internal principle of growth toward an end. Man is 
not merely a body in random motion, and his development cannot be 
arbitrarily directed by the legislature.
The man of system, . . .  is apt to be very wise 
in his own conceit, and is often so enamoured with the 
supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, 
that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any 
part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and 
in all its parts, without any regard either to the great
2 Ibid.. p. 460.
3Ibid., p. 18.
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Interest or to the strong prejudices which may oppose 
it: he seems to Imagine that he can arrange the dif­
ferent members of a great society with as much ease 
as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a 
chess-board; he does not consider that the pieces upon
the chess-board have no other principle of motion
besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but 
that, in the great chess-board of human society, every 
single piece has a principle of motion of Its own, al­
together different from that which the legislature might 
choose to impress upon It. If those two principles co­
incide and act in the same direction, the game of human 
society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very 
likely to be happy and successful. If they are opposite 
or different, the game will go on miserably, and the 
society must be at all times in the highest degree of 
disorder.^
The outstanding difference between Hutcheson and Smith In their 
approaches to moral knowledge is that for Hutcheson, moral knowledge 
was available to man by means of an Internal faculty called the moral 
sense; for Smith, moral knowledge was obtained by a sympathetic place­
ment of oneself in another's situation and an appeal to the Impartial 
spectator for judgment of the proper moral action. It will be shown 
that Smith's use of the impartial spectator as a means of moral appre­
hension made morality and the good life more dependent on social
relationships than perhaps Hutcheson would have held,
The Moral Invisible Hand 
Recall that Hutcheson's moral sense could apprehend the duties 
of benevolence toward extensive groups of mankind— that is, indivi­
duals are capable of autonomously apprehending moral duty. Smith
^Ibid., pp. 342-343.
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holds that knowledge of moral duty arises from social Interaction, 
not from an Individual faculty. Without society there can be no 
knowledge of morals. The society of others regulates our own ex­
treme passions as we consider the views of others. Our passions and 
viewpoints tend to be brought into accord with the rest of society 
by the operation of sympathy, and, as stated below, sympathy is the 
beginning of moral Judgment.^ Glenn Morrow conments on this point:
The theory of Adam Smith abandons this individualistic 
method. The moral world is something independent of 
the individual thinker. His moral judgement is based, 
not upon an inner intuition of rational truth, nor upon 
a divine revelation, but upon the reflected sentiments of 
himself and those of his fellow-men, mutually supporting 
and influencing one another, produce the objective order 
of moral standards. At the same time this objective moral 
order is not a transcendent rational order, like the 
order of immutable truth to which the lntellectuallst 
moralists appealed, but an order lmanent in human ex­
perience, and varying with the conditions of experience.
This is not to say that Hutcheson's methodologically individual­
istic analysis of the means of moral apprehension leads to a narrow 
concern with the individual only. It does not. We know that Hutche­
son was very concerned with the duties incumbent on different groups 
in society, and the consequences of those duties on society as a 
whole— for instance, the duty of good offices by the rich might pro­
duce technological advances which would benefit all of society. All 
that Is being said here is that Smith's analysis of morals depends on 
society itself to produce moral standards.
5Ibld.. pp. 23-24.
^Glenn R. Morrow, The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam 
Smith (New York, 1923), p. 33.
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According to Smith, the first step toward making a moral Judg-
ment about the actions of another is to mentally place oneself in
the other’s position, "As we have no Immediate experience of what
other men feel, we can form no Idea of the manner in which they are
affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves would feel In the like
situation."^ This ability of entering psychologically Into another’s
situation Is called sympathy. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
Adam Smith says quite clearly and distinctly what he means by the
principle of sympathy as an operative force In man.
Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify
our fellow feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, 
though Its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, 
may now, however, without much Impropriety, be made use 
of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion what­
soever . 8
Sympathy does not always denote a compassionate and benevolent 
feeling toward our fellow men. Sympathy Is simply an ability to 
understand or feel to a certain degree the passions which motivate 
others, whatever those passions might be. The meaning of sympathy 
here Is similar to that of empathy in modern discussions. We might 
be able to sympathize with passions of love and benevolence or pride 
and vanity. So with this definition of sympathy, it Is possible for 
men to be motivated by self-interest, as Smith emphasizes in The
7Smith, Moral Sentiments, p. 3.
8Ibid., p. 5.
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Wealth of Nations. and also to sympathize with the motives of self' 
interest in others. However, man Is not exclusively a self-inter­
ested creature, "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are 
evidently some principles In his nature, which interest him in the 
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it,"® 
In judging one*s own conduct, an appeal must be made to an im­
partial spectator; or we must try to view our own conduct through the 
eyes of some Imaginary onlooker. If the spectator approves of an ac­
tion, we can approve It also by means of sympathy with the spectator.
We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine 
any other fair and impartial spectator would examine 
it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we 
thoroughly enter Into all the passions and motives which 
Influenced it, we approve of It, by sympathy with the 
approbation of this supposed equitable judge. If other­
wise, we enter into his disapprobation and condemn lt.^^
By means of the Impartial spectator we are able to apprehend the
virtues currently approved. It seems that the views of the Impartial
®Ibid.. p. 3. Concerning the matter of self-interest and fellow- 
feeling with others, Joseph Cropsey states; "It would be misleading 
to suggest that Smith's doctrine of man's sociality was a relapse into 
the Middle Ages or into antiquity* It would be more misleading to 
suggest that, in Smith's view, human nature Is simply dominated by 
a natural sociality of any description , . , the theme of man's nat­
ural dlrectedness toward preservation is not by any means made to 
languish by Smith . . . .  We are able to gather, therefore, that If 
we use 'altruism' and 'egoism' In their literal sense, man can be de­
scribed, according to Smith, as being by nature altruistic and ego­
istic— a species-member moved by love of self and fellow feeling with 
others." Joseph Cropsey, "Adam Smith," in History of Political Phil­
osophy, ed. by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago, 1972), p. 613,
l^Smith, Moral Sentiments, p. 162.
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spectator could change as society develops. The virtues which Smith
delineates are prudence, justice, and beneficence.
In our approbation of the character of the prudent man, 
we feel with peculiar complacency the security which 
he must enjoy while he walks under the safeguard of 
that sedate and deliberate virtue. In our approbation 
of the character of the Just man, we feel with equal com­
placency the security which all those connected with him, 
whether In neighbourhood, society, or business, must 
derive from his scrupulous anxiety never either to hurt 
or offend. In our approbation of the character of the 
beneficient man, we enter Into the gratitude of all those 
who are within the sphere of his good offices, and con­
ceive with them the highest sense of his merit,H
Prudence for Smith is similar to Hutcheson's virtue of prudence.
It has specifically economic connotations and makes economic activity
a part of the virtuous llfe.^ Hutcheson's virtue of temperance Is
11also mentioned by Smith as a part of prudent conduct. J Smith dif­
fers somewhat from Hutcheson's treatment of the virtues of fortitude 
and justice. Smith omits fortitude from his listing of the virtues. 
The reason, perhaps, being that Smith detected a decline in this 
attribute as the economic development of society took place.
11Ibtd., p. 388.
^"The care of the health, of the fortune, of the rank and repu­
tation of the individual, the objects upon which his comfort and 
happiness In this life are supposed principally to depend, Is con­
sidered as the proper business of that virtue which Is commonly 
called prudence." IbId., p. 311.
11 In the command of those appetites of the body consists that 
virtue which Is properly called temperance. To restrain them within 
those bounds, which regard to health and fortune prescribes, Is part 
of prudence. But to confine them within those limits, which grace, 
which propriety, which delicacy, and modesty, require, Is the office 
of temperance." Ibid., pp. 34-35.
147
That In the progress of improvement the practice of 
military exercises, unless government takes proper pslns 
to support It, goes gradually to decay, and, together 
with It, the martial spirit of the great bod'"' of the 
people, the example of modem Europe sufficiently 
demonstrates.14
Justice for Smith consists of those basic sanctions that prevent
Injury to the populace. "The object of justice it? the security from
injury, and It la the foundation of civil government. Hutcheson
includes good offices under the heading of Justice; Smith does not
do so. Smith considers good offices toward others as the virtue of
beneficence.^ Beneficence is the most attractive of the virtues,
and it ". . .is always free, It cannot be extorted by force, . .
Beneficence is desirable for Its beauty, but It Is not absolutely
necessary to the order and existence of civil society, as Is Justice,
It (beneficence) is the ornament which embellishes, 
not the foundation which supports the building, and 
which It was, therefore, sufficient to recommend,
^Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 738. Smith recognizes that for­
titude is a part of the character of the whole man. ", . . a  coward, 
a man Incapable either of defending or of revenging himself, evidently 
wants one of the most essential parts of the character of a man,"
Ibid., p. 739. Smith is concerned with the loss of martial spirit 
In the great body of the people, but he, nevertheless, does not list 
fortitude specifically among the virtues.
l^Adam Smith, Lectures on Justice. Police. Revenue and Arms, ed. 
by Edwin Cannan (New York, 1964), p. 3. Also on this point Smith 
states: "Mere justice Is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue,
and only hinders us from hurting our neighbours." Smith, Moral Senti­
ments. p. 117.
■^Smith, Moral Sentiments, p. 385.
17Ibld.. p. 112.
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but by no means necessary to Impose, Justice, on the 
contrary, Is the main pillar that upholds the whole 
edifice. If It Is removed, the great . . , fabric of 
human society . , , must In a moment crumble Into 
atoms.18
Prudence, justice, and beneficence are the virtues proper to man,
and "The man who acts according to the rules of perfect prudence, of
strict justice, and of proper benevolence, may be said to be perfectly 
19virtuous." What Is it, then, that crucially differentiates Smith's 
treatment of the life of virtue from that of his teacher, Francis 
Hutcheson? Specific points of agreement and difference have already 
been noted. The Important point of difference seems to be the method 
by which the virtues are apprehended.
Recall that Hutcheson was a vigorous proponent of liberty, be­
cause by extending freedom, men could follow more fully the dictates 
of the moral sense. The moral sense apprehended good and virtuous 
ends for mankind, and the pursuit of those ends could only be bene­
ficial to society. Smith must have been impressed by Hutcheson's 
forceful advocacy of liberty. However, Smith's exposition of the 
benefits of freedom proceeds in a different manner from that of 
Hutcheson.
Smith doesn't agree with Hutcheson's Innate moral sense Idea, 
but he substitutes appeal to the impartial spectator for approval or 




spectator of his own day as leading men to pursue wealth rather than 
virtue itself; that Is to say, most men perceive no further end than 
wealth,
They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly, a select, 
though, I am afraid, but a small party, who are the 
real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The 
great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, 
and, what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently 
the disinterested admirers and worshippers, of wealth 
and grea tness.20
So, If freedom Is extended, evidently the majority of men will 
pursue wealth and greatness. Smith could applaud the extension of 
liberty If wealth and greatness were the ultimate ends of man's ac­
tivity. However, Smith quite clearly states that this is not his 
view.
. . . wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivo­
lous utility, no more adapted for procuring ease of 
body or tranquillity of mind, than the tweezer-cases 
of the lover of toys; and like them, too, more trouble­
some to the person who carries them about with him than 
all the advantages they can afford him are commodious.21
How Is It, then, that Smith could follow Hutcheson in expounding
the benefits of liberty particularly in the production of wealth; If
he held that wealth and greatness were "mere trinkets of frivolous
utility"? Evidently a further Inquiry must be made into Smith's view




Smith's Idea of the good life seems to consist of two basic
parts. One aspect of the good life Is tranquillity, "Happiness
consists in tranquillity and enjoyment. Without tranquillity there
can be no enjoyment; and where there Is perfect tranquillity there
Is scarce anything which is not capable of amusing,"22 The second
aspect of happiness consists in being beloved.
If the chief part of human happiness arises from the 
consciousness of being beloved, hb I believe it does, 
those sudden changes of fortune seldom contribute much 
to happiness. He Is happiest who advances more grad-- 
ually to greatness, whom the public destines to every 
step of his preferment long before he arrives at It, 
in whom, upon that account, when it comes, it can excite 
no extravagant Joy, and with regard to whom it cannot 
reasonably create either any jealously In those he 
overtakes, or any envy In those he leaves behind,23
The tranquillity which Smith has In mind Is not that of the con­
templative life. This type of life can only be lived by the very few, 
and the bulk of mankind Is necessarily occupied with other pursuits.
The idea of that divine Being, whose benevolence and 
wisdom have from all eternity contrived and conducted 
the immense machine of the universe so as at all times 
to produce the greatest possible quantity of happiness, 
is certainly, of all the objects of human contemplation, 
by far the most sublime . . . .  The man whom we believe 
to be principally occupied In this sublime contemplation, 
seldom falls to be the object of our highest veneration; 
and though his life should be altogether contemplative, 
we often regard him with a sort of religious respect, 
much superior to that with which we look upon the most 
active and useful servant of the commonwealth . . . .
To man is allotted a much humbler department, but 




and to the narrowness of his comprehension-— the care
of his own happiness, of that of his family, his friends,
his country: that he Is occupied In contemplating
the more sublime, can never be an excuse for his 
neglecting the more humble department} . . . 2 4
Man, according to Smith, is made for action, and It Is fortunate 
that this Is b o . Through purposeful action man can achieve the 
applause of fellow men and the sense of being beloved which is one
part of the good life.25 where is the life of tranquillity to be
found In this world of action? Tranquillity is found not In sublime 
contemplation, but In the friendly Intercourse and conversation of 
civil society. Tranquillity Is found In an even temper, In the 
equable disposition of a man of the world.
2*Ibld., pp. 347-348. Smith seems to have been averse to the 
type of contemplation found In the Middle Ages. HIn the ancient 
philosophy the perfection of virtue was represented as necessarily 
productive, to the person who possessed It, of the most perfect 
happiness in this life. In the modem philosophy It was frequently 
represented as generally, or rather as almost always inconsistent 
with any degree of happiness In this life; and heaven was to be 
earned only by penance and mortification, by the austerities and 
abasement of a monk; not by the liberal, generous, and spirited 
conduct of a man." Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 726.
25"Mait was made for action, and to promote by the exertion of 
his faculties such changes In the external circumstances both of 
himself and others, as may seem most favourable to the happiness of 
all. He must not be satisfied with Indolent benevolence, nor fancy 
himself the friend of mankind, because In his heart he wishes well 
to the prosperity of the world. That he may call forth the whole 
vigour of his soul, and strain every nerve, in order to produce those 
ends which It is the purpose of his being to advance, Nature has 
taught him, that neither himself nor mankind can be fully satisfied 
with his conduct, nor bestow upon it the full measure of applause, 
unless he has actually produced them. He Is made to know, that the 
praise of good intentions, without the merit of good offices, will 
be but of little avail to excite either the loudest acclamations 
of the world, or even the highest degree of self-applause. Smith, 
Moral Sentiments, pp. 153-154,
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Society ard conversation, therefore, are the most power­
ful remedies for restoring the mind to Its tranquillity, 
if, at any time, it has unfortunately lost it; as well 
as the best preservatives of that equal and happy temper, 
which is so necessary to self-satisfaction and enjoyment.
Men of retirement and speculation, who are apt to sit 
brooding at home over either grief or resentment, though 
they may often have more humanity, more generosity, and 
a nicer sense of honour, yet seldom possess that equality 
of temper which is so common among men of the world.26
How are men to go about achieving this Smithian good life as 
outlined above? There are two possibilities open to man for achiev­
ing the consciousness of being beloved; the study of wisdom and 
practice of virtue, or the attainment of wealth and greatness.
To deserve, to acquire, and to enjoy, the respect and 
admiration of mankind, are the great objects of ambition 
and emulation. Two different roads are presented to us, 
equally leading to the attainment of this so much desired 
object; the one, by the study of wisdom and the practice 
of virtue; the other, by the acquisition of wealth and 
greatness. Two different characters are presented to 
our emulation; the one of proud ambition and ostentatious 
avidity; the other, of humble modesty and equitable jus­
tice. TVo different models, two different pictures, are 
held out to us, according to which we may fashion our own 
character and behaviour; the one more gaudy and glittering 
in its colouring; the other more correct and more exqui­
sitely beautiful in its outline; the one forcing itself 
upon the notice of every wandering eye; the other attract­
ing the attention of scarce any body but the most studious 
and careful observer.22
There is no doubt in Smith's mind as to which road the majority 
of mankind are going to take. As pointed out above; " . . .  the great 
mob of mankind are the admirers . . .  of wealth . . . ." However, 
there is a powerful invisible hand at work in the moral world by
26Ibid., p. 25. 
^Ibid., pp. 84-85.
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which the pursuit of wealth Is productive of a part of the life of 
virtue. At least this is true for the lower and middle classes.
In the middling and inferior stations of life, 
the road to virtue and that to fortune, to such for­
tune, at least, as men In such stations can reasonably 
expect to acquire, are, happily, In most cases very 
nearly the same. In all the middling and Inferior, 
professions, real and solid professional abilities, 
joined to prudent, just, firm, and temperate conduct, 
can very seldom fail of success . . . .  In such 
situations, therefore, we may generally expect a con­
siderable degree of virtue; and, fortunately for the 
good morals of society, these are the situations of 
by far the greater part of mankind.
So, though men are deluded In thinking that wealth itself Is
happiness, by pursuing wealth they are led Into the virtuous conduct
which is necessary for the production of wealth. In a passage from
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith says that this deception about
wealth is fortunate, because It leads to the development of great 
29civilizations. This very process of civilization allows man to
28Ibld.. p. 86.
29"lf we consider the real satisfaction which all these things 
are capable of affording, by Itself and separated from the beauty 
of that arrangement which Is fitted to promote it, It will always 
appear In the highest degree contemptible and trifling. But we 
rarely view It In this abstract and philosophical light. We naturally 
confound it In our imagination with the order, the regular and har­
monious movement of the system, the machine or economy by means of 
which It Is produced. The pleasures of wealth and greatness, when 
considered In this complex view, strike the Imagination as something 
grand, and beautiful, and noble, of which the attainment Is well 
worth all the toil and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow upon it.
And It Is well that nature Imposes upon us in this manner. It 
Is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the 
industry of mankind. It Is this which first prompted them to culti­
vate the ground, to build houses, to found cities and consnonwealths, 
and to Invent and Improve all the sciences and arts, which ennoble 
and embellish human life; which have entirely changed the whole face 
of the globe, have turned the rude forests of nature into agreeable
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fulfill his nature, for man Is made for action; and civilization 
allows man to achieve the Smithian view of the good. Man can achieve 
the feeling of being beloved and public applause by the products 
that he creates,^0 and he can achieve a tranquil mind through the 
pleasant sociability which civilization offers. This whole process 
is furthered by the living of the virtuous life.
This moral Invisible hand provides a powerful underpinning for 
the system of natural liberty. Freedom will allow men to follow 
their own interest which for many will be the attainment of wealth, 
and if men have the liberty to pursue wealth, the society very likely
Olwill become wealthy. But this is not the end for Smith. In pur­
suing wealth men must also exercise virtue, and with the growth of 
civil society man can attain the good which Is tranquillity and being 
beloved.
and fertile plains, and made the trackless and barren ocean a new 
fund of subsistence, and the great high road of communication to the 
different nations of the earth. The earth, by these labours of man­
kind, has been obliged to redouble her natural fertility, and to 
maintain a greater multitude of inhabitants." Ibid., pp. 263-264.
That he (man) may call forth the whole vigour of his soul, 
and strain every nerve, In order to produce those ends which it Is 
the purpose of his being to advance, Nature has taught him, that 
neither himself nor mankind can be fully satisfied with his conduct, 
nor bestow upon it the full measure of applause, unless he has actually 
produced them. He Is made to know, that the praise of good intentions, 
without the merit of good offices, will be but of little avail to 
excite either the loudest acclamations of the world, or even the 
highest degree of self-applause." Ibid., p. 154.
^"What is the species of domestic Industry which his capital 
can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest 
value, every Individual It is evident, can, in his local situation, 
judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him.”
Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 423.
155
Evidently, Smith Is in the Hutcheson camp as a proponent of 
liberty and an advocate of civil society and culture. However, 
the views of Hutcheson and Smith about the nature of man differ, 
as well as their views on the developmental process of civiliza­
tion. Differences In viewpoint seem to be centered around the 
reconciliation of self-interest with the public good. Recall that 
Hutcheson's moral sense could Indicate when an Individual's pursuit 
of self-interest was In conflict with the public good. Individuals 
not subject to confused sentiments would follow the dictates of the 
moral sense. Men can handle their freedom, and good results would 
flow from freedom. Therefore, Hutcheson became an outstanding pro­
ponent of the extension of liberty.
Of course, we know that Smith followed Hutcheson In advocating 
the system of natural liberty. Smith wrote his magnum opus on the 
economic benefits of liberty, and like Hutcheson he believed In 
moral benefits from liberty. However, Smith posited no moral sense 
to reconcile self-interest and the public good. Virtue and the good 
would be produced along with economic development and civilization. 
Perhaps Smith was anticipating objections to the moral sense doctrine 
and hoped to develop a system that could stand In the absence of a 
moral sense. Sjiith says in effect that men do not know the good, but 
in their deluded pursuit of wealth, men may arrive at the good through 
the operation of this moral Invisible hand.
3^See above p. 116.
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So we may say that Smith agreed with Hutcheson's position as a 
liberal and a proponent of civil society and culture. He disagreed 
with Hutcheson over the specific means by which liberty would pro­
duce moral ends.
Treatment of Mandevllle
In the introduction of The Wealth of Nations Edwin Cannan states:
He (Smith) may have obtained a general love of liberty 
fomr Hutcheson, but whence did he obtain the belief that 
self-interest works for the benefit of the whole economic 
community? . . .  it seems probable--we cannot safely say 
more--that he was assisted by his study of Mandevllle,
.33
We have seen how Hutcheson treated Mandevllle*s paradox. He 
states that it is simply not a vice to consume the finest products 
or wear the dearest manufactures if such consumption Is accompanied 
by temperance.^ At least part of Mandevllle's paradox turned on 
his definition of vice, and Hutcheson disagreed with that definition. 
However, when Mandevllle speaks of orgies of consumption as being 
beneficial to society, Hutcheson simply opposes this method of in­
creasing aggregate demand because of bad effects on character and the 
possibility of increasing consumption through charity rather than 
debauchery.
Smith also disagrees with Mandeville's definition of vice:
Every thing according to him is luxury which exceeds 'what 
is absolutely necessary for the support of human nature,
33smith, Wealth of Nations, p. li. 
3̂ See above, p. 118.
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so that there Is vice even In the use of a clean shirt,
. . . .  The Ingenious sophistry of his reasoning Is 
here, as upon many other occasions, covered by the 
ambiguity of language.35
Smith, like Hutcheson, thought that the temperate use of the 
finest products constituted no vice, even If such use be called 
luxury.
Under necessaries therefore, I comprehend, not only 
those things which the established rules of decency 
have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people.
All other things I call luxuries; without meaning by 
this appellation, to throw the smallest degree of re­
proach upon the temperate use of them.36
However, Smith's treatment of the private-vices-public-benefits
paradox has some common ground with Mandevllle's treatment. Speaking
of Mandevllle*8 work, Smith states; "But how destructive soever this
system may appear, it could never have imposed upon so great a number
of persons, nor have occasioned so general an alarm among those who
are the friends of better principles, had it not In some respects
37bordered upon the truth."
Smith's treatment of self-interest (or vice In Mandevllle's
38system ) 1b not designed to scandalize or shock. Smith's paradox
-^Smith, Moral Sentiments, pp. 456-457.
^Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 822.
■^^Smlth, Moral Sentiments, p. 459.
-*®Mandeville states that the bees enjoy some limited or mild 
form of government; , . They were not Slaves to Tyranny, Nor rul'd 
by wild Democracy; . . . "  The bees evidently use this freedom to pur­
sue business interests; ". . . Millions endeavoring to supply Each 
other's Lust and Vanity; . . . "  Finally Mandevllle states that all 
the trades were based on vice; " . . .  All Trades and Places knew some 
Cheat, No calling was without Deceit." Mandevllle, Fable, pp. 17-20,
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might be stated as; "private self-delusiont public benefits",
However, self-delusion Is not a vice. Smith would say that in the 
exercise of liberty, men will pursue wealth which Is a self-delusion 
if they equate wealth with happiness. Ultimately, through the moral 
Invisible hand, men will arrive through exercise of some of the vir­
tues at both wealth and decent behavior. This Is very different from 
the spirit of Mandevllle's paradox. Mandevllle would hold that free­
dom allows men to engage In vice and low pleasures which Is wonderful 
because of the booming economy produced by such depravity. Mande- 
vllle's view is very cynical with no concern for man's moral charac­
ter— not so for Hutcheson and Smith. Hutcheson would hold that if 
In the final analysis, private vices were productive of public bene­
fits, then he must oppose vice and forego such public benefits. Smith 
would say that pursuit of self-interest leads to public benefits, 
and self-interest la simply not a vice. "Regard to our own private 
happiness and interest, too, appear upon many occasions very laudable
IQprinciples of action.1 7 In pursuing self-interest man Is led to 
exercise a virtuous character also, not necessarily a vice-ridden 
character. Smith like Hutcheson seems to be concerned with the char­
acter of the citizenry. George Stigler Is right when he says; "the 
desire for better men, rather than for larger national incomes, was
^Smlth, Moral Sentiments, p. 445.
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40a main theme of the claealcal economics.'* But, as we have seen, 
according to Smith, these two goals are not unalterably opposed.
Utilitarianism
He know that Adam Smith had an Idea of man's perfection and the 
life of virtue which differed from the pleasure-pain utility of Ben- 
tham. How does Smith stand in relation to Hutcheson as a developer 
of utilitarian thought? Did Smith unwittingly further utilitarianism 
as Hutcheson had done?^ James Bonar states that virtue and the use­
fulness or utility of goods are not necessarily connected. **. . , 
virtue, Adam Smith seems to say, Is not essential to utility, nor 
utility to virtue, . . .
In fact, Adam Smith does not discuss the role of utility In his 
system, even in the purchase of consumer goods. He seems to say that 
desire for goods stems from propensities or natural drives of the 
human species rather than any sort of utility calculation. "Taste,
. . . is originally approved of, not as useful, but as just, as deli­
cate, and as precisely suited to its object. The idea of the utility 
of all qualities of this kind is plainly an afterthought, and not
t ̂
what first recommends them to our approbation,"
^^George Stigler, Five Lectures on Economic Problems (London, 
1949), p. 4.
^See above, pp. 133-134.
^Bonar, Moral Sense, pp. 218-219.
^Smlth, Moral Sentiments, p. 21.
160
It seems that Smith has downplayed the idea of utility In goods
purchases because of his extreme dislike for the attempts to found
a system of morals on the principle of utility. Smith says, that If
such a principle Is used, philosophizing about the nature of man will
resemble a course in mechanics.
There is another system which attempts to account for 
the origin of our moral Bentlments from sympathy, dis­
tinct from that which I have been endeavouring to estab­
lish. It is that which places virtue in utility, and 
accounts for the pleasure with which the spectator sur­
veys the utility of any quality from sympathy with the 
happiness of those who are affected by It. This sympathy 
Is different both from that by which we enter into the 
motives of the agent, and from that by which we go along 
with the gratitude of the persons who are benefited by 
his actions. It is the same principle with that by which 
we approve of a well-contrived machine. But no machine 
can be the object of either of those two last-mentioned 
sympathies.
There Is another aspect of utilitarianism with which Smith dis­
agreed; that Is the greatest-happiness-for-the-greatest-number prin­
ciple usually associated with the name of Bentham, although we have 
seen that Hutcheson offered It first as a rule of thumb. We know, 
in fact, that Hutcheson would have opposed Bentham's radical formu­
lation of this p r i n c i p l e . S m i t h  follows Hutcheson in the condem­
nation of such an absolute welfare principle.
To hurt in any degree the Interest of any one 
order of citizens, for no other purpose but to pro­
mote that of some other, is evidently contrary to
44Ibid., pp. 480-481.
4^See above p. 119 and footnote.
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that justice and equality of treatment which the 
sovereign owes to all the different orders of his 
subjects,^**
Hutcheson and Smith In their concern for the character of the 
citizenry were averse to make utility the final good for man, and 
Smith seems to relegate to utility a minor role In demand analysis, 
Paul Douglas has remarked that; "Smith's moralistic sense was prob­
ably a further reason why he failed to follow up the analysis of 
utility as a possible cause of v a l u e . H u t c h e s o n ' s  moralistic 
sense led him to separate the utility of demand theory from moral 
considerations, Hutcheson's moral world led to economic development; 
for if people performed the good offices and prudent actions dictated 
by the moral sense, then economic development would follow. Smith's 
moralistic sense led him to disregard utility, and Smith's economic
world— the process of economic development— led to the realization of
the moral world. Both authors are concerned with the relationship 
between morality and economic life, and perhaps for this reason de- 
emphaslzed utility in the moral world (for utility makes moral ques­
tions a bit easier to relegate to the background).
We can say certainly that Smith followed Hutcheson as an advocate 
of the benefits of liberty. Hutcheson and Smith also shared a desire 
to understand the relationship between economic development and the 
character and virtue of the populace. However, Hutcheson and Smith
^Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 618.
4?Paul H. Douglas, "Smith's Theory of Value and Distribution," 
Adam Smith, 1776-1926 (Chicago, 1928), p. 80,
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did diverge in their treatment of utility, H. M, Robertson and
W, L. Taylor have suggested;
It seems that there may always remain a certain rather 
fascinating aura of mystery as to why the most crucial 
elements In these Ideas (utility) were hidden in the 
background of the Wealth of Sations almost as though 
by some deliberate process of censorship.48
They seek to explain this mystery by way of Smith's attempt to
develop a long-run measure of value (which had also been suggested
by Hutcheson):
. . .  he concentrated upon what , , . appeared to him 
to be the more Important phenomenon of 'natural price' 
or normal value, for which the traditional utility 
approach appeared Inadequate.
The explanation must be that, in the Wealth of 
Nations, Adam Smith had cast his thought in a more 
ambitious role. His eyes were set, not on the trans­
ient determination of market values but on a long­
term demonstration of the causes of the variations in 
the Wealth of Nations . .
Robertson and Taylor are partially correct, and a further point 
of explanation would include the effect of moral outlook upon econo­
mic analysis. Smith was Interested in long-run movements in value 
and the wealth of nations. This long-run outlook stemmed from Smith's 
view of a long-term developmental process in the moral world. His 
long-run moral outlook directed his concern to long-run economic 
phenomena. The utility concept which is at best a short-run explana­
tion of value thus had a negligible appeal for Smith.
^®H. M. Robertson and W, L, Taylor, "Adam Smith's Approach to the 
Theory of Value," The Economic Journal. June, 1957 LXVII 168,
49Ibid.. p. 193,
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Hutcheson may have had no such aversion to short-run utility 
analysis because the moral situation of the world could Improve In 
the short-run. The main thing required was the extension of free­
dom to allow men to act upon the dictates of the moral sense,
Smith's performance has stood the test of time better than 
Hutcheson's because The Wealth of Nations can stand alone without 
moral considerations. Hutcheson's economic work la contained with­
in works on moral philosophy and constitutes a small part of Hutche­
son's writings.
However, Smith seems to follow Hutcheson*s approach (If we 
consider The Theory of Moral Sentiments) by considering the relation 
of morals and economics. Hutcheson's position Is that men's moral 
sense dictates certain duties to them (good offices, technological 
improvement) which will lead to economic development. All that men 
need is the liberty to pursue moral ends and economic development 
will follow. Smith held that man's natural eelf-lnterested drives 
would lead to economic development; the main ingredient necessary for 
this occurrence was liberty. However, through the process of devel­
opment, men would find the virtuous life advantageous in procuring 
wealth, and civilization Itself would make possible the good for man 
(tranquillity and being beloved).
LIBERAL POLITY AND CURRENT POLICY DILEMMAS 
As I have Indicated above neither Hutcheson nor Smith envisioned 
liberalism as a system of anarchy. Both men talked of specific areas 
where beneficial government action could be taken, I shall attempt 
to show In this chapter that these two classical liberals do not stand 
In any dramatic opposition to modern liberal policy. In fact, the 
classical liberals' discussions of government policy seems to be an 
origin of political liberalism. Also, I shall discuss some current 
policy Issues and their relation with liberal polity as envisaged by 
Hutcheson and Smith.
Liberal Polity, Democracy, and Distribution 
What did Hutcheson and Smith mean by liberalism? What areas of 
human activity could government properly leave alone? Liberalism 
is not simply a policy of governmental non-concern with economic 
activity. It la a policy that stems from concern with the economic 
and political ramifications of market endeavors.
Hutcheson observed that political power was baaed on property 
ownership, and to preserve the democratic element of a regime some 
plan must be worked out to prevent great concentration of wealth 
and political power. One plan that Hutcheson envisaged was the work­
ing of agrarian laws to prevent Inmoderate increases In wealth.
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And consequently when the situation of the people, 
their manners and customs, their trade or acts, do not 
sufficiently of themselves cause such a diffusion of 
property among many as is requisite for the continuance 
of the Democratick part in the constitution; there 
should be such Agrarian laws as will prevent any lninod- 
erate Increase of wealth In the hands of a few, which 
could support a force superior to the whole body.l
Expropriatlon of excess wealth is therefore one method of main­
taining democratic polity. Although the right of property ownership 
Is an essential feature of the system of natural liberty, both Hutche­
son and Smith Indicate that the public Interest may require temporary 
suspension of this right. Smith stated quite clearly that government 
was Instituted to maintain the security of property. However, on 
occasion the public interest might be better served by expropriation.
They (entails) are founded upon the most absurd 
of all suppositions, the supposition that everv suc­
cessive generation of men have not an equal right to 
the earth, and to all that it possesses; but that the 
property of the present generation should be restrained 
and regulated according to the fancy of those who died 
perhaps five hundred years ago.3
Hutcheson indicated that government would be justified in pre­
venting the enclosure of extensive tracts of land. Such enclosure 
might exclude many from gainful employment.
But as property is constituted to encourage and 
reward Industry, it can never be so extended as to
^Hutcheson, System II, 248.
2"Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security 
of property, is in reality Instituted for the defence of the rich 
against the poor, or of those who have some property against those 
who have none at all." Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 674,
3Ibld., p. 363.
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prevent or frustrate the diligence of mankind, No 
person or society therefore can by mere occupation 
acquire such a right in a vast tract of land quite 
beyond their power to cultivate, as shall exclude 
others who may want to work, , , .4
Hutcheson also advocates elimination of artificial privileges 
among the citizenry.
For the same reason, all those groundless par- 
tition-walls among citizens, confining placeB of 
power and profit to certain families or certain
orders, ought to be prevented or broke down; as they
are both the occasions of immoderate and dangerous 
wealth in these orders; and give the justest causes 
of indignation, resentment, and setting up of a sep­
arate Interest, to all those who are thus unjustly 
excluded.5
Elimination of monopolistic privilege is another method of pre­
serving a distribution of wealth which is consonant with democratic 
government. As indicated above6 Hutcheson thought that agrarian laws 
might prove unnecessary if the right to buy and sell were guaranteed
to all orders of people. In a passage from the first volume of A
System of Moral Philosophy Hutcheson opts for the maintenance of pri­
vate property rights because of favorable incentive effects. A cen­
sorial power and proper laws, of course, must accompany property 
rights to prevent criminal activity and, perhaps, usurpation of 
political power. In this passage Hutcheson discusses and rejects 
the maxim "from each according to his abilities and to each according 
to his needs" as being unworkable because of the difficulty in
^Hutcheson, System I, 326.
5Ibld., II, 248-249.
6See above, p. 112,
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compelling men to labor and the Impossibility of knowing everyoneTs 
needs.
These reasons for property, from the general 
Interest of society requiring universal diligence, 
would not hold If a wise political constitution 
could compel all men to bear their part In labour, 
and then make a wisely proportioned distribution 
of all that was acquired, according to the Indi­
gence, or merit of the citizens. But the other 
reasons would still hold from the natural sense 
of liberty, and the tender natural affections.
Such constant vigilance too of magistrates, and 
such nice discernment of merit, as could ensure both 
an universal diligence, and a just and humane dis­
tribution, Is not to be expected, Nay, no confi­
dence of a wise distribution by magistrates can 
ever make any given quantity of labour be endured 
with such pleasure and hearty good-vlll, as when 
each man is the distributer of what he has acquired 
among those he loves. What magistrate can judge of 
the delicate ties of friendship, by which a fine 
spirit may be so attached to another as to bear all 
tolls for him with joy7 Why should we exclude so 
much of the loveliest offices of life, of liberality 
and beneficence, and grateful returns; leaving men 
scarce any room for exercising them In the distri­
bution of their goods? And what plan of polity will 
ever satisfy men sufficiently as to the juat treat­
ment to be given themselves, and all who are peculiarly 
dear to them, out of the comnon stock, If all Is to 
depend on the pleasure of magistrates, and no private 
person allowed any exercise of hiB own wisdom or dis­
cretion In some of the most honourable and delightful 
offices of life? Must all men In private stations 
ever be treated as children or f o o l s ? ?
Therefore, Hutcheson supports property rights with the notion 
that a system of freedom of contract will ensure a sufficient diffu­
sion of wealth in society to maintain democratic polity. If this is 
not successful, then we may enforce agrarian laws for purposes of
?Hutcheson, System I, 322-323,
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expropriating property from the rich, This is a conditional form 
of laissez-faire doctrine. Government can perhaps leave buying and 
selling activities of Individuals alone with the hope that this policy 
will prevent great concentrations of wealth In society, The Idea 
presented here by Hutcheson Is that liberalism can distribute wealth 
more equally than feudalism or mercantilism throughout society; his 
aim Is not to legitimate vast inequalities of wealth and concentra­
tions of power, Smith takes exactly the same tack and presents 
liberalism as conscious government policy to break the grip of mono­
polistic forces in society. He presents cases of government sanc­
tioned monopolies with their corresponding pernicious effects on 
society.
A monopoly granted either to an Individual or to 
a trading company has the same effect as a Becret In 
trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping 
the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully 
supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities 
much above the natural price, and raise their emolu­
ments, whether they consist In wages or profit, greatly 
above their natural rate,®
In his chapter on "Inequalities of Wages and Profit" In The 
Wealth of Nations, Smith presents case after case In which combi­
nations of entrepreneurs or workmen lead to artificial Inequalities
g Smith, Wealth of Nations, p, 61, Smith gives another example 
of a special Interest group using government for their own enrich­
ment. "In 1688 was granted the parliamentary bounty upon the expor­
tation of com, The country gentlemen, who then composed a still 
greater proportion of the legislature than they do at present, had 
felt that the money price of c o m  was falling. The bounty was an 
expedient to raise it artificially to the high price at which it had 
frequently been sold in the times of Charles I and IX" Ibid.. p. 196,
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among men. Smith suggests that a system of natural liberty would 
lead to more equality among men, not less.
Whatever regulations, therefore, tend to Increase 
these wages and profits beyond what they otherwise would 
be, tend to enable the town to purchase, with a smaller 
quantity of Its labour, the produce of a greater quantity 
of the labour of the country. They give the traders and 
artificers In the town an advantage over the landlords, 
farmers, and labourers In the country, and break down 
that natural equality which would otherwise take place 
In the commerce which Is carried on between them. The 
whole annual produce of the labour of the society is 
annually divided between those two different sets of 
people. By means of those regulations a greater share 
of it Is given to the inhabitants of the town than would 
otherwise fall to them; and a less to those of the country.^
Hutcheson and Smith were advocating the system of natural 
liberty as a means of restoring the natural equality among men and 
preserving the democratic part of the constitution by preventing 
great concentrations of wealth.^0 However, when we use the expres­
sion lalssez-falre to describe the position of the classical liberals, 
we must not suppose that they were hostile toward government or sim­
ply opposed to government activity in the economic realm. In fact, 
the rather detailed description of proper government activity by
9Ibld., p. 125.
*®Smith states that men have pretty equal abilities at birth, 
the differences must be the result of habit and custom. Liberty, 
of course, might break down customary differences in men. "The 
difference of natural talents In different men is, In reality, much 
less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which 
appears to distinguish men of different professions, when grown up 
to maturity, Is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the 
effect of the division of labour. The difference between the most 
dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a comnon street 
porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from 
habit, custom, and education." Ibid., p. 15.
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Hutcheson and Smith points toward modern liberalism. However, Hut­
cheson and Smith believed that government should remain flexible. 
That is, flexible means should be used to pursue objective moral 
standards. Ho system of government should be rigidly enacted. 
Hutcheson points out that government is essentially an experiment, 
and the argument from antiquity in favor of any form of government 
is without merit.
Tis little to the honour of any form, and of 
little consequence to shewing it to be a Just or 
prudent, or sacred and venerable one, that It was 
the antlentest, or prevailed In the earliest ages.
There is no human contrivance that we could less 
expect to be brought to perfection at first, or in 
a short time and upon little experience, than that 
of civil polity; as the settling It well must require 
the greatest wisdom and experience. The argument of 
antiquity would recommend to us to return again to 
dens, and caves, and beasts skins, and acorns, or 
wild fruits of the earth, Instead of our present 
houses, food and cloathlng.^'
Smith's comments concerning the errors that the man of system 
12is likely to coninit Indicate that Smith also preferred a non- 
doctrinaire approach to government . Doctrinaire establishment of 
a system of government may lead to occasional discord between the 
government and the citizenry.
Hutcheson and Smith In their discussions of policy were proto­
types of modern liberals. Lalssez-falre was part of a package of 
policy recoimiendatlons. Laissez-faire was meant to reduce
^Hutcheson, System II, 258.
^Sraith, Moral Sentiments, pp. 342-343.
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monopolistic privilege and increase the wealth of nations. Govern­
ment was charged with correcting certain external effects of produc­
tive activity, interfering when necessary in affairs of business 
firms, and on occasion holding In abeyance the right of property 
ownership. Government, in fact, was to be flexible. The end of
government is the public good. " . . .  the good of the whole body,
13as all allow, is the sole end of all civil power; . . The In­
creasing wealth of nations is included as a very important part of 
the public good. "Every law should be intended for some real util­
ity to the state; and as far as human power can go, laws should
14enjoin whatever is of consequence to the general prosperity."
Alienation and Externality
Let us look at specific areas In which either Hutcheson or
Smith discussed government activity as a necessary complement of
market activity. The negative effects of technology on the lives
of individuals continues to be a matter of concern to some. Smith
clearly understands the unfortunate effects of the division of labor;
and his specific policy recommendations point toward subsidized
15universal education. However, Smith leaves government with the 
responsibility of studying and correcting this negative effect of 
improvement in productive technique.
1 1Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 285.
U Ibid., p. 318.
15Ibld., p. 737.
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The man whose whole life is spent In performing 
a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, 
perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, 
has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to 
exercise his invention in finding out expedients for 
removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally 
loBes, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and 
generally becomes as stupid and Ignorant as it is 
possible for a human creature to become . . . His
dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this
manner, to be acquired at the expense of his intellec­
tual, social, and martial virtues. But in every improved 
and civilized society this is the state Into which the 
labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must 
necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to 
prevent it .1**
Both Hutcheson and Smith agree that government Intervention into 
the actions of corporations may be necessitated by criminal activity 
and restriction of output by corporation members (although the cor­
porations referred to here were established by government charter). 
The corporations are some regulated and joint stock companies which 
were originally chartered to establish trade with distant parts of
the world. For providing this service the companies were given ex­
clusive privilege to the trade. Smith points out that once such
trade has been established, the exclusive privilege generally leads
17to mismanagement or deliberate restriction of output. Hutcheson 
suggests that If exclusive privilege leads to criminal conduct 
either the privilege should be revoked by government or perhaps 




It may sometimes be Just to take from the corpora­
tion either these privileges, or fortifications, or arms, 
by which the criminal members of it were encouraged or 
enabled to do injuries to their neighbours, if security 
against like Injuries can be obtained in no other way.
The corporation may sometimes be bound to compensate 
damages out of its publlck stock, or even the private 
fortunes of its members, when the criminals can't be 
found, or cannot repair the damage; . . .1®
The End of Liberalism?
In trying to assess the liberal political economy envisaged by
Hutcheson and Smith, we must try to understand the generally optimis-
19tic outlook for mankind that these men held.
We might follow the lead of William Ophuls who has suggested 
that a key element in Hobbes' Leviathan is the view that resources
are in short supply which forces the war of all against all in the
20state of nature. It is possible that the more sanguine outlooks 
of Hutcheson and Smith stemmed from views of resource abundance, 
although both men relied on an analysis of human nature for many
1 RHutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 329.
19"Smith . . . is a thorough representative of that optimistic 
Deism which we have seen Illustrated by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson." 
Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century 
II (London, 1902), p. 71.
Of)William Ophuls, "Leviathan or Oblivion," Toward ii Steady-State 
Economy, ed. by Herman E. Daly (San Francisco, 1973), pp. 216-217. 
Although the conclusions of Leviathan clearly proceed from Hobbes' 
analysis of the nature of man, the viewpoint of resource scarcity 
could be an underlying theme. "Competition of Riches, Honour, Com­
mand, or other power encllneth to Contention, Enmity, and War: Be­
cause the way of one Cooqietitor to the attaining of his desire, is 
to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other." Hobbes Leviathan, 
47-48. The necessity of killing competitors may be due to Hobbes' 
view of a zero-sum game.
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of their conclusions. Both men were pro-natallsts which would imply 
no concern over imminent resource limits. Smith identified pros­
perity with population Increase. "The most decisive mark of the
prosperity of any country is the increase of the number of its 
21inhabitants." Hutcheson suggested that positive encouragement be 
given to an increase in population. "Encouragement should be given 
to marriage, and to those who rear a numerous offspring to 
industry.
This increasing population advocated by Hutcheson and Smith 
does not seem to imply any decreasing per capita incomes. Hutche­
son states that the productivity of labor is fairly high compared 
to subsistence needs, and the reason for occasional low wages naist 
be In the timidity of the workers in negotiating contracts. Pro­
curing necessities should not be any problem for the great majority 
of the population.
The labours of any person sound In body and mind, 
are of much more value than the bare simple food and 
clothing of a servant; as we plainly see that such can 
purchase all this by thler labours, and something fur­
ther for the support of a family, and even for some
^Smith, Wealth of Nations. p. 70.
22Hutcheson, System II, 319. An interesting contrast can be 
made between Hutcheson and modern no-growth writers. Hutcheson con­
demned polgamy partly on the basis that it did not contribute to 
the populousness of a country. Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 
260. Garrett Hardin speculates on the desirability of polygamous 
arrangements precisely because they might lead to a stabilization 
of population size, Garrett Hardin, Exploring New Ethics for Sur­
vival (Baltimore, 1973), pp. 206-211.
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pleasure and ornament. If any one therefor has In­
cautiously insisted for no more in his contract; yet 
as the contract is plainly onerous, he has a right 
to have this inequality reduced.23
Smith was confident that the necessities of life could be ac­
quired by any laborer. The real striving of men was not for sur­
vival but for vanity.
For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle 
of this world? what is the end of avarice and ambi­
tion, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and pre­
eminence? Is it to supply the necessities of nature?
The wages of the meanest labourer can supply them 
. . . From whence, then, arises that emulation which 
runs through all the different ranks of men, and what 
are the advantages which we propose by that great pur­
pose of human life which we call bettering our condition?
To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice 
of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are 
all the advantages which we can propose to derive from 
it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, 
which interest us.
The view of nature that Hutcheson and Smith held led to some
optimism about mankind's future. Subsistence needs could be met
by the efforts of comnon labor. Lalssez-falre provided a means of
breaking down monopolistic privilege and led toward increased out-
25put and lower prices. This tends to make the real earnings of
^Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 272.
24Smith, Moral S ent intent s . pp. 70-71.
25in fact, it seems that the system of natural liberty best 
suits the purpose of growth in GNP. "It is thus that every system 
which endeavours, either, by extraordinary encouragements, to draw 
towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the 
capital of the society than what would naturally go to it; or, by 
extraordinary restraints, to force from a particular species of 
industry some share of the capital which would otherwise be employed 
in it; is in reality subversive of the great purpose which it means 
to promote. It retards instead of accelerating, the progress of the
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many people somewhat higher. Increased earnings make possible the 
more complete performance of good offices (Hutcheson) and the life 
of tranquility (Smith). In other words Increased earnings aid man 
in achieving happiness.
A pertinent question can now be asked concerning the liberal 
programme which was outlined by Hutcheson and Smith. "If economic 
growth stops (or per capita Incomes fall) will liberalism lose com­
pletely its optimistic outlook? Will liberalism cease to be a viable 
political progranme?" The scenario painted by Paul Ehrlich and many 
others suggests that rapidly depleting non-renewable resources 
coupled with increasing population growth will lead not only to an
end to economic growth but also to a decreased ability of large
26numbers to survive.
Let us assume for purposes of discussion that growth of real
GNP will come to an end in the U.S. within the next one hundred 
27years. Must we abandon the system of natural liberty developed
society toward*s real wealth and greatness; and diminishes, Instead 
of increasing, the real value of the annual produce of its land and 
labour.
All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, 
being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of 
natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord." Smith,
Wealth of Nations, pp. 650-651.
2^See Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Population Resources 
Environment (San Francisco, 1972) and Donella H. Meadows, et. al.
The Limits to Growth (New York, 1972) .
^Robert Solow points out that as yet there is no clearly per­
ceived limit to GNP production, because of the possibility of new 
resource discoveries, substitutability of one resource for the other 
in the productive process, and technological improvement. Robert M.
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by Hutcheson and Smith and embrace the authoritarian Leviathan of 
Hobbes? This is certainly a real possibility if a scramble for 
scarce resources leads to a breakdown of order. Hen do have an 
Inclination to survive, and some type of authoritarian regime may 
be necessary for the survival of large numbers. This does not, how­
ever, mean that this is the best regime or that survival Itself is 
productive of human happiness. Perhaps Hutcheson and Smith did not 
emphasize the problon of survival because it seemed evident that any 
laborer could provide for the survival needs of himself and his 
family. The provision of human happiness played a more important 
part in the works of Hutcheson and Smith than the guarantee of sur­
vival . The system of natural liberty was thought to be the best way
2ftfor men to achieve some measure of happiness. °
Solow, "What Do We Owe to the Future?" Nebraska Journal of Economics 
and Business. Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter, 1974), pp. 10-13.
Richard Easterlln suggests on the basis of thirty surveys con­
ducted in nineteen countries, that higher income means more indivi­
dual happiness. However, the surveys suggest that happiness is 
relative to perceived needs, and these needs are socially determined 
rather than being an idea of minimum survival needs. Those with a 
lot of goods relative to perceived needs tended to consider themsel­
ves very happy. Richard A. Easterlln, "Does Money Buy Happiness,"
The Public Interest (Winter, 1973), 3-9.
Smith would say that continual striving for betterment of our 
condition arises from vanity. Smith, Moral Sentiments, p. 71. How­
ever, in order for the majority of men to materially better their 
condition they must live the life of virtue required by the world of 
business. The life of virtue is a good life for man--a type of 
happiness--though not the highest happiness. For Smith the system 
of natural liberty served quite well in allowing large numbers to 
achieve perhaps the only happiness of which they were capable. Once 
again, this may point out the growth oriented nature of Smith's 
thought. Many men will seek to better their conditions under the 
system of natural liberty--their success Implies growing GNP.
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However, economic liberalism might prove very effective in 
providing necessities. If resources become increasingly scarce 
over time, liberal polity would seem to provide a fairly practical 
way for inducing efficient production of survival needs. Under a 
system of free markets very high prices (relative to other goods) 
for such necessities as food should induce farmers to bring more 
usable land under cultivation and Improve productive technique in 
order to reap high profits. Relatively high prices for necessities 
should also induce wage and salary earners to concentrate their buy­
ing power on those necessities and cut down on purchases of frills 
such as electricity, telephones, and vacations. Thus the demand for 
non-essentials (relative to survival needs) would decline, causing 
production of non-essentials to decline, freeing resources for more 
essential goods production (now in high demand).
However, some visions of the future describe a different situa­
tion than a steady increase in scarcity of resources. Same extra­
polations of present trends in resource use suggest that when many 
non-renewable resources are depleted, the population of the earth
will be much larger than can be sustained by the reduced carrying
29capacity of the globe, which results in a chaos of massive rioting. 
This scenario, if correct, seems to call for authoritarian rule 
simply to maintain order. The reason for the overshooting of limits 
of the earth by population is due to time lags in the ability of a
^^Meadows, Limits, p. 163.
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population to change Its birth rate In response to changing condi- 
30tlons. The authors of Limits suggest one of the dilemnas concern­
ing their models of the future Is the laissez-faire attitude itself.
The basic behavior mode of the world system is ex­
ponential growth of population and capital, followed by 
collapse . . . .
The unspoken assumption behind all of the model runs 
we have presented in this chapter is that population and 
capital growth should be allowed to continue until they 
reach some 'natural1 limit. This assumption also appears 
to be a basic part of the human value system currently 
operational in the real world. Whenever we incorporate 
this value into the model, the result is that the grow­
ing system rises above its ultimate limit and then collapses. 
When we introduce technological developments that success­
fully lift some restraint to growth or avoid some collapse, 
the system simply grows to another limit, temporarily sur­
passes It, and falls back. Given that first as assumption, 
that population and capital growth should not be delib­
erately limited but should be left to 'seek their own 
levels,' we have not been able to find a set of policies 
that avoids the collapse mode of behavior.31
In other words, the authors of Limits found that the absence of 
a policy of limiting short-term population and capital growth led to 
a serious famine situation and possible collapse of industrial pro­
duction as we know it in the near future. The policy recomnendation 
of these scientists is to take deliberate control of growth rates 
which means, of course, the ending of some free market activity.
Every day of continued exponential growth brings 
the world system closer to the ultimate limits to that 
growth. A decision to do nothing is a decision to in­
crease the risk of collapse. We cannot say with cer­




deliberate control of his growth before he will have lost 
the chance for control. We suspect on the basis of pre­
sent knowledge of the physical constraints of the planet 
that the growth phase cannot continue for another one 
hundred years. Again, because of the delays in the system,
If the global society waits until those constraints are 
unmistakably apparent, It will have waited too long.32
Assuming that the extrapolations of the authors of Limits are 
correct, Is economic planning at all compatible with economic lib­
eralism? Perhaps Hutcheson and Smith who helped found the programme 
of economic liberalism can provide some wisdom which would be help­
ful In discussing this potential dilemma.
The public good is the thing to be sought by government. "'Tis 
almost superfluous to examine the reasons alleged for some divinity
of one form of polity above all others. That one is truly most
33divine which is most adapted to the publlck good." If the public 
good requires abandonment of free market activity, It seems likely 
that Hutcheson and Smith would approve of such a policy. The system 
of natural liberty was not a fetish, but a tool for the public good. 
Natural liberty could be withdrawn If the situation dictated such 
action.
"But those exertions of the natural liberty of a few indivi­
duals, which might endanger the security of the whole society, are,
32Ibld. , p. 188 .
33Hutcheson, System II, 285.
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and ought to be, restrained by the laws of all governments; of the
34most free, as well as the most despotical."
The most serious problem in attempting to replace the laissez-
faire aspect of the liberal progranme with a more thoroughly planned 
economy (assuming that the authors of Limits are correct in their 
assessment of the near future and their policy recommendations) lies 
in changing the propensities of the citizenry. For instance, it 
would seem to be very difficult to persuade man to renounce the
short-term pursuit of self-interest in favor of survival needs fifty
or one hundred years hence.
’"Tis well known how hard it is to make the vulgar quit their 
own customs for such as are far better in agriculture or mechanick 
arts. And how much more difficult must it be to obtain their con­
currence in any great and noble designs of distant advantage to
3Swhole nations, when they cost much present labour and expence.
The principle of consent is also part of the public interest, 
and the willingness of the citizenry to depart from laissez-faire
34Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 308. Hutcheson makes the follow­
ing statement, again pointing out the pragmatic nature of government. 
"But as the end of all civil power is acknowledged by all to be the 
safety and happiness of the whole body; any power not naturally con­
ducive to this end is unjust; which the people, who rashly granted 
it under an error, may justly abolish again, when they find it neces­
sary to their safety to do so." Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 
302.
^Hutcheson, System II, 214.
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must be considered In discussing the feasibility of such a change.
In discussing the likelihood of a future slowing in economic growth, 
Robert Heilbroner presents the many variables that must be considered 
in forming expectations and arriving at policy recomnendations. Cer­
tainly, this approach would be approved by Hutcheson and Smith.
For the gravity of the human prospect does not hinge 
alone, or even principally, on an estimate of the dangers 
of the knowable external challenges of the future. To a 
far greater extent it is shaped by our appraisal of our 
capacity to meet those challenges. It is the flexibility 
of social classes, the resilience of socio-economic orders, 
the behavior of nation-states, and ultimately the 'nature* 
of human beings that together form the basis for our expec­
tations, optimistic or pessimistic, with regard to the 
human outlook.3?
If it becomes clear that economic growth is ending, does this 
mean that the laissez-faire aspect of the liberal progranme will end 
also? Laissez-faire may be replaced by planning if large numbers of 
citizens agree th*»t the public interest Is best served by planning. 
There is nothing in the works of Hutcheson and Smith to indicate 
that they would oppose any policy that truly served the interests 
of mankind. For Hutcheson and Smith, laissez-faire was a tool meant 
to promote the public interest. The promotion of the public interest
. . . no power generally suspected and dreaded can make a 
people, who are diffident of their most important interests, easy 
or happy; no man can justly assume to himself power over others upon 
any persuasion of his own superior wisdom or goodness, unless the 
body of the people are also persuaded of it, or consent to be sub­
jected to such power, upon some reasonable security given them, that 
the power intrusted shall not be abused to their destruction." 
Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 112.
37Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect 
(New York, 1974), p. 19.
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was Che primary purpose of the liberal programme, and the decision
to maintain or end laissez-faire policy should be made not on Ideo-
38logical grounds, but on grounds of serving the public good. This 
would be In the best pra&natlc, liberal tradition founded by Hutche­
son and Smith.
" T h e  natural end and sole purpose of all civil power, as It 
is acknowledged on all sides, where men retain any remembrance of 
their dignity as rational creatures, is the general good of the 
whole body, in which the governors themselves are included as a 
part, . . . Hutcheson, System II, 221.
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